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CHVENI GZA -- OUR PATH

ORGAN OF POLITICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE GEORGIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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THE RIGHTS OF GEORGIA

by G. A. KOBACHIDSE

The Georgian political emigration observes three national days of historical significance from recent Georgian history: Georgia's Independence Day (May 26), the Day of the Loss of Independence (February 25), and the Day of the Great Insurrection (August 29). If the first day is recalled by the Georgian people with great joy, then the last two are recalled with sadness and sorrow. And these days bring three different emotions to the fore, as if they were symbols of the Georgian past and an indication of the rights of Georgia. When Georgians recall these days, it is as if we see before us the Georgian national flag, which is made up of three colors: crimson, white and black. These colors are not only the colors of a flag, but they invoke images of Georgian life. The color of crimson occupies three-quarters of the flag's entire surface and symbolizes the Georgian shedding of blood for its freedom and independence. The remaining parts of the flag are equally divided between the white and the black. The white color symbolizes the freedom which we Georgians achieved after great difficulties. The black color is a sign of mourning and represents the suffering of the Georgian nation incurred after the loss of her freedom.

And these colors have characterized our national life for the past thirty-seven years. On May 26, 1918 Georgia was proclaimed a free and independent nation, one of the family of nations. On February 25, 1921 our Georgian land was occupied by the Russian Bolsheviks and entirely conquored. On August 29, 1924 the Georgian nation rose against the Bolsheviks and several thousands of the most ardent Georgian patriots fell in battle.

Where is Georgia? What corner of our globe does she occupy? Who are the Georgians? What type of historical past is theirs? What sort of culture is theirs? What is her spiritual life like? and what do her Sons and Daughters demand from humanity? Where are they heading and why do they carry on the struggle against the oppressors of their country?

Very few answers are given by the Free World to these questions and those, only by specialists, e. g., diplomats, geographers, historians, archeologists, etc. The average individual of the Free World is ill-informed in regard to this problem: there was a time, however, when Georgia was well known among all peoples. After the Soviet subjugation, Georgia was gradually forgotten and the new generation knows little of her history and culture. And Moscow does not want anyone to know of Georgia's history and culture. She has powerfully suppressed the voice of Georgia so that it may not be heard by the Free World. Moscow allows Georgia certain national rights — but these are not the rights that Georgia wants, but only those that Moscow needs to make propaganda abroad.

Does Georgia have the right to freedom and independence? Of course she does, despite the fact that it is a small country. Does not a small man have the same rights as the large man? It must be the same among nations. Unfortunately, life is so formed that small nations sometimes fall prey to the larger nations. When this occurs, morality calls for the other nations to help the small nation regain its independence and freedom. It is impossible to say that these small nations should be reconciled to their oppressor and forget their dreams of independence and freedom. The subjugated people will never forget their freedom and **will never cease struggling for it.** Many people think that if such a nation lives a long time under the oppression of another, then it automatically forgets its yearning for freedom and independence and reconciles itself to slow assimilation. If some nation lives for 50, 100 or more years under the domination of another, the Free World comes to believe that they belong to the oppressor and they do not try to defend that nations right to freedom. But the oppressed nation will never forget its freedom even if it lives through a thousand years of subjugation. There are many examples in history to support this idea. The first that comes to mind is the Turkish Empire. In this empire there were many people subjugated by the Turks in the fifhteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth cent. And these people never ceased their struggle for freedom and independence. And several of these people achieved their freedom 100, 200, even 300 years later. Ex-

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amples of this are the Greeks, Bulgarians, Caucasian people, etc. It would be illogical if someone would say: Since these people have lived for so long under the Turks, they do not need independence and freedom. And it would be further evidence of this illogicalness if some one should add: Since these people have lived for so long under the yoke of subjugation, they have lost their right to freedom and independence. Another example comes to mind in the Jews. Israel lost her independence in 44 A.D. and only achieved it again in 1948, that is, 1,904 years later. And in the course of these years, how many misfortunes, how much of unhappiness and difficulties did the Jewish people suffer. But she always sought to gain again her lost independence. This indicated that the desire and striving for freedom and independence never died and proves that **it is impossible to suppress this longing.** It redounds to the advantage of the United States that she recognized and helped Israel. And logic requires that if we helped Israel acquire her independence after almost 2,000 years, then we recognize the rights to independence and freedom of Georgia and other nations. Some lost their independence only a short time ago.

Is it possible for Georgia to exist as an independent state or not? Whoever knows Georgian economy, the energy of her people, their administrative abilities, the vast amounts of natural resources (coal, oil, etc.) must agree that it is possible for Georgia to exist as an independent nation. All conquorers sought to subdue Georgia because of its great wealth and strategic position. If Georgia is left in peace, its wealth unexploited by foreign conquorers, then she could create her own independent state and independent life. She could carry out economic and commercial relations with all nations; her great natural wealth may be exported for those commodities that are necessary for her economy. For example, the Baltic lands are smaller in territory and have less natural resources, but they lived well until subjugated by the Soviet Union. During their period of freedom, they carried out relations with other nations; they exported and imported and thus maintained a stable economy. Another example is Luxemburg. It is a nation fifteen times smaller in area and twenty times smaller in population; and it is less wealthy than Georgia. But it exists and so long as its commercial and economical relations continue and it is allowed to develop in peace, it will continue to exist.

The Russian political emigration preaches that the people of the Soviet Union remain intact in some sort of federation after the liberation from Bolshevism and they tell the Georgian people that they would be much better off in such a federation. This is not so! For Georgia to develop economically, it is not necessary that she be allied with another nation politically. In the economic development it is only necessary that Georgia be allowed to trade freely with the other nations. It is not true that — as the Russian emigration puts it — in a federation of several nations, each nation can supply the whole with the commodities that are lacking. That is, a federation would be self-sufficient. As is known, the Soviet Union contains sixteen republics. They should have no difficulties in supplying all the necessities of life for their populace. However, we know that the Soviet Union must buy a great deal abroad because they cannot supply their own people from their own resources!

Actually, the Russian political emigration fears that Georgia might break away from Russia and enter an alliance with Turkey. This hypothesis is tendacious and not very plausible. It is not possible to believe that modern-day Turkey is the same Turkey of fifty or even twenty years ago. Times have changed and so has Turkey, both politically and culturally.

Turkey started to draw nearer Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century. This was during the reign of Sultan Mustapha III (1757-1774). He was an antagonist of slavery and freed many slaves who found themselves under Turkish control. He also established financial reforms within the Turkish Empire and introduced many significant cultural changes in Turkish cultural life: He opened a public library in Constantinople, many schools and hospitals. He concluded a commercial treaty with Prussia in 1761; in general, he wanted to draw his nation closer to the West. His reforms were halted by the first Russian-Turkish War (1768-74). But his successors and the succeeding Turkish governments never lost this spirit of reforms and they were able to carry out many new reforms.

Modern-day Turkey is a highly civilized state and it is difficult to believe that they are intent upon subjugating the Caucasian people in the future. On the contrary, we believe that the Turks will seriously try to create a buffer state of Caucasian people between her and Russia. This is the immediate aim of Turkey. One can venture the supposition that the cause of Turkey's restiveness is the huge Russian collosus which stands threateningly at her border, ready to swallow her. Turkey now realizes that it was her former policy of imperialism, which forced Georgia into the Russian orbit. Therefore, she will not repeat her mistakes in the future. Turkey's new policy was evident during the First World War. With sympathetic understanding and practical aid, Turkey helped Georgia and the other Caucasian people shore up their independence. Turkey returned to Georgia all the southern lands. She had occupied these lands for approximately 250 years. By a trick of fate, these lands are again Turkey's because

Lenin, after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, saw fit to return them to Turkey.

The argument of the Russian emigration for federation continues by asserting that the Turks, rather than return land to Georgia, will want to claim still more land. And that it will only be as part of a federation that Georgia will be able to retain her land. These are rather specious words and empty promises. We Georgians believe that, after the overthrow of Bolshevism, the Turks will not only not take more land but will restore that part of Georgia now under her control to an independent Georgia, as she did during the First World War.

The Russian emigration also tells us that the United States considers Turkey one of her most trustworthy allies and, as a reward, she will give Turkey parts of the Caucasian territory after the next war. It is impossible to believe that a humane and cultured United States would stoop to such actions; we are convinced that the United States would never give any part of Georgia to any of her allies and for the Russian emigration to suggest such a thing is calumny. Turkey certainly does not need the territory of Georgia as a reward. Turkey's aim in any future war will not be territorial aggrandizement but self-protection in the face of a Russian attack. She has enough land; even if her population should increase five times, she would still have enough land without casting covetous eyes on that of her neighbors. If she manifests any tendencies in this direction, the appropriate international organization would bring her to her senses. But all these difficulties will be settled between Turkey and her Caucasian neighbors; they can live freely and neighborly with one another. To threaten Georgia and her Caucasian neighbors with Turkish aggrandizement is quite foolish and lacks any foundation in facts.

What do the Georgians and other Caucasian people want from the Free World, especially from the United States, as the leader of the Free World? As we know, each non-Russian nation dreams, not only of attaining freedom from Bolshevism, but also of throwing off the shackles of Russian imperialism. None of these people want to remain within the Russian orbit after the overthrow of Bolshevism, and, undoubtedly, a struggle will take place between the republican and monarchistic elements within Russia. And, in addition, the overthrown Bolsheviks will undertake an underground struggle to restore themselves to power. All Russia will probably be in a terrible state of chaos. Such a state of affairs will not take place among the non-Russian people. They will begin, as they did in 1917, to restore their own independent states, and, at this moment, such international organizations as the U.N.O. will have to defend the rights of these people to form their independent states.

Why is it impossible to speak of these future problems now? That view that America does not want to promise independence to non-Russian people because it does not want to alienate the Russians and thus lose their support — is a one-sided, foolish evaluation. We can look at this problem in another way. If America will not promise national independence to the non-Russian peoples, it will lose the support of the latter who are more numerous and more powerful than the Russians. We are sure that the America has considered the problem judiciously and that at the decisive moment they will not err in evaluating the strength of the two camps. In addition, no one must forget the fact that if the pheripheral peoples will be separated from Moscow, then the center will be paralyzed. But for these peripheral peoples to separate themselves from the center, we must promise them independence and freedom. America accepts the fact that people subjugated by the Bolsheviks since 1939 will automatically receive their independence and freedom. But why is it impossible to also act in this fashion toward the people who were subjugated prior to this date? For example, the Georgians, Armenians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, etc. Where is the logic in this position?

The contemporary international situation is distinguished by the prevelance of the idea of co-existence. Of course, each nation is interested in peace. We, too, can dream of peace but we also know that any prognosis of co-existence with Bolshevism is quite without foundation. It is like the story of Senator Knowland, who said that the turkey can co-exist with his master freely and without fear; however, when Thanksgiving Day arrives, the master will put an end to this freedom and bravery by chopping off the turkey's head. And when Bolshevism is completely prepared, then they, too, will attempt to chop off the head of the Free World. It is much better that the Free World, at its convenience and in its own time, pick up the axe and do exactly what the Bolsheviks would like to do to us.

EUGENE P. GEGETCHKORI THE NATIONS LAWYER AND STATESMAN

by J. GOLDMAN

Eugene Petrovich Gegetchkori died unexpectedly in Paris last June. He was the most colorful figure among the Georgian Patriots, one who enjoyed his people's affection, the sincere friendship of all Caucasians, and the respect of his Russian political opponents. He was the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs during her independence and, later, served in the same post in the government-in-exile. After the death of Noah Jordania (1953), the President and Founder of the Georgian Republic, he assumed his duties and was recognized as the undisputed leader of the Georgian emigrants. He was on intimate terms with N. Jordania, one of his most active helpers in rebuilding a free Georgia. This period of restoration of the Independent National State will undoubtedly receive complete historical evaluation, and when this occurs an honorable place is reserved for Gegetchkori in this chapter of Georgia's history.

However, as long as the country is occupied by a foreign power, the people chained, spiritually and physically, it is premature to attempt any comprehensive evaluation. The complete story will be written only after the liberation, when all documents and facts are at the disposal of historians. Nevertheless, a review of Gegetchkori's life by a contemporary might be of considerably public interest, since his life epitomized all the stages of our national life, both in the period of Georgia's incorporation in the Russian Empire, as well as in the period of her Independence. No other Georgian statesman personified the Russo-Georgian situation and contributed to its amelioration and standarization as Gegetchkori did.

Gegochkori was born in Georgia in 1882. This was the period when the Russian Emperor, Alexander III, introduced the extremely reactionary absolutism into Russia, which was combined with the policy of unlimited intolerance toward the so-called national minorities, i. e., the non-Russian subjects of the Empire. Alexander III sought to exterminate the national feelings and ideals of these minorities by systematic Russification and brutal oppression.

