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The Voice of Free

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THE VOICE OF FREE GEORGIA

PERIODICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

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E. GUEGUECHKORI

EVGUENI GUEGUECHKORI, one of the Founders and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Georgian Republic, died in Paris last June. His passing is a great loss not only to Georgia and Caucasia, but to all free and freedom-loving men. All his life Gueguechkori was a tireless fighter