As a youth Gegotchkori had to face the abnormal conditions which were established in Georgia by the decrees of the Imperial Government. Following the general orders of Russification, the local administration did not allow the Georgian schools to be opened; even more, the use of the Georgian language and the teaching of Georgian history and literature in the existing Russian schools was proscribed. As is well known, any proscription supported by force and punishment rather than by explanation is a bad educator. Youth cannot be easily silenced, especially in matters of national dignity and pride. They asked for the reasons behind the prohibition, but received no answer in school. Therefore, our Georgian youth sought for an explanation outside and found it in the elements of national resistance.

Gegetchkori followed the same path. He attended a Russian high school and, as his fellow students, contacted the cultural organization of national opposition to supplement his knowledge of Georgian history.

For the young pupil this was not simply an opportunity to attend historical lectures, but was his first contace with constitutional law, its origin and abuses. Here he discovered that the incorporation of Georgia into the Russian Empire — and the subsequent oppresion — was illegal. Georgia had concluded in 1783 a treaty of friendship with Russia which guaranteed her independence. The Russian emperor had abrogated this treaty in 1801 and annexed Georgia. This was carried out under the pretext of avoiding domestic quarrels as to the ascension to the throne. He, the tsar, would be the heir of the Georgian kin. He assumed the title "King of Georgia" and abolished the name of Georgia. Therefore, instead of protecting Georgia's independence — even in the sense of a personal union — the tsar annulled it completely.

This tale of the abrogation of an historical treaty, without provocation or guilt on the part of Georgia, was indelibly impressed on the mind of young Gegetchkori. This was the first impulse which made him decide to study law and become a lawyer and defender of the civil rights of his people His graduation from high school opened the door to a university education. However, there were no universities, colleges or law schools in Georgia or, for that matter, in any other place in the Caucasus. The Caucasian youth had to go to Russia, thousands of miles from home, because the establishment of high educational institutions in the Caucasus would have run counter to the government's Russification policy. The Russian Government hoped that Georgian students would be reconciled to the Russian rule during their studies in these universities and, thus, prevent the creation of a nationalist movement. The hopes of the government were not fulfilled. The universities were under Western influence and did not share the reactionary trend of the government.

Young Gegetchkori was most interested in his studies at the university. He was supplied with a knowledge of Law as well as an insight into the

Russian intelligentsia's attitude to current problems of the Empire. His professors of Law were all admirers of the liberal Court Reform of 1864, which finally provided for open trials and jury system, an independent judiciary, and the right to independent counsel. In Western Europe these institutions were long regarded as the elementary requisites of civil rights and justice; to the Russian Government at the turn of the century they seemed too liberal. Scholars have reviewed the theory and practice of this reform not without sadness, since the government tried to subvert it, returning the country to pre-1864 conditions. The enthusiastic student Gegetchkori soon learned to his great astonishment that this judical reform did not extend to Georgia. His native land, whose culture was more than 2,000 years old, was not allowed to enjoy the elementary civil rights. There was no court procedure in the Georgian language, no jury, and no Bar Association. These were forbidden in the attempt at complete Russfication. For the young student of law this was a debasement of national pride and history and not merely discrimination. When his mood of passive resistance developed into active legal opposition, he joined the social-democratic movement.

* * *

The Georgian Social-Democratic Party was an opposition party of the majority of the people. It showed no tendency toward identification with one particular economic class. Technically it was a regional organization of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, however, it differed drastically in practice. The Russian Social-Democrats presented the political views of the labor class and made efforts to organize workers. Georgia was not very industrialized at that time and the number of workers was limited; the country was and still remains agricultural, a country of peasants and artisans. The Georgian Social-Democrats had to appeal to the whole nation in order to win political influence. They devoted more time to organisational work than to theoretical discussions, going from village to village and talking to everybody — peasants, workers, artisans, and small shop owners. Their program was simple and understandable: freedom, civil rights, and higher living standards. They wanted to use peaceful legal means democratically; they rejected force, terror, dictatorship. The Party gained the sympathy of the majority of the people and left no room for any Bolshevik activity. For example, as early as 1904 Stalin had to leave his country because his propaganda had no chance for success. Georgia became the bastion of the Georgian Social-Democrats and retained this position until the invasion by the Russian Red Army in 1921. The Party really represented the entire nation. This was proven in the Duma (Russian Parliament) elections, despite the discriminatory provision of the reactionary election law against socialists. Later free democratic elections gave the Party 110 of the 130 seats in the Georgian Constitutional Assembly during the period of independence.



EUGENE P. GEGETCHKORI (1882-1954)

Its national character attracted young Gegetchkori to this party. His dream was to be a lawyer for his people, not only for individuals and groups. He considered the practice of law as a political duty and honor and not merely a profession. He was soon able to carry out his ideas. It was in the tumultuous period of 1905 — 1906 when the first Russian revolution was suppressed with unbelievable severity. In Georgia the government suspended all the civil rights which had just been granted and persecuted mercilessly thousands of innocent people. Legal help was urgently needed, and Gegetchkori did his best. Young, courageous, dynamic, eloquent and cautious in tactics and expressions, he won popularity and appreciation. In a few short years his dream came true: he became the People's lawyer and was sent to Petersburg as an elected member of the Third Duma. He had just reached the age of 25.

* * *

Membership in the Third Duma was an honour but an immense responsibility. The Russian Parliament had appeared as a result of the 1905 Revolution. It was not favored by the Russian Monarch, since he considered himself the symbol of imperial absolutism and would not be reconciled with the idea of a constitutional monarchy. For this reason the First and Second Duma were in session for only two or three months and then dissolved as not being sufficiently loyal. A new electoral law, which reduced the role of the non-Russian nationalities, was promulgated without the Duma's consent. In this way the government achieved the desired conservative-reactionary majority in the Third Duma. This was convoked in the fall of 1907 and served the full five years.

For Gegetchkori, the young lawyer and Georgian Socialist, it was a difficult task to act in such an atmosphere. He had to be firm in those statements which reflected the views of voters and in his criticism of the government; at the same time he had to bear in mind that he was a parliamentarian in an absolute state and preserve a diplomatic role so that he might not provoke his expulsion or create a pretext for dissolving the Duma. The people of the vast Empire preferred a Duma with minimal power to no Duma at all.

Gegetchkori's every step, every word, every contact was watched; he knew this and remained calm. He lost his temper but once, and it occured in such a way that it was sympathetically received. From the Duma floor he requested the government "to change its spy (political police agent) because he had gotten tired of his face."*

This was his scorn of the entire political system, his protest against the violation of the deputies' immunity, even though he sounded like an indignant aesthete — which he was. Even the Police were sympathetic and, thereafter, often changed their agent. However, he remained allergic to police agents all his life.

The Third Duma presented to Gegetchkori the best opportunity of understanding the basic political aims of the Russian people and the Russian administration. Although the Conservatives were in the majority in the Duma, all of the Russian parties were represented; their political platforms were different from time to time, but on one point a rare unanimity was demonstrated — this was in their treatment of the nationalities problem. The Russian Government insisted that a nationalities problem did not exist in the Russian Empire because of Russian nationalism, which encouraged assimilation and promoted Russification. They simply could not understand that other non-Russian nations in the Empire had a right to their own nationalism. This attitude may be explained partly by the ntolerance of the extreme right. deputies and partly by the primitive ignorance of some of the delegates as well as by the strange ideological approach of numerous highly educated members of the Duma. The latter believed either in the immaculate protective character of the Russian Monarch's power, which derived from the Lord and which could not be criticized, or in Russian Messianism, which had developed from Pan-Slavism and was supported to some extent by Russian religious concepts. The Russian peasants considered austerity, humbleness, and even suffering a sacred virtue (there is a Russian song: Show me the holy place where the Russian peasant would not suffer). Such a people must be the bearers of Messianism.

For all these reasons the Third Duma accepted Russian supremacy and acted accordingly. During his membership in the Russian Legislature Gegetchkori saw how the legitimate rights and desires of the non-Russian nationalities were disregarded. Thus, the Third Duma passed a bill to restrict Finnish autonomy, which had been restored in 1905, and extended the All-Russian Imperial laws to Finland in violation of all previous treaties. The use of the Polish language in Polish schools was legally forbidden; the autonomous government (zemstvo) in the western districts with a prevailing non-Russian population was to have a Russian majority, and so on.

In this atmosphere of ignorance and ill will what could the enthusiastic Georgian representative do for his country? This question was uppermost in Gegetchkori's mind during the five years he sat in the Duma. To incite the people to revolt, to acts of disobedience, to passive resistance, would be a crime against the people. The Duma would express no sympathy and would suppress the revolt in the bloodiest manner. No revolution originating and carried out in Georgia alone would be successful. Another way had to be found — a way of evolution, influencing the internal policy in the direction of democratization, getting other nationalities, non-Russian as well as Russian, to understand the nationalities problem, winning friends for democracy and for the national cause.

These were the lessons Gegetchkori learned by participating in the Duma for five long and turbulent years. He came to Petersburg as an ardent young lawyer who worked for his people; he went home as a mature, experienced statesman who knew how things looked from the tower in Tiflis, capital of Georgia, and how they were considered in the Winter Palace (the Tsar's residence) and in the Tavride Palace (the seat of the Duma) in Petersburg.

Now he possessed an excellent knowledge of Russian intentions and of the nascent possibilities.

* This episode so impressed a British observer that he mentioned it 24 years later. Bernard Pares, **My Russian Memories**, London 1931 p. 173

He made many friends, whom he respected and who respected him; some did not agree with him but they were still ready to discuss problems of individual freedom, national self-determination, and home rule. He was convinced that the solution of the Georgian problem was only a question of time and that it could be achieved in a democratic, constructive way, despite the reactionary trend of those days. The decision depended upon the development of a democratic western ideology in the Empire and a halting of the destructive, reactionary elements.

This time came sooner than anybody expected. The March Revolution of 1917 in Russia, unexpected and unprepared, was rather a derailment of the Monarchial train; it could have been avoided if the whole political system was not so unwise and so corrupt and demoralized as to be incapable of necessary reforms. If there was to be a revolution no worse time could have been chosen: Russia was at war with Germany, and there was no Russian political party strong enough or properly organized to assume power in the vast Empire. The conservative parties had lost the people's confidence — if they ever possessed it. The democratic and liberal parties attracted many sympathizers, but traditionally had no extensive organization or practical leaders who were capable of political action and intensive efforts.

During the March events Gegetchkori was at his home town of Kutais, Georgia. He was suspicious of the rumors and the news of the disorders in Petersburg. He would have preferred a legal governmental change and the establishment of democratic rule in a normal parliamentary way. But the Tsarist Regime lost the opportunity for peaceful evolution — by March, 1917 it was already too late.

Gegetchkori knew the weakness of the Russian democratic parties and was therefore sceptical as to whether they would succeed. He greeted the revolution warmly, but he was not overjoyed. He appealed to his nation to accept the change with dignity and calmness, to avoid disorder, terror, intolerance toward Russian officials and people. The Georgian people responded to his appeal brilliantly. Upon regaining their freedom they immediately showed hospitality toward their opressors of yesterday. In fact, Georgia had not known the horors of the so-called revolutionary activity with which the other parts of the Empire were familiar.

Gegetchkori was called to Petersburg to support the democratic elements. Meanwhile, Lenin appeared with his Bolshevik cohorts and immediately attempted to exploit Russian Messianism and to overthrow the Provisional Government. Gegetchkori began the fight against Bolshevism with his customary vigor. Already on June 9, 1917, in addressing a session of the Petersburg Soviet, he shouted to the Communist faction: "Take your dirty hands off a glorious cause." He called on the industrial shops and military camps every day to explain the true nature of Bolshevism and the hollowness of their claims. The first attack of the Bolsheviks failed in the first week of July. However, this success was temporary and could not be maintained because the Russian democracy was not prepared to fight.

Gegetchkori returned to join N. Jordania, the leader of the Georgian nation, and his work to salvage the best from the near Civil War and anarchy in the Russian Empire. Events in Russia were watched closely and appropriate preparations were made.

When word was received that the Bolsheviks had usurped power on November 7, 1917, the reaction in Tiflis was spontaneous; the Communists were sharply condemned and all Transcaucasia refused to recognize their power. Within two weeks an independent local government, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, was established. There was no doubt that Gegetchkori was the most authoritative person to lead this government. He was a champion in the anti-Communist fight; he was the advocate of legal evolution, neighborly friendship and mutual tolerance; he pleaded for the triumph of free democracy. The Bolsheviks received no support from the Georgians and were forced to use the Russian Army in Tiflis. But Gegetchkori appeared in person to addresss the Army Congress. He pointed out the Bolshevik faction and said: "Here are the traitors of democracy, here are the agents of the tsarist secret police" — and named them. The Bolsheviks were defeated, and when they tried to capture power as they had done in Petersburg, it was too late. The Georgian National Guard had already seized the munitions depots. The Bolsheviks left Tiflis and fled to Baku. Gegetchkori, with the active help of the Georgian people and with the support of the other Transcaucasian people, destroyed the Bolshevik embryo in Georgia in 1917 and made the democratic system secure until the invasion of the Red Army.

* * *

Shortly after the proclamation of Georgia independence, Gegetchkori was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He occupied this position during the period of independence and then in the government-in-exile. He was remarkably successful. He gained the recognition of Georgia by most of the nations of the world (except the United States, where the Russian problem was confused at that time). Even Soviet Russia recognized Georgia's sovereignty.

This was a difficult , but for Gegetchkori a comparatively simple job since this was his favored field law. The legal basis for Georgian independence could not be disputed. It was historically

correct and contained all constitutional requirements. The Georgian people expressed their desire to be independent in their elections to the Georgian National Assembly. Their political maturity was reflected in the Georgian Constitution, which contained provisions for a free democracy, civil rights, private property, individual initiative, and neutralism in international affairs. The administrative ability of the Georgian government was demonstrated by a moderate agrarian reform and by organizing a disciplined army. World opinion was indeed favorable.

Gegetchkori was satiffied, but his hatred of communism did not cease, and he sought the support of other nations and of the League of Nations. This spurred on the aggressiveness of Soviet Russia. The treaty concluded with the Russian Soviet State in 1921 was broken in the same way as the Russian Imperial State had broken the Treaty of 1801.

At our last meeting — a few weeks before his death — Gegetchkori complained to this writer: "I wanted freedom and good government so much for Georgia, government as Abraham Lincoln understood it: of the people, by the people, for the people. Tell this to our friends in the United States."

Gegetchkori did not have the Lord's Grace to see a free Georgia. However, his old nation will survive these evil times and will again taste freedom. Then it will remember the name of Gegetchkori, the great Georgian statesman, with reverence and gratitude.

AGRICULTURE POLICY AND RE-SETTLEMENT IN OCCUPIED GEORGIA

by SAM TREDELLY

Since its occupation by the Red Army, Georgia, incorporated into the social structure of the USSR, represents one of the sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics of which the actual Soviet Empire is composed.

The Georgian Soviet Republic stretches over a territory of 76,206 km², a surface which surpasses in size many European countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Ireland, etc.

According to the latest census (1939) the popuation of Georgia consists of 3,542,000 persons of both sexes. From among them 1,066,000 (30.1 per cent) form the urban and 2,476,000, the rural population.

With regard to the number of its population, Georgia is equal to the above-mentioned European countries, or such countries in Central or South America as Guatemala, Esuador, Haiti, Uruguay, etc. The density of Georgia's population reaches 46.5 or even 80-90 persons per square kilometer in some areas.

From the argicultural point of view, Georgia is a land of tillage and stock-raising. Neither in former days nor today has the cattle-raising been encouraged by the government by teaching adequate methods, the use of machinery, technical knowledge or subsidies. The cattle was controlled by Russian officials, who followed the old patterns of Russia in raising cattle, so entirely different from Georgia in soil, climate and other conditions connected with agricultural problems. Georgia's rural economy obtained even less support from the Soviet Government than has its industry, even though such support was granted other territories of the former Russian Empire. That is why, despite the high level of its natural resources, the Georgian population derived very low income from its agriculture. During the thirty-four years of Soviet rule in Georgia, despite the very broad propaganda of the Soviets as to their achievements in rural economy, the agricultural production did not increase in comparison to the growth of its population, but has even decreased. Let us cite a few examples.

Sown areas in Georgia:
- In 1913 ..... 741,000 hectares
- In 1938 ..... 785,000 hectares

Population:
- In 1914 ..... 2,140,000 persons
- In 1939 ..... 3,542,000 persons

Thus, the increase of sown areas (within twenty-five years) was 32 percent while the increase in population during the same time was 65 percent.

It is deplorable that the same picture prevails in another important branch of rural economy in Georgia, namely stock raising. The increase in cattle raising did not keep pace with the population increase. This can be explained by a lack of feeds as a consequence of backward husbandry (as we indicated above) and also by the Soviet inability to take into account the experience of the local population in cattle breeding, e. g., the utilization of vast territories of Georgian soil for pasture lands.

Amount of horned cattle in Georgia:
- In 1913 ..... 1,144,000 units
- In 1940 ..... 1,556,000 units

Thus, the increase in cattle raising was 36 percent while the increase in population was 65 percent.

On the other hand, those products of rural economy which are scarce in the central and northern parts of the USSR, because of the severe climate or incapability of the Russians to produce them, are preferentially treated by the authorities. Such agricultural products are: tobacco, tea, citrus trees, etc.

	1913	1946
Plantations of tobacco	10,000 hectares	16,000 hect.
Plantations of tea	894 hectares	51,000 hect.
Plant. of citrus trees	500 hectares	19,000 hect.

The increase in tobacco growth was 60 percent, tea, 5,100 percent, and in citrus trees, 3,800 percent. Such exclusive support of agricultural products which are needed by central Russia is not only arbitrary but is contrary to the constitution (page 14). It follows therefore that the central government of the USSR is allocating the budget for the national branches of agriculture quite arbitrarily in all republics of the union.

As a result of its exclusive control of the national economy, the Moscow regime has brought new settlers — mainly Russians — into Georgia (and other Soviet Republics) who are foreign to the population. It is no secret that the introduction of foreign elements into Georgia can not be justified by the industrial increase alone, but is dictated by the Soviet desire to expel the native population from their beautiful homeland under fantastic and accusatory pretexts and to resettle these areas primarily with the Russians. In connection with this policy Georgians are obliged to seek work beyond the borders of their homeland; there they are considered politically unreliable and are forcibly deported to the very distant places in the USSR. According to a muster roll of 1926 38.7 persons per square kilometer (in some places even 65 persons) lived in the territory of Georgia, while in the USSR proper there were 6.9 persons per square kilometer. Despite these facts, Georgia had to admit new settlers from other areas of the USSR, especially from Great Russia. This number amounted to 3,4 percent of the total population of Georgia, according to statistics from 1922; according to the muster roll of 1939 the number of Russian settlers in Georgia increased to 8,7 percent.

The Georgian land is being artificially Russified. There never was such a high rate of foreign elements in Georgia as now. According to official Soviet data from 1934, i. e., more or less thirteen years since the Georgian occupation, the population was distributed nationally in the following way:

	Georgians (percent.)	Non-Georgians (percent.)
a) In industry	51.2	48.8
b) In construction	21.6	78.4
c) In agriculture	33.0	67.0
d) In offices	42.5	57.5*

After the Second World War the flow of foreign elements increased, especially of Russians. That is why the Georgians do not feel at home upon their own soil — especially since all those who rule the country are foreigners, representatives of the Moscow regime.

The Georgian people do not look at figures, nor do they understand the numerous statistics. However, everything that occurs in everyday life is carefully registered in their minds and is being compared with not too distant past, when the Georgian was better off materially, was not made mockery of morally, and enjoyed full rights as a citizen of the Independent Democratic Republic of Georgia.

Soviet falsehoods and their loud propaganda do not mislead the people; they comprehend even more clearly the difference between what is reported and what is printed officially — and reality.

* See **Socialnoe stroitelstvo USSR** (SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF USSR) Moscow, 1935, p. 538.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAUCASUS

by JOHN NANUASHVILI

The political importance of the Caucasus comes from the military features of its geography and the influence of these factors on the neighboring countries.

When we speak of the military and political importance of the Caucasus, we must state categorically that the Caucasus forms a single, complete, indivisible area — a desirable object for all elements interested in the fate of the Near East and the south of Russia.

When I refer to various parts of the Caucasus in this article, I am speaking of the military features and employing the ethnographical names of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and am considering their military situation in relation to the entire Caucasus and its significance on the basis of the entire Caucasian indivisible happenings. If they are treated as separate units, the Caucasus loses all mapor military importance and beromes only a plaything of local interests concenrned with border defense. This aspect of our country is well illustrated by the century-long history of the Caucasus.

The political significance of the Caucasus is an entirely different matter when its people are free and when they are not controlled by a non-Caucasian people. But in the hands of some

aggresive state, it offers an ideal military base for the conquest of the entire Near East and is a threat to the entire area. We must study both of these aspects to learn what the Caucasus means today for its neighbors and, indeed, for the entire world. These military and political features of the Caucasus derive from the geographical position, which is, in turn, conditioned by topography.

We can be sure that all Caucasians have a good knowledge of the Caucasus and its geography, but those features which furnish the basis of its military importance must still be mentioned. The geographical Caucasus includes the area between the Caspian and Black Seas, bordered on the north by the rivers Kumy, Manich, and the lower Don. The southern boundary runs along the southern boudaries of the republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. From the point of view of military operations, from the north the inaccessibility of the Caucasus proper defends it from the adjacent regions. The defensive line of the Caucasus really begins at the city of Anapa on the shore of the Black Sea, Novorossiysk Region, and extends to the south-east, ending on the Aspheron peninsula (Baaku Harbor). Its highest point is Mt. Elbrus, 5,633 meters above sea level. Here there are only six surfaced roads: (1) along the western slopes, (2) the Sukhum-Batalpashinsk, over the Glukhom Pass, (3) the Kutais-Oni-Alagiy road and the Mimisoni Pass, (4) the Military Ossete road over the Roki Pass, and, (6) the road along the east slopes of the Caucasus. The first five roads and their passes are in Georgia. The height of the passes varies from 3,132 to 3,345 meters.

The entire Caucasian ridge forms an ideal mountain area for position warfare and total defense. It is possible to do over to the attack and make a strategic deployment to the north through the passes. It is interesting, in this respect, that in the entire history of Georgia no conqueror has forced the passes from the north.

The Caucasian passes were first crossed by the generals of Genghis Khan, Chepe and Sabuday in 1223 when they moved for the first time into Russia. The second time was in 1921 when the Soviet Russians crossed the undefended Mamisoni Pass.

From the south the Caucasus devolves into a series of lower ridges extending between the Black Sea and Persia. The highest of these is Ararat, 5,156 meters. In the region of the Little Caucasus there is a comparatively heavy river system, which provides a considerable number of roads. The valleys of the Kur, the Mes (Arax) and the headwaters of the Tscozsh are very close, almost joining the headwaters of the rivers Tigris and Orontes. Another century-old strategic road leads to Syria and the Persian Gulf. In this sector there is a second series of roads leading from the Eastern Caucasus and connecting with several historical highways. Over these roads and through these valleys passed the stormy history of the Near East. This region promises again, possibly in the near future, to be the scene of the clash of great hosts. While it is true that this region of the Little Caucasus is not so impregnable as the Great Caucasus and that this area has a system of passable roads, still the military possibilities in its elevation and the mountains themselves make it possible for a small, determined group to protect themselves against their opponent's technical superiority.

As a result of the geographical position, the Caucasus provides a large quadrangle complete with positive means for carrying out its own defense. So, in the event of a struggle, the Caucasian area will free a considerable body for active combat. The terrain offers an economical use of tactical forces and a means of carrying out a long passive struggle.

We speak of this from a military man's point of view. However, the key to this Caucasian power is a free Caucasus, and the means to its defense. The role of the Caucasus is to be an unbreakable gate to the whole Near East. These geographical conditions furnish an excellent means for using an active force while preparing reliable means of opposition. Nature has provided a strong citadel. The main role in the Caucasian area falls to the western part, i. e., a Free Caucasus, whose defensive position in the Near East would be a defensive gate. The results of all these territorial advantages have not been used by the separate native peoples. They cannot do so entirely, but more of that later. Here we must emphasize one fact: while the technical level of the Twentieth Century has reduced the significance of separate fortified points, the importance of the Caucasus — the special result of natural conditions — is increasing and not diminishing along with the technical improvements.

The military qualities of the Caucasus are not growing smaller because of its natural geographical position. This position creates its military value and, in the same way, the military value creates its political importance. When the entire Caucasus is in the hands of an aggressive military power, than the importance of the Caucasus is magnified, since it is an excellent military base for carrying out an aggressive war against the Near East. But why? Since the Caucasus is not the center of the Near East, but is outside of the area, actually in the north. The fact is that the roads that lead into the Near East radiate from the Caucasus. They lead to the port of Alexandria and to the Persian Gulf (the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and also the territory of Persia). Over this historical road in the past came the Turks, who held these roads for three centuries.

In the eighties of the nineteenth century efforts were made to build highways and roads. There were no barriers in any direction, and railroads were planned for the lesser passes. The highways are adaptable for motor traffic. More than this, a very extensive regular economic traffic goes over these roads. At the present time this military base (the Caucasus) is a firm bastion for an attack on the Near East. In ancient history the value of this military base was demonstrated clearly during the domination of the Arabs and of Tamerlane. The expulsion of the Arabs from the Caucasus began under David the Restorer (1089-1125) in the east, while the Crusaders attacked from the south. An independent kingdom remained. After long and sanguine battles, David the Restorer gradually freed all Georgia from the Arabs. With the assistance of the mountain areas he also secured Tiflis from attack and destroyed the emirate of Tiflis. Tamerlane's case was also typical. A Caucasian conquest provided Tamerlane with the opportunity of overthrowing the Golden Horde on the banks of the Volga completely. It made him the ruler of the entire Near East. To achieve this goal, Tamerlane gave the Georgians direct communications with Palestine and led the Caucasians into Egypt. At that time there was a fabulous national army in the Caucasus. He destroyed Georgia and erected pyramids of Georgian heads. To do this he murdered all the young people in the city of Kalo-ubany. According to legend, on his deathbed he lamented that he could not subdue the Georgian race. This is near the truth. One fact remains of all this — the creation of a separate state. Tamerlane saw the Caucasus as a whole. He judged the problem well and, in his own way, tried to separate it. The importance of the Caucasus in modern history has increased since the northern territory is no longer deserted but is thickly settled.

Now the entire Caucasus is in the hands of the Soviet Union, which is the greatest military aggressor of the world, indeed, of all history. Here it is not necessary to repeat that which has already been printed on the pages of "Our Flag". We must mention but one phenomenon. The world situation has so developed that if military operations begin, under present political conditions, the fate of Europe and of humanity will depend on the happenings between the Tigris and Euphrates than between the Rhine and the Loire. This is because this area of the Near East will menace directly a vital region of the Soviets and will be the chief base of the opponents of the Soviets. The outcome of the war can be settled there. Western Europe can only be the scene of local battles in which neither side can secure victory or defeat and so it cannot decide the outcome of the war. This makes the Near East one of the prime areas and also defines the military significance of the Caucasus in a conflict on such a vast scale.

* * *

What advantages does the Caucasus offer to Russia in its entire area? As we have remarked, Russia can invade the Near East from five directions and reach the Persian Gulf and Alexandria. This will be decisive for the fate of the whole of Asia. Once in the Persian Gulf, only Indo-China stands between Russia and Red China. This area will be carefully scrutinized by Russia's opponents, but they cannot concentrate the necessary forces here against Russia and its vassals before the outbreak of war. Russia's Caucasian possessions give a great advantage — she has in her hands the center of the roads radiating from here. This gives Russia the chance to move her forces toward the borders. Thus it can divide the forces of its opponents, compelling them to fight at sea and on widely scattered fronts. As a result they will be forced to secure a preponderance of technical and human resources in all sectors, and they will be forced to concentrate almost triple strength in these triangles. In addition Russia will find it tactically feasible through its long occupation of this strategic position to hold the Caucasus against its opponents. In the beginning it will be almost hopeless to try to dislodge them. From a military point of view it is senseless to drive the enemy from its strategic positions into the Caucasus and attempt to destroy the entire holding force in the barren steppes of the Caucasus. The result of this makes us realize that the Caucasus is an excellent base to attack west and southeast (this is proven by the fact that Hitler aimed at those regions in 1940, during the last war.) On the other hand, if Russia's opponent at the same time attempts to penetrate the Caucasus from these regions, then this would be very surprising if successful, for such an occupation would threaten the vital organs of Russia. But in such military operations there s a real danger for Russia, since it could only be carried out by technical superiority. The entire Caucasus from the military point of view is very weakly linked to Russia. The Caucasus is joined to it by two centrifugal bonds. At the beginning of mobilization and the concentration of military forces, supremacy passes to the continent, i. e., Soviet Russia. As a result the opposing forces in the Near East cannot appear in time to deprive Russia of the chance to use the advantages of the Caucasus. It will carry out the majority of its plans in the Near East, if its commanders do not make errors or mistakes. This will be the first phase of the war. The situation will be different when the opponents of the Soviet Union appear on the Eurasian continent with their own forces. Then the political situation will be so changed that wherever they attack Soviet Russia they will at-

tain local successes, but these will not be decisive. This can be achieved only in another place — the northern section of the Caucasus and the basin of the Black Sea. The opening of military operations in this basin will definitely separate the entire Caucasus from Russia, making it possible to secure the entire Caucasus without the need of position warfare. Under these conditions the Caucasus will form an excellent base for destruction of the military power of the Soviet Union.

GRIGOL DIASAMIDZE

by G. A. KOBACHIDSE

The famous Georgian writer and editor, **Grigol Diasamidze,** was eighty-five years of age on February 8 (January 25, old style). He comes from a family famous in Georgian history, the Diasamidzes. For example, the first time this name is mentioned in Georgian annals as early as the tenth century, when it occurs as **Shvenier** (beauty) Diasamidze. The historian Mose Dzhanashvili discussed this briefly in an article.*

Until the seventeenth century the family possessed its own estates in the south of Georgia and large land holdings in **Samtskhe.** The Diasamidze followed immediately behind the families of Dzhakheli (who owned all of Samtskhe) and Shalikashvili. The Diasamidzes gave many historical figures to Georgia and perhaps the most famous were the two **katolikos**-Patriarchs (Head of the Georgian Church). The first was **Evdemos** who was slain by the Georgian **King Rostom I** (1634-1658) because **katolikos Evdemos** was implicated in a conspiracy against the throne. Rostom I was a very zealous Mohammedan who often persecuted the Georgian Christians. The Georgian magnates wanted to overthrow Rostom and place a Christian king on the throne. An Armenian Melikh learned of this conspiracy and informed the King, who succeeded in capturing all the plotters. Evdemos was hung and his body thrown from a high tower. For his martyr-like death, the Georgian people and the Georgian Church considered Evdemos a Holy Martyr. The remains of his body are buried in the Cathedral of Antchishati. The second **katolikos** was **John** who died in 1699. He played a very important role in the ecclesiastical life of Georgia.

The family also gave several writers and poets to Georgian letters e. g., Gulkhan (fifteenth century). Mzekhali (sixteenth century), Tamar (seventeenth century) and others.

In addition to these Church figures, the family of Diasamidze gave two queens to the Georgian throne. The first was **Tamar,** the wife of the Immerian (Western Georgia), **King George II (1548-1585).** She was the daughter of **Shermazan Diasamidze.** The other queen was **Elena** the wife of Prince **David** who was the son of **King Theimuras I (1605-1648).** Prince David was slain before his ascension to the throne, but King Theimuras named Elena as the Queen. Elena was the daughter of Leon Diasamidze and mother of King **Irkali I (1688-1703).**

The Diasamidze family also gave many important personages to the military and civil organizations. In the sixteenth century Georgian history recalls the exploits of **Shermazan, Iju, Amovan and Vakhusht Diasamidze.** They were instrumental in securing for the Georgian King **Louarsab** in **1547** many Georgian provinces in Meskheti. In **1553** these provinces were again retaken by the Persian **Shah Tamas.** He captured Shermanzan and Vakhusht and executed them for their services to the Georgian king. And about **1576** the Georgian historian mentioned the military-chiefs **Aftandil, Shermazan II, Amatak, Rostom, Sekhnia, Iliya** and others who were active in the country's military affairs. In the seventeenth century the turks started to occupy the southern part of Georgia and to introduce Mohammedanism into Georgia by force. All those who wanted to escape Mohammedanism fled to the central part of Georgia and the family of Diasamidze did likewise. In the central part of Georgia they (the Diasamdize family) releived new estates near Surami — Sakhasheti, Brilli, and other places. During the reign of King **Irakli II (1742-1798),** the Diasamidze family received great honors and gained great distinction, but in **1784** the family was all but wiped out in the battle against the Turks and the Lesgins. Only **Dimitri Diasamidze** was saved and he was appointed a colonel of the Fortress Gori by King Irakli in **1795.** Dimitri Diasamidze died in approxmately **1802** and left two sons, one of whom was **David,** the grandfather of Grigol Diasamidze. **David Diasamidze** had studied in Petersburg and upon his return to his estates he made many enlightened reforms. He opened schools, hospitals, theatres and helped the Christians in many ways. David was the forebear of the Eastern Georgian nobility. He died in **1849.**

His son was **Nicholas,** the father of Grigol Diasamidze. He was also a very famous Georgian figure and a personal friend of the famous poet **Akakiy Tseretelli.** He continued the tradition of his father's reforms and gained a deserved respect among his people. Unfortunately, despite his humane character and actions, he was murdered by revolutionaries in **1897** without any reason at all. And his death provoked great sorrow among the Georgian intelligentsia. **Akakiy Tseretelli** wrote a famous poem in which he praised the personality of **Nicholas Diasamidze.**

* See the newspaper **Themi,** No. 168, 1912.

After the death of his father, Grigol Diasamidze became the head of the family and he, too, continued his father's friendship with Akakiy Tseretelli. Grigol Diasamidze finished the Tiflis Gymnasium for Men in **1888** and entered Novorossiysk University in the same year in the faculty of law. He finished his course in **1892** and successfully passed the state examinations in **1893.** He did not enter the civil service but, instead, took up the career of a journalist, literateur, teacher, and a co-worker on different periadical publications of the progressive elements of Georgia and Russia.

In **1894-1895** he taught the Georgian language in the Transcaucasian Institute for Girls in Tiflis. Later, he worked in the Rural-Agrilultural Society of Landowners of Gori county, where he was the chairman of the administration. In **1901-1910** he was a deputy from the nobility of Gori county to the Tiflis Meeting of Deputies. He was one of the first founders of the Georgian Red Cross. From **1911-1915** he was the editor of his own newspaper, **Themi;** one of the closest workers on the paper was Akakiy Tseretelli. In **1917-1918** with Alexander Kancheli he edited a large daily Russian newspaper, the **Republic.** He left Georgia in February 1921 with his daughter Elena, and in August of the same year settled in Berlin. Grigol Diasamidze continued his cultural and social work among the Georgian emigration. He established the publishing house of Neue Osten (the New East) and published other boks. He and Doctor R. Mekkelein edited a monthly journal, **Morgenland.** Until the end of his stay in Berlin in **1945,** he was the chairman of the Georgian colony for several times and participated in the cultural life of the Georgian colony. After the last war he lived in **Wangen,** Germany until **1952.** In **March 1952** in his eighty-second year he came to **New York** with his daughter, **Elena,** and his grand-daughter **Nina,** the daughter of Prince Elizbar Vatchenadze. He is very happy to have arrived in a free land and to be able to live the remaining years of his life in freedom. At the present time he is studying English in order to take his final examination for his United States citizenship. At the same time he is continuing his work of helping the social and cultural life of the Georgian emigration. He is a member of the editorial board of "Our Path," and our organization and in this capacity he is always prepared to give wise and beneficient counsel to his younger colleagues.

The American Council for Independent Georgia takes this opportunity of congratulating Prince



GRIGOL DIASAMIDZE

Grigol Diasamidze with all its heart and we wish him future happiness together with his daughter and his granddaughter in this land which he loves so much!

PROFILE OF G. DIASAMIDZE
by his Friend.

The American Council for Independent Georgia has received letters congratulating Prince Grigol Diasamidze, but owing to the lack of space we find it impossible to print them all. Therefore we have selected a letter from a **close personal friend** because of the masterful depiction of Prince Grigol Diasamidze in it.

The secret of each individual is not only "what" he is, but that he "is" at all. It is possible that anyone of us might not have seen the light. And therefore, everybody who "is," is for himself a God-given gift. How not to rejoice at existence, even though it is full of pains and sorrows. The joy of living is felt more strongly in the unfolding of creative powers, in the growth itself. How

deeply did the Georgian genius perceive this truth. We, Georgians, often say "a flower is rejoicing" instead of, "a flower is growing." Never is this rejoicing so deeply felt as when Georgian people sit down to a feast. For a Georgian, a festivity, a reception, is never an ordinary "pastime" but an occasion for general merriment, an encounter of open hearts. Handsome young men and fair young ladies, soldiers, heroes, poets, singers, music and dancing compose an orchestra which is conducted by the head of the table: the so-called **"Tamada."** Every participant of the feast appears as a special guest, be he ever so insignificant, he is addressed in toasts and speeches as the unique, the unusual one. Thus, mutual rejoicing turns spontaneously into a polyphony. The guests drink wine in abundance. Yet the drinking does not lead to "drunkenness" but only to an "intoxication." **"In vino veritas"** is not a mere saying for a Georgian; wine gives wings, it creates the excellent spirit and mood at a party.

I often had the opportunity to be at a party with G. Diasamidse. It was surprising that while we others got intoxicated from wine, he, not even touching a drink, caught the mood from others. A gift of wings — these were his natural traits. Sitting at a table his exultation became almost an ecstasy. I scarcely met a man who enjoyed company to such an extent. When walking along the Rustuval Avenue in Tbilis, he was the first to greet everyone he knew. Moreover, he would stop to chat with each acquaintance about this and that. What was said was from the heart. The ties attaching him to other people became stronger. He knew a lot of people, and this kind of intercourse with friends during his walk made it last an hour and a half, though he was a very fast walker, almost a runner. Therefore, it was not surprising that no banquet, no anniversary could take place without him. If a high-ranking person would visit the city, he was in the fore to greet and honor him.

Although, descendant of a well-known, princely family, Diasamidse stopped calling himself prince when still very young, being in this respect like some other eminent statesmen. Psychologically, he probably needed a more informal approach with the simple folks. But essentially he always remained a prince, a **"Tavad"**, as it is said in Georgian, in the knightly sense of the word — a commander, an associate, a representative. The word "no" did not exist in his vocabulary, for he was always ready to render a service, to do a favor. If a new talent, remarkable in any field of arts or sciences, appeared on the horizon, Diasamidse not only welcomed him but introduced him to his friends and supported his further development. In this regard I am also much obliged to Grigol Diasamidse.

In Georgia friendship is a sacred relationship. It certainly was so for Grigol Diasamidse. He counted among his good friends: Sandro Kancheli, a perceptive thinker and man of many accomplishments; Prince George Amiredsib, a fearless knight and a Don Juan. The friendship of this trio was topped by the unforgettable Tamara, wife of Kancheli and sister of Amiridsib. Through the intermediary of Diasamidse, I found myself in the circle of these friends, became an accepted member, a friend. From this angle I observed Tbilisi, one of the mose splendid cities of the world, which I have described in one of my novels, as a ship gliding into a vast eternity. Grigol Diasamidse "inherited" one of his friendships from his father Niko. What I have in mind, is Diasamidse's friendship with the poet and prince, Akakiy Zeretelly. Diasamidse loved and admired him. Zeretelly treated the latter as a son. I have met this excellent poet in the home of Diasamidse, where we both were frequent guests.

A personality of Diasamidse's scope could not have done without a publication. He had at his disposal a weekly journal, **The Themi. Themi** means in Georgian a "tribe," a "community." In Greek **Themes** is the name of a goddess of the pre-historic law of order. Diasamidse hardly thought of the significance of the word when he first chose the name for his press organ. It successfully fitted, containing in itself a synthesis of its task. The journal **Themi** stood above all parties, but it was not "unbiased" or "neutral"; it could justly be called a "publication rising above all party lines." Everything is splintered — parties, the whole — and the nation is menaced by collapse. The **Themes** justified its name; it became the voice of the **"Themis."** It endeavored to bring "order" into discordent party groups, which departed from the tribal "law" of the peoples. Akakiy Zeretelly was also a co-worker of the journal; I wrote in it also. The **Themi** was the first to print the works of the now famous novelist Demina Shengelayi, who at that time was still a high school student at the gymnasium for nobility in Tbilisi.

In the **Themi** Diasamidze wrote the daily chronicle. His articles were hot-tempered, but without ire, although full of fire. He also wrote essays, a kind of memoirs. Each essay was of particular interest. Did he narrate from memory? Memory alone, even though extraordinary, cannot make a memoirist. Andrei Bely the Russian writer, derived the word **nenavidet** (to hate) from **ne videt** (not to see). Nothing was farther from G. D. than "hate" — that is why he could "see" things. Having lived with "others" and in "others," he animated his events, he put himself under given circumstances, e. g., in relation to the historic context. That is the reason why his memoirs thrill us as vividly real. In one of Georgian journals I have recently read about John Meynargyi, an essayist, who has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in Georgian literature. We can say without hesitation that Diasamidse's memoirs are a masterpiece of world literature. They abound in a wealth of characteristic details, literary and biographical, but moreover every detail, precious in itself, appears as essential in the concrete representation of the whole.

I was dining with Grigol Diasamidse just before the Bolsheviks took over Tbilis. I never saw him so upset before. The following day he left Tbilis and his native land. He went to live in Berlin. I came to live there too. The small apartment of Grigol Diasamidse in Berlin was impoverished, but he remained a **"Tavad"** in spite of all. His home was a hearth where the flame of Georgia burned. When I felt lonely and homesick, I rushed over to him for comfort. Luxuriating at his hearth, I felt my composure return. Nowadays, Grigol Diasamidse is residing in a scenery of biblical serenity, among the skyscrapers of New York. He probably still reminisces about his native **Sakashety** and particularly about **"Brilli,"** one of his names, which he liked very much because of its melodious sound.

In my thoughts I hasten over to Grigol Diasamidse to celebrate his eighty-fifth birthday, and, with best wishes from afar, I offer him a vessel of life-giving water from the Brilli springs.

GEORGIANS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

by LADO ARVELADSE

One of the most effective weapons of Communist propaganda against the Tsarist regime was the assertion that, in the Russian Empire, military training of the national minorities was conducted in the Russian language, which was unknown and unintelligible to the trainees. Such a charge was irrefutable.

It would be hard to tell how many Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, Mongolians, sometimes even Ukrainians, had been mercilessly beaten during their service in the Russian army because of their inability to understand Russian. When my neighbors — Giugo Arveladze and Vassil Guildedava — were discharged from the army, they were suffering from tuberculosis: The natives of the sunny South were unable to bear the rigors of the northern climate. Another neighbor of mine - Onissim Potskhveria — was a sturdy enough to resist climatic influences, but all the insults and all the beatings of non-coms failed to teach him even a single word of Russian.

The people succeeded in overthrowing the Tsarist regime, but was unable to prevent cannibals from seizing power. The Romanov dynasty and the descendants of "excellencies" were gone forever. Notices such as "No Admitance for Soldiers" disappeared from the doors and the gates of public places. But, as far as the soldiers themselves were concerned, their position was fundamentally unchanged: The same black bread in their daily ration, but of an inferior quality as compared to pre-revolutionary times and that despite Russia's agricultural wealth. The same coarse, ill-fitting uniform, the same haversack... They were unshaven, even more restricted in their rights by the new political statute, their mouths sealed, all their conversation strictly censored, their thinking severely controlled.

I got my first baptism of fire in 1928, while serving in the Second Artillery Regiment in Tbilisi, Georgia. At the time military training in all the national units proceeded in their respective native languages. This reform was not a gift of Lenin-Stalin, but the legacy of the 1917 February Revolution.

Our regiment was at the time under the command of Yasson Yosseliani, a former colonel of the Tsarist army and not a member of the Communist Party. A man of gigantic stature, he was a perfect specimen of the purest Georgian type: dark-haired, wieh a kindly smile ever hovering around his lips. Our battery commander was Devdaniani, a former shepherd. Devdaniani never used any optical device during practice training, his right hand being his base deflection. He would take his check point, kneel, put forth his right fist, and order "fire". The target was invariable hit after the first shot, and the shell would send the brush flying into the air... Devdariani was a Communist.

The former general staff army officer, D. Ardaziani, was kind and polite, so were the other Party — and non-partymen, all of them officers or commanders of the former Tsarist army. Both the commissars and the political instructors were lenient and considerate. All the training proceeded in our native language. The soldiers had no reason to feel insulted or ill-treated in any way. It was the short period when the Kremlin was courting the nationalities. However to be quite frank, there was an iron discipline in the army at that time; Red Army men dared not transgress political rules. There was no freedom of thought; everything the political instructor told us had to be taken for granted. When the wife of the Red Army man Georgadze fell ill and was confined to a hospital, her husband got no permission to see her except on Sunday. But there were no insults and no in-

vectives. Neither the commander nor the political instructor had the right to hit or to beat his subordinates. All disputes and wrangles among Red Army men were strictly forbidden.

But as before the revolution, we had to sleep in bunks, on straw-filled mattresses; our uniforms were ragged, but the Red Army man of today would have found our conditions of life heavenly.

No one in the world, not even King Solomon the Wise, could persuade today's Soviet soldiers that only twenty-six years ago all military training proceeded in their native languages; that each Sunday soldiers were given a four hours authority for absence and were free to go where they pleased; that neither their commanding officers, nor their political instructors were even entitled to swear at them and to curse while rebuking them for some minor infraction of discipline.

Many waters have flowed since the year 1928... The Communists have succeeded in "building up socialism in one country." No one among us has ever got any information as to the fate that befell my former regiment; its commanders and its political instructors were, all of them, shot in 1937. Twenty per cent of the Red soldiers of my regiment shared the fate of their officers, the rest were lost in far away Siberia.

National units ceased to exist in all the corners of the USSR. They disappeared, melting away like the first snow...

The Georgian divisions were split, subdivided into battalions and scattered all over the vast territory of Siberia. They were replaced by Russian divisions which were swiftly transferred to the Georgian territory.

How different, how utterly changed everything in the Red army appeared to me when, thirteen years later, in 1941, on the first day of the declaration of the "War for the Fatherland," I donned Red Army rags again to become once more a soldier of the 953rd Artillery Regiment in Kutaisi.

Until 1930 the Red Army food rations were so good that the Red Army men could not eat up everything set before them. In 1941, on the other hand, food was so scarce that men rose from table half-hungry. By that time everything was changed: Foul language and abuse on the part of commanders and political instructors had become the order of the day. Our regiment was composed of representatives of thirteen or fourteen different nationalities who could hardly understand one another — a real Babel. Only the Russians were able to understand the orders of their commanders. (The reader should not imagine that our regiment represented an exception to the general rule, or that matters stood better in other regiments.)

One day our first cannon driver, Gabo Odishvilli, while returning from field exercises, failed to understand the battery commander's order to turn his horses to the right and turned them to left instead. The only school Gabo Odishvili, former shepherd, had ever attended were the Trialet mountains in summer and the Kizlar valleys in winter, where he tended his father's flocks of sheep at a time they belonged to him. When the Red Kremlin nationalized all the sheep, lambs their skins, their milk and cheese, the only things Odishvilli could call his own were his staff and the cold mountain nights. Odishvili knew his job well, but he did not know the Russian language. Each time Gabo went to the battery kitchen to get his bowl of soup and his bread ration, he had to bring an interpretor along with him.

Gabo turned his horses to the left without creating any disorder in the convoy. But the battery commander, Nikitin, was set upon finding fault with the shepherd. It irked him that Gabo could not understand Russian. With all his might, Nikitin struck several blows on the Soviet slave's back.

The young fellow blushed crimson with shame... Born and reared in the mountains, Gabo was used to fighting the elements and the wild beasts and was not afraid of death. Now fury blinded him. He glared at his offender like a mad wolf and was about to rush at him. Luckily for both of them, Gabo had no arms on him. When his first flare-up was over, Gabo turned toward us. "I ought to have killed Nikitin as though he were a dog," he said, "but then I thought better. I would have left behind me five souls — a blind father, a wife, a four-year daughter, and two twins in arms. I dare not let these innocent beings suffer for my sake. All of them would be hanged in front of my house if I killed Nikitin. Were it not for them, my offender would not see another sunrise. Never have I had to bear such an insult!" To all of us, this incident with Odishvili was like a bolt from the blue skies.

The commissar's replacement, Alexander Chumburidze, a teacher by profession, undertook to clear up the entire matter. Chumburidze was a kind man and a faithful adherent of the Communist regime despite the fact that only a happy coincidence had saved him from being annihilated by these very Communists in 1937. He was absolutely opposed to terror. "Why should an innocent man be punished?" he would say in the circle of trustworthy men. When Chumburidze saw Nikitin beat an innocent — in this case Odishvili — he ran to find the regiment's commissar, the hunchback Pushkov, and reported the situation.

"Ha, ha, ha", the Leninist-Stalinist Guardsman, Pushkov, roared. "Comrade Chumburidze, you ought to have better studied the military statute and the last orders."

Chumburidze did not know the Red Army statute too well, having been but recently drafted.

"What orders?" he asked in astonishment.

"Besides the right to shoot a serviceman who disobeys him, the commander has also the right to give the serviceman a good beating whenever he finds it necessary," the uniformed gorilla answered, jeering and baring his decayed teeth in an ugly grin. Then, turning his back on Chumburadze, he dismissed him curtly.

To Chumburidze each of the "gorilla's" words was like a lash.

Poor Odishvili did not escape from the hands of the Red henchman.

Three months later, in Sevastopol, the first enemy bullet killed Gabo's horse and pierced his hand.

Since all kinds of wounds, those of the skull not excepted, excited the Red Command's suspicions, the luckless Odishvili, instead of being sent to the hospital, was directed to the staff advocate's office. He was led there by four armed soldiers, his hands tied behind him. As the poor fellow could not understand a word of Russian, he nodded assent each time anyone asked him a question in that language. Therefore, when the staff advocate asked: "You, S.O.B! Did you shoot through your hands intentionally, your mother...?" the former shepherd was unable to understand either and nodded assent again. His fate was thus sealed. The same four Red Army men took him to the yard behind the staff advocate's office and shot the father of three little human beings, the only support of his family and of his blind father.

THE CANCELLED GIFT

by G. ALANIDSE

On April 14, 1955 the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) issued the following report:

"The Soviet official gazette (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta April 2nd 1955) contains a decree which provides for the surrender of Georgian territory to the Russian Federation (RSFSR). The decree itself is dated March 14th 1955 and signed in the usual way by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Voroshilov, and its secretary, Pegov. The territory in question is the district of Klukhori comprising 1200 square miles. It has now been added to the Stavropol Territory of the RSFSR.

The Klukhori district has had a very interesting history. Until 1944 it formed the bulk of the Karachay Autonomous Province. However, the 75,000 Karachay were deported from their homeland in the Caucasus at the end of World War II and the Karachay Autonomous Province was abolished. The northern part of the province was included in the Russian Federation and its southern part was given to Georgia. The territory ceded to Georgia contained the capital of the former Autonomous Province which was built in the twenties and was originally named Mikoyan Shakhar. But as this was a Karachay name the Georgians changed it to Klukhori. To the Georgians the cession of the southern part of the Karachay province brought little economic gain for it is a rather barren mountain land; but it was a national triumph. It enabled their country for the first time to spread out to the north of the main Caucasus range.

The annexation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation is another indication of the fact that the Georgians have ceased to be a favoured nation in the Soviet Union. The death of Stalin and the disgrace of Beriya have deprived them of their main protectors in the central government. Georgians are known to have been ousted from many important posts which they occupied throughout the country, particularly in the police apparatus. The central authorities have also shown a sudden interest in certain national minorities in Georgia such as the Abkhazians and Ossetins and taken up their defence against "Georgian great power chauvinism". So the incorporation into the RSFSR of Georgian territory, however newly acquired, is only the last of several blows to Georgian national prestige to be administered by Stalin's sulcessors. As far as the ethnic composition of the territory is concerned there is no justification for including it into the Russian Federation. In 1926 the Russians represented even less than 2% of its population. On the other hand it is likely that a fair number of Georgians settled down in the Klukhori district during the 10 years in which it belonged to the Georgian republic."

The British commentator was not accurate when he said that the incorporation of the Kluhori district into the Georgian system was a "national triumph." The Georgian people did not request this district from the Kremlin. They do not want any foreign areas and it can not be said that they were pleased. The Georgian people do not covet their neighbor's lands and throughout all of Georgia's history Georgia has fought to defend her own border, not for territorial aggrandizement!

Georgia has always been particularly respectful of her Caucasian neighbors in the south, and east. Therefore, the other comment of the British Broadcasting Company that the Georgians are guilty of "great power chauvinism" against the

3/023

საქართველოს პარლამენტის ეროვნული ბიბლიოთეკა

Abkhasians and Ossetins is completely in error. Through the long history of Georgia, neither the Abkhasians nor the Ossetins have suffered any "chauvinistic attacks" from the Georgians side. Indeed, the Abkhasians are very closely tied to the Georgian people. And the Ossetins have lived in Georgia from the fifth century. At that time the Georgian King Vakhtang I had moved 100 Ossetin families from the north and gave them land in the vicinity of the Dariel Pass in order that they might act as defenders of this pass. And from this nucleus, the Ossetins became Georgian Ossetins in the course of time. At the present time there are approximately 80,000 Georgian Ossetins scattered throughout Georgia their homeland.

The commentator also observed that the presence of Stalin and Beriya in control of the Russian Empire made Georgia's positions the most favored in the Russian Federation. This was never true. In fact it is a total error. Stalin was a total outcast from Georgia and only interested in the fate of the Russian Empire. He was never a defender or protector of Georgia's interests. Georgia's prestige has never depended on anyone in the Kremlin and it will never, whether the Bolsheviks give her additional territory or not.

The assertion of the British commentator to the effect that the Georgians occupied a special place in the internal security system is simply not true. The fact that Beriya held such a position does not mean that the rest of the Georgians did. The very fact of the paucity of Georgia's population in comparison with the rest of the Russian Empire is primary evidence that Georgians could not play a decisive role in the internal security system.

In general, the Kremlin has voluntarily ceded Georgian territory to the other nations from the time when Georgia was first occupied by the Bolsheviks in 1921. There are many examples of this: Turkey was given many provinces which she had wanted; land in the south of Tiflis was given to Armenia; the Zakatala oblast, part of Georgia, was given to Azerbaijan. Finally, part of Abkhasia, Sochi and Taupse, were taken from Georgia and included in Russia. Of course, there are many other examples, of which the best known is the case of Krym, attached prabably temporarily to Ukraine.

The annexation of the Kluhori district by the Russian did not bother the Georgians because they had never considered this territory to be theirs. It was an unrequested gift from Kremlin. But what does bother the Georgians is the fact that during the period that Kluhori belonged to Georgia, the Kremlin had forcefully settled many Georgians there. Now that the Russian administration has taken over the entire district, all these Georgians are subject to the Russification policy, what means a special form of genocide for Georgian nation.

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION FORM BOLSHEVISM

The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism has now existed for several years. The aims and deeds of this Committee are too well known to be discussed here; we only want to make some observations about these achievements. **Now is is possible to say that its results have been significant.** If the Committee was not able to unite the Russian and non-Russian people, it was not its fault but the fault of the Russian emigration, and this emigration's chauvinistic adherence to the denial of even the most elementary rights to the non-Russian groups.

The activities of the American Committee in supporting Radio Liberation and the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR are especially laudatory. The fact that the Soviet Union violently attacks Radio Liberation and even murdered some of its workers and blackmailed others (threatening letters were sent to them) shows that **the Kremlin considered the action of the American Committee as very dangerous.** The Institute has made many valuable contributions to the anti-Bolshevik struggle. These works are sent to all the countries of the Free World and the people have thus become acquainted with various problems of the USSR.

In general we must observe with pleasure that the American Committee is handling the problem of the non-Russian people much better in its publications. The executives of the American Committee correctly understand the nationalities problem and, as far as it is possible, are attempting to answer the questions raised by the non-Russian people. It should be pointed out that these ections will not distrub the Russian political emigration. Indeed, the Russian politcal emigration is becoming better acquainted with their non-Russian neighbors and are studying closely their cultural and political roghts. Such a mutual exchange of information between the Russian and non-Russian groups is a great help in the struggle against Bolshevism.

The work of the American Committee has advanced rapidly and must be supported by all of us in order that they can continue their struggle against Bolshevism.

PRESS REVIEW

THE REPORT OF THE KERSTEN COMMITTEE

We have a brochure entitled "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia," which represents a special report (No. 6) of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression from the House of Representatives. It was published in 1954 by the United States Government Printing Office in Washington. The Chairman of the Committee was Charles J. Kersten, a congressman from Wisconsin; Georgetown University, its faculty, and a group of experts from various parts of the United States helped in the preparation of the report. The basis of this report was the record of the Committee's hearings, sworn depositions of witnesses, documents, exhibits, and other authoritative evidence.


On October 13, 1954 a hearing of five Georgian witnesses was held in New York. Under oath, they described the occupation of Georgia. The complete hearing was published in the official records.

In general, we must state that the Kersten Committee made a valuable contribution in collecting this enormous amount of material about Bolshevik aggresssion and Bolshevik tactics used in subjugating nations. Especially valuable was the material relating to the subjugation of the Baltic and East European satellite nations.

It was very praiseworthy that the committee



ELIZBAR VATCHNADZE



KHAIHOSRO CHOLOKASHVILI (1888-1930), left.
ALEXANDER SULCHANISHVILI, right

did not forget the Caucasian people of whom not much was known for a long time. After the subjugation of the Caucasian people in 1920-1921, they were almost forgotten. After April 1926, practically nothing was heard about Georgia in the United States. If Georgia was mentioned it was usually in relation to the fact that Stalin had been born there. But no one was interested in the political fate of Georgia. On April 1-2, 1926, a committee of the United States Congress concluded a report on how Georgia had been overthrown by the Bolsheviks. This report was a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the events in

Georgia, since the facts were carefully collected and presented. Each theme relating to Georgian affairs — politics, culture, art, the Church — was entrusted to authorities who were well prepared to deal with these problems.

Every Caucasian who heard that the Congress was again going to investigate the Caucasian affair after twenty-seven years, felt a deep sense of gratitude and pleasure.

However, we must observe that the Kersten Committee did not use all the most important Georgian groups and personalities in the United States and this is important since it is just these groups which could have presented valuable information on different periods of the Bolshevik occupation. And when compared with the 1926 period there are many more Georgians living in the United States — in fact the increase was 10 per cent. After 1947, many new immigrants settled in the United States — these were former prisoners of war who had lived under the Soviet regime and experienced all its terrors. At the same time many old immigrants entered the United States who had vivid memories of the Revolution and who were eye-witnesses of the establishment of Georgian independence, its takeover and the Georgian revolts against the Bolshevik occupation.

We must observe that these five witnesses did all they could. They presented information on the occupation of Georgia and on other matters which was in general very good; indeed, in some cases the testimony was excellent. However, if the entire affair had been better organized the results would have been commensurately better.

Some witnesses spoke in detail of the uprisings in Georgia of 1922 and of 1924, which occured when they were only fourteen or sixteen years of age. Of course, they undoubtedly had heard of these revolts from their parents and relatives and, perhaps, were able to present much valuable factual information. But it would have been wiser to ask those men who had actually participated in these uprisings or, better, had been leaders in the revolts. There is such a man in New York, Mr. **Alexander Sulchanishvili,** a member of the Board of the American Council for Independent Georgia. As is known there were two national uprisings in Georgia (1922 and 1924); the leader of both was **Colonel Khaihosro Cholokashvili,** who died of tuberculosis in 1930 in Paris. For four years Colonel Cholokashvili struggled against the Bolsheviks, first as a leader of the uprisings and, then, as a partisan. There were many leaders who helped Cholokashvili and who were killed in these years. However in the last years of his life there were only two: Prince **Elizbar Vatchnadze** (now residing in Belgium) and **Alexander Sulchanishvili** both of whom are well known among the Georgian emigration as national heroes for their struggle against the Bolsheviks. Both could have given intimate and extraordinary information about these uprisings. There are other people who have had interesting experiences under the Bolsheviks. For example, several of the members of our organization could have given much information because they were associated with the government of Georgia during her independence, with the Georgian juridical system, and also with the Georgian underground movement.

Due to limits of this article, we have not been able to note all the mistakes that appeared in the testimony of the witnesses before the Kersten Committee. We were able to observe several chronological and factual inaccuracies which were printed in the section, "Georgia During World War II," but due to the shortness of this article, could not include them.

In conclusion we wish to express our thanks to the Kersten Committee for its valuable contribution and we hope that the committee, if it continues its work in the future, will draw witnesses from the most important Georgian organizations in the United States.

THE AFFAIR OF SHALVA MAGLAKELIDZE

(Some Observations)

An article of General Sh. Maglakelidze appeared in the December 9, 1954 number of the **Dawn of the East (Zarya vostoka).** This paper is published in Tiflis, the capitol of Georgia, and is the official organ of the Georgian Communist Party. Shalva Maglakelidze was an emigree from 1923. Approximately eight months ago he disappeared from West Berlin and suddenly re-appeared in the hands of the Bolsheviks. During the period of Georgian independence (1918-1921) he held various high governmental posts. He was first a governor general in Tiflis and then in Abkhasia; he was then a member of the Social Democratic Party, the official party of the government. He held a colonel's rank in the army. As an emigree, Maglakelidze was at first connected with the Social Democratic Party. In the beginning of the thirties he formed his own Georgia Royal (Monarchistic) Party and he became a Nazi general in the forties.

Maglakelidze was closely connected with the Georgian emigration and undoubtedly knew all the intimate details of this emigration. Therefore, he was able to give the Bolsheviks much valuable information. He knew the names of many anti-Bolshevik emigrants, and, undoubtedly, their relatives were made to suffer at the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The chief question in this whole affair is this: Did Maglakelidze voluntarily return to the Bolshevik's side, or was he kidnapped by them? — It is impossible to answer these questions in their entirety since there is no objective evidence available. Perhaps Maglakelidze was a double agent (Bolshevik and German), as rumored by Georgian emigrees, but this rumor has no substantial foundation. However, we do know it to be a fact that very few people have voluntarily returned to the Bolsheviks — this is particularly true of the Georgian emigration. On the other hand there are many facts that attest to the opposite; the Bolsheviks have carried off many political activists among the emigrants by force. After the Bolsheviks had done this, their press speaks of the "voluntary return" of these people. Soon after, these "voluntary returnees" write a letter, which is published in the Bolshevik press for propagandistic purposes. Why can we not conclude that this very same thing happened to Maglakelidze?

The Russian emigree press, without adequately considering the question, concluded that Maglakelidze had voluntarily returned to the Soviets. And what is more they (the Russian emigree press) surmised that the Soviets had planted spies and espionage agents among the non-Russian emigree groups. Of course, such an "analysis" is quite subjective; it has provoked certain political antagonisms on the part of the non-Russian emigrees, who see it as an expression of Great Russian chauvinism. These Russian political groups have closed their eyes to the fact that not long ago the Soviets murdered Fatali-bei, the editor-in-chief of the Azerbaijanian desk of Radio Liberation in Munich. And again, the Soviets murdered Kazembek, a prominent anti-Communist in Berlin. The Bolsheviks also murdered a valuable Byelorussian worker from Radio Liberation. These people all represented the non-Russian groups. The non-Russian emigrees are fighting not only against Bolshevism as a political idea but also against Great Russian imperialism for the restoration of their national independence. Thus, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks the non-Russian emigrant groups are doubly dangerous as a political and a national force. Therefore, they strike against the non-Russian camps with increased fury.

Let us return to Maglakelidze. Before all, it is apparent that he did not write the article which was published under his name in the **Dawn of the East.** It was written by the M.V.D. on the base of what Maglakelidze had told them. Many phrases in the article are borrowed directly from the storehouse of Soviet cliches; certainly, Maglakelidze would not, an an emigrant, subscribe to them. And the political analysis is primarily that of the M.V.D.

Those outsiders who are not familiar with the details of the Georgian emigration would not have noticed the following facts which were immediately apparent to all Georgian emigrants. In his article,Maglakelidze named those leaders of the Georgian emigration who had already died, e.g. the former President of the Georgian Republic, Noa Jordania; the former foreign minister, Eugene Gegetchkori; and the former minister of internal security, Noa Ramishvili. Of those still living, he named only one, the former Georgian ambassador to France, Akaki Tchaenkeli; he was only referred to once and without the use of his first name. The others were referred to many times.

In general, the Bolshevik press spoke of the Georgian emigration only as it existed before 1929. They even published a brochure on the emigration; the authors were responsible Georgian Communists Filip Macharadze, Mikhail Khahiani, and Levan Gogoberidze. After 1929, the Soviets ceased speaking of the Georgian emigration — not a single word. Thus, this letter of Maglakelidze was the first such statement for the past twenty-five years. Despite the fact that nothing was written about the emigration, the Georgian people knew about it through underground sources and found reason to hope that at some future date the legal Georgian government would return. Evidently, the mood for freedom is so strong among the Georgian people that the Soviet government had to combat it by publishing an article which would prove that the leaders of the emigration were dead and that the people's hopes should be buried with these dead leaders. It is interesting that the article referred to not one of the present-day leaders of the Georgian emigration. This is not to say that Maglakelidze did not name any of these leaders, but that the Soviets saw fit to conceal these names intentionally. They did not want the Georgian people to know that there were leaders who were continuing the struggle for a free and independent Georgia. For example, nothing was said in the article of Mr. Constantine Kandelaki, who was elected the chairman of the Georgian government-in-exile after the death of Jordania and Gegetchkori. Kandelaki was the finance minister during the period of Georgia's independence and achieved the greatest reputation among the Georgian people after Jordania and Gegetchkori. Of course, the Soviets would prefer to ignore such people. It is also curious that the Soviets do not once mention the right-wing groups of the Georgian emigration, or even one of their leaders, in the articles. This group carried out more a decisive struggle against the communists than did the left-wing of the emigration.

Maglakelidze in his article names several others who, as is known among the Georgian emigration, were his personal enemies. This is the second characteristic of the article. Every secret political agent will act in this way when he is captured by a hostile government. He reveals the names of his former comrades or enemies — this was typical for Nazi agents and is typical for Communist agents.

In one place in the article Maglakelidze writes: "From the moment of the Hitlerite attack on the

Soviet Union and until her repulsion, the military criminals among the Georgian emigrees carried out active, destructive work against the U.S.S.R. and the countries allied with it. In particular the following military criminals, with whom I was personally acquainted, took an active part in this destructive work: Mikhail Kediya, Grigori Alshibaya and his son, Mikhaiil Alshbaya, Alexandr Tsomaya and Givi Babliani. At the orders of the Gestapo and the German Command, several of these people, by deceit, violence, and terror, enlisted Soviet war prisoners of Georgian nationality in the service of Hitler".

Maglakelidze said nothing about the fact that **he was the first emigrant** who allied himself with the Gestapo and the German Command. By their orders, he formed the **first** Georgian legions which were made up of Georgian prisoners-of-war. This occured in March-April, 1942 in Krushino near Warsaw. The German press wrote much about this during the last war. The others began to collaborate with the Germans **later.** When they began to oppose Maglakelidze, the latter expended all his efforts to get complete power into his own hands. Of course the struggle did not have any national character, but was a personal struggle between careerists and materialists. The Germans, following the rule of divide and conquor, particularly wanted the emigrant groups to fight among themselves in order to control them easier.

In general, the Hitlerities selected those people among the emigrants who would be willing to work merely as agents, i. e., people who had no idea of national aggrandizement. The Germans did not want to deal with those political patriots who would demand a great amount for their people. It was well-known that Hitler did not favor the independence of any other nation. When he occupied a country, he did not choose an administrator from the subject people but always one from the Germans. He placed the real patriots in concentration camps, e. g., Georgians, Ukrainians, etc. The responsible emigree leaders of these people demanded at the very outset from Hitler that he would establish independent states. Only if they had such guarantees would they have formed legions from the prisoners-of-war. Only the careerists did not make any such stipulations.

In October 1942, the Georgians created on their own initiative the "Georgian National Committee," the president of which was the distinguished political and social figure, Professor Dr. Mikhail von Tseretelli. The members of the committee were the former senator, Professor Zarub Abalishvili (Avalov), and the leader of the Georgian National Democratic Party, Spiridon Kediya.* The reason for the creation of such a committee was the fact that in the summer of 1942 the Germans had sized the Northern Caucasus and were on the immediate border of Georgia. In order to prevent the Germans repeating the same mistakes that they had made in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine, the committee wanted to act as an advisor to them. The members of the committee were greatly respected by the people of Georgia and therefore the Georgian political emigrees trusted them. Mikhail Tseritelli with Prince George Matchebelli commanded the Committe for the Liberation of Georgia in Germany during the First World War. This committee was supported by the famous Count Schulenburg (who was slain in 1944 as an accomplice in the plot against Hitler) and some other outstanding Germans. The Kaiser government promised the committee that after the liberation of Georgia she would receive her independence. Monarchistic Germany was true to its promise and helped the Georgians set up an independent Georgian republic.

Bue Hitlerite Germany acted differently. The advice of the older Schulenburg was cynically rejected by the Gestapo. The demands of the Georgian National Committee for the establishment of an independent Georgia were also cynically rejected. Thereafter, Mikhail Tseretelli dissolved his committee in 1943 and ceased all his work with the Germans. Soon after this on October 24, 1943 the Germans created the so-called **"Verbindung Stab"** the chairman of which was Mikhail Kediya. The duties of the staff were to follow the movements of the Georgian emigration, to encourage the "political education" and most important of all, through the staff provide more and more soldiers for the German Army from the prisoners-of-war.

In this case the staff seriously helped the German High Command and did not refuse any of its commands. At the end of 1943, especially in 1944, it was clear that Hitlerite Germany had lost the war. The prisoners of war in the various prisoner camps did not want to enlist in the German Army. The various staffs of the non-German people nonetheless still called them up, formed units of them, and sent them to the front. It is quite typical that when the Anglo-American troops landed on June 6, 1944 in France, the Georgian battalions were at the front with the German troops. One of these battalions was entirely annihilated in the defense of Cherbourg... And many other Georgians were taken prisoner and, consequently, returned to the Russians. Information on these events was published in the **Volkischer Beobachter** of this period. It is necessary to recall that the "Georgian National Committee" violently opposed the sending of Georgian troops against the Anglo-Americans. While this Committee existed, the Germans did not send any Georgian troops to fight the Anglo-Americans.

The creation of this staff was not favorably received by Maglakelidze, and the struggle between

* Not to be confused with Mikhail Kediya.

him and the Verbindung Stab became sharper. The struggle only ended with the German defeat. Thus, it is evident why Maglakelidze named these people, his personal enemies, in his article.

After the war, Maglakelidze again tried to create a political group but did not succeed in the democratic atmosphere that prevailed. He applied for work with Radio Liberation but did not get a position because he had compromised himself with the Germans. Perhaps these various rebuffs after the war pushed Maglakelidze into the Communist camp.

Be it as it may, the affair of Maglakelidze is very important for us Georgians and one from which we may learn a great deal. We must be careful to know each among us, especially here in America — the bastion of freedom. It is impossible to work with a former Gestapo or Chekist agent; they have too many sins upon their conscience. Many former Gestapo agents are now working fo rthe Bolsheviks and indeed Moscow is now sending its agents to America. We know that when the Bolsheviks want to send their agents to an anti-Communist country — those people appear as strong anti-Communists. All this in order that the governments of the anti-Communist country will not watch him closely. In such a case the agent can work freely. On the other hand if the Communists see that some emigree fights without mercy against Communism and the anti-Communist country respects him highly — such an emigree is either murdered by Communist terrorists or is called a Communist or Fascist in the Soviet press in order that the anti-Communist country in which he acts might lose faith in him.

A free coutry must act carefully in both cases to distinguish the real fighter against the Bolsheviks and the one who is the agent-provocateur or disorganizer.

ANTI-SEMITISM

On December 10, 1954 an article was published in the **Aufbau** an internationally known German language weekly published in New York, entitled "Finstere Maechte des Satanismus" with the subtitle "Antisemitische Hetzzentrale in Muenchen." The author of this article discusses a brochure of the Muenich emigree organization, **The Antibolshevik Bloc of Nations,** entitled, **The Jewish Question** which was written by E. Arciuk and W. Mositschkin. According to the **Aufbau** this book is permeated with an anti-Semitic spirit and disseminates hate among the Germans and Jews.

In our opinion the Bloc must concentrate first of all on the struggle against Bolshevism. In doing this it must not spread hate among the nationalities or insult them. The anti-Bolshevik struggle will be lost if the anti-Bolshevik camps of the free World do not respect one another. In adopting an anti-Semitic spirit, the Antibolshevik Bloc lends itself to suspicion and can be regarded rather as an associate of Communists than their foe. For the Communists were never in this foes of the Nazis, the official representatives of anti-Semitism, but were only their competitors. The Bolsheviks persecuted the Jews with the same vigor as the Nazis, although in a different form. The Kremlin forbade the Jewish national movements (Zionism), arrested their leaders, dissolved their organizations and press, annihilated all Jewish language writers, and closed all synagogues (with a few exceptions which were shown to foreigners where it was necessary). During the last war they did not evacuate the Jewish population from the dangerous zones deliberately and hundreds of thousands of Jews fell in German hands. In this way the Bolsheviks aided the bestial Nazis in gas chambers activities; they arrested Jewish refugees from Poland and Galicia and sent them to Communist concentration camps, where thousands perished. After the war they trumped up false charges against Jewish doctors, the Jewish intelligentsia and ordered anti-Semitic persecutions in the satellite countries; they prohibited the Jews from emigrating from the USSR to Israel, from receiving food packages from America and so on and so on.

When such anti-Semitic pamphlets are published in the Free World, they invariably come into the hands of the Kremlin and, of course, will be promptly used for propaganda purposes against the West, even though the Bolsheviks secretly sympathize with the spirit of the pamphlet.

Without knowing all the facts we can not judge the activities of the Bloc (ABN) or of Prince Nakashidse, its secretary general who is mentioned in the **Aufbau** article. But since Mr. Nakashidse is a Georgian, we would like to point out that any Georgian who directly or indirectly is allied with anti-Semitism, alienates himself from the Georgian nation, because **GEORGIANISM** and **ANTI-SEMITISM are IRRECONCILABLE.**

Georgian Jews have lived in Georgia for more than two thousand five hundred years. During this period there have never been any dissensions or pogroms directed against the Jews. This is perhaps the only country in which the sword was never raised against the Jews. If any one wants to verify this he need only to read any history of Georgia; there is also much material on this subject in English, French, German, and Russian. In general, there is in the Georgian soul a great deal of respect for other people. Non-Georgians who live in Georgia have never felt that they were foreigners and they have never been persecuted by the Georgians — either in a moral, financial, or religious sense. And, conversely, the attitude of the Georgian Jews toward the Georgians was excel-

lent; interestingly enough, they proved to be the most patriotic. Even if some non-Georgians proved to be traitors and passed to the side of the enemy, this could not be said of the Georgian Jews. The religious differences never prevented a sincere, fraternal relationship from existing between the Jews and the Georgians. The tsarist regime attempted to provoke a religious battle between the Jews and the Georgians during the period when they controlled Georgia, but they did not succeed. The Georgian tradition of amity between the Jews and other people of Georgia became even stronger during the Hitlerite struggle. The Georgian Jews who lived in France and Germany during the last war were not bothered by the Germans because the Georgian emigration protected them. And now the Georgian people and the Georgian emigration still continue this tradition of respect for all non-Georgian nationalities.

The famous Georgian poet, Akaki Tseretelli, once wrote a beautiful poem, "The Song of the Georgian Jews," in which he very wonderfully depicted the three-thousand year friendship between the Jews and the Georgians. The same poet in another work said, "Of all the ancient peoples, I most like the Jews." The roots of this poet's glory are in the past. We must not, therefore, change this tradition. The Georgian emigrees, we are certain, will preserve this genuine spirit of the Georgian people.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME — A SYMPOSIUM OF REFUGEE SCHOLARS AND SCIENTISTS

(April 3-4, 1954)

A very interesting collection of reports was published several months ago under the above title in English. The reports were delivered at a conference arranged under the initiative and control of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR. Many of these reports were very well suited to the central problem of the conference, but several demonstrated a lack of scholarly information. Our purpose is not to analyse the entire collection but rather to study those reports that pertain to the Georgian problem.

Alexander V. Tsomaia delivered a report entitled, "Academic Freedom in Georgia," (pages 101-6). This article presents a very general picture of academic freedom in Georgia and fails to delineate the most important facts in the past and present cultural life of Georgia. In this same collection Stefan H. Hovian published an article, "The History of Armenian Literature and its Study in Soviet Armenia." The author presents the most significant features of the history of Armenian literature and covers all the more important tendencies of Armenian literature under the Soviet regime. Unfortunately, Mr. Tsomaia did not do the same to Georgian literature and culture. He failed primarily because he conceived the problem of academic freedom in its narrowest limits — merely the teaching of various subjects in Georgian schools. Consequently, he concentrated too much on his own personal experiences in the University of Tiflis. It must be remembered that this was confined to the twenties when conditions were not as bad as they were to become later. The Bolsheviks were not able to subordinate the University of Tiflis as it existed during the twenties. Even in Tiflis the Georgians used to say: "The Bolsheviks could capture all Georgia, but they could not capture the University of Tiflis." Mr. Tsomaia left Georgia at the end of the twenties and did not witness the terrible events which occured in the thirties and forties. The cultural life of Georgia — art, literature, science — was subject to severe repressions in the thirties, which were either not mentioned or referred to only slightly. And the facts were unfortunately filled with serious errors. For example, in speaking of the famous Georgian historian, Academician Ivan Dzhavakhishvili, it said, Dzavakhishvili lost not only his post as Rector but also the chair of Georgian history. After protracted abridgements, corrections, and rewritings, his great work, **The History of Georgia,** was reduced to the interpretations of varous conflicts between the feudal nobility and the peasants." It is true that Dzhavakhishvili actually lost his chair of history and his position as Rector about 1928 or 1929. However, several years later he again received the chair of history and occupied it until his death. Dzhavakhishvili was such an outstanding scholar and professor that the Bolsheviks did not dare to destroy him from fear of the entire scientific world and the Georgian people. Therefore, it was decided to restore to him the chair of history, but he was supposed to write a history of Georgia based on the general Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history. **This he very stubornly refused to do** and, instead, continued his own scientific work based on western scientific methods. Dzhavakhishvili was one of the Georgian scholars who refused to bow to the Soviet "mailed fist" and who was prepared for whatever consequences might result. Therefore, it is not true that Dzhavakhishvili allowed his works to be "abridged, corrected and rewritten." Whoever is intimately acquainted with his work, **The History of the Georgian People,** (not **The History of Georgia)** could not agree with the assertions that the work was reduced to an "interpretation of various conflicts between feudal nobility and the peasants." This work was based on scientific research and not on the Marxist class struggle. Even now the Bolsheviks accuse Dzhavakhishvili of being a "bourgeois nationalist" on the basis of his works; the fifth volume of his history was singled out for special criticism.* How could the Bolsheviks say this if he was a follower of the Marxist-Leninist line in his writings?

In another place we read: "The best works of Georgian medieval literature such as the **Knight in the Tiger's Skin** by the poet and philosopher Shota Rustaveli, which European scholars regard as one of the finest monuments of medieval literature of any European nation-also came under the guillotine." And further: "Shota Rustaveli was rehabilitated in 1937, and the 750th anniversary of his birth was celebrated throughout the Soviet Union." Both statements are correct, but they do not explain the cause of such a contradictory shift. And this failure might be interpreted in the Bolsheviks' favor, i. e., they had made a mistake and they set about to correct it. The Bolsheviks do not merit such compliments! They resurrected Rustaveli and his works in order to claim him as one of their own. They asserted that all the noble principles of Rustaveli were fulfilled in Soviet life, e. g., the principle that man and woman must be equal, which Rustaveli had set down in the twelfth century, was claimed by the Bolsheviks to have been achieved in practice. Thus, the basic reason was that the Bolsheviks noticed that during the period of the banning of Rustaveli's works, the Georgian people seemed to be more assidously reading his works and more zealously studying his ideology.

In relation to the other Georgian writers of the nineteenth century, the same general approach is apparent. For example, Ilya Chavchavadze, Akakei Tseretelli, Vazha Pshavela, Alexander Kazbek, Rafiel Eustavi, and others, were in the beginning defamed and attacked, but later they were restored to their former glory. This was done for the very same reason as pertained to Rustaveli. All these writers were adopted as the predecessors of the Bolshevik ideology. There is no explanation in the article of why these authors were restored to the Soviet Georgian Pantheon.

This collection of reports remains a very valuable contribution on the part of the Institute and the American Committee. It is vital that the American people have a chance to know and study Georgian life and culture. This collection has served that end. In the future it is hoped that members of the more recent Georgian emigration might be given an opportunity to participate in and contribute to the work of the Institute. Many of them are scholars and scientists who are well qualified to report about intellectual life under the Soviets.

See G. V. Hachapuridze, "Ob istoricheskom znachenii prisoyedineniya Grudzii k Rosii," **Voprosy istoryi, No. 5, May 1954,** Moscow.

ECONOMIC FAILURE IN OCCUPIED GEORGIA

In **Pravda and Izvestiya** (February 5-8, 1955) there are accounts of the budgetary achievements at the Supreme Council of the USSR. From the accounts of the Georgian deputies, M. P. Georgadse and G. D. Dzavachyshvili, although interwoven with loyal assertions as to Soviet accomplishments, the following facts became apparent concerning the Bolshevik economic policy in Soviet Georgia.

(1) The yearly plan of major construction work of 1954 was not fulfilled. This relates to public works of the Republic as well as local construction enterprises, e. g., the official buildings of the government. The program of construction of housing was not fulfilled either.

(2) As to the timber industry, highway construction and road construction — bases for supplies and production of the necessary material were not established. It is evident from the data supplied by the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR that the Department of Supplies of centralized powers held back 47 percent of the allocated funds. Actually, the funds received by the Republic of Georgia were even smaller.

(3) Delays in construction of mines and modern plants has hampered the development of the manganese industry. The Soviets decided in 1949 to increase the volume of manganese ore for export by building a vast electrified railroad line; this line was to be in operation in 1953. Lack of funds has prevented the completion of this operation.

(4) There are serious deficiencies in the raising of live stock. These may be attributed to poor care and nutrition. Collective farming has created this decline in cattle breeding and the increase in the number of dry cows.

(5) Insectide campaigns for rural areas not adequately organized. Georgia has received every year less copper vitriol; this is especially marked during the season. Thus, Georgia was short 1,450 tons of copper vitriol and this created the corresponding deterioration in fruit trees, citrus trees, vineyards, and crops.

(6) At the present time Georgia produces 95 per cent of the tea for the Soviet market. The tea season coincides with crops of other rural cultures (e.g., corn, citrus, tobacco, etc.) and this creates an enormous shortage of farmhands during this season.

BLACK SEA CONFEDERATION

The Ukrainian magazine **Free Ukraine (Vilna Ukraina,** No. 3, 1954) has opened the discussion of the problems the Ukraine and other nations will have to face after their liberation from Bolshevism. The insistence upon independence is, of course, out of the question, but these liberated nations must be warned of any manifestation of isolationism, of withdrawal from the world, or

of the establishment of new, perhaps a silk, curtain.

In the "One World" concept of the West, the organization of the United Nations must be based on continental and regional associations of independent nations. America has already a permanent Committee of American States. Europe is about to realize a United Europe. But even if this latter idea is to be fulfilled, the existence of regional associations would not be negated.

Where will the Ukraine be then? Historic experiences with Poland and Russia have created a certain disappointment and bitterness. The Ukraine of the future would hardly be desirous of taking up these old connections once more. Consequently, other partners must be sought for such an association.

The magazine has proposed a confederation of Black Sea states: Turkey, Ukraine, Roumania, Bulgaria and the Caucasus. This idea is of great interest and value and deserves to be the subject of serious consideration, regardless of the present regimes in these states. Undoubtedly, the response of the Caucasian people will be positive, since this idea of the Caucasian federation has long been popular among them. Preliminary studies of this problem have already began in the Caucasian Institute in Turkey. It would be important to awaken interest in this idea in the United States.

TWO NATION'S SOLIDARITY

The Ukrainian newspaper **Narodna volya** of April 28, 1955 contains the following interesting story concerning Georgian-Ukrainian relations in Kiev. During the First World War a Ukrainian society held a memorial meeting in honor of Taras Shevchenko. The tsarist regime had forbidden the celebration and ordered the Ukrainians not to gather. When the Ukrainians ignored the order and gathered for the meeting, the tsarist police raided the meeting, arrested all the Ukrainians and allowed all non-Ukrainians to leave. The next day a arge group of young people appeared at the police station and demanded that they be arrested also. They said that they were Ukrainians and the Police Chief demanded their passports. He inspected them and saw to his astonishment that all all these young people were Georgians. He asked, "Why do you want to be arrested?" The young Georgians answered. We are united in spirit with the Ukrainians and we also love Shevchenko. Therefore, we demand that we too be arrested.

CHRONICLE

The annual meeting of the **American Council for Independent Georgia, Inc.** took place in New York on Sunday, December 12, 1954, in Parkside — Hotel. For the next year were reelected the Board of Directors. The members of the Board is as follows: V. ABASHZIDSE; L. AVRELADSE; S. GASHONIA; G. GOGOBERIDSE; G. KOBACHIDSE; V. NANUASHVILI; and A. SOULHANISHVILI.

The Financial Committee was re-elected also; **N. Alavidse, M. Sakradse,** and **K. Shatberashvili.**

At the same meeting was reelected as Editor-in-Chief of the "Our Path" and "Informations Bulletin" G. A. KOBACHIDSE and as well as Advisory Board: D. ALAVIDSE; L. ARVELADSE; I. J. GOLDMAN; G. DIASSAMIDSE; G. KOBACHIDSE and V. NANUASHVILI. **Theodore Sarjeveladse** (Sarje) was unanimously elected as the respected president of the **American Council for Independent Georgia.**

A meeting of the **Georgian Association in the U.S.** took place at the Parkside Hotel in New York on January 23, 1955. Engineer **Ivane Kobachidse** (John Koby) was elected the Chairman of the Georgian Assaciation at this meeting. The following were elected to the Board of Directors: **Teimouraz Bagrationi, A. Gourieli, M. Sakradse, V. Sangulia, Aslan Shveli** and **A. Tchenkeli.** The meeting expressed the hope that the Board would correct all the errors and difficulties of the past year and attempt to unite all Georgian groups. The hope was also voiced that the Board would buy a house for social functions. Mr. Ivane Kobachidse thanked the meeting for electing him Chairman and promised to fulfill all the problems placed before him.

The American Cauncil for Independent Georgia and its editorial board wish the new administration of the Georgian Association success.

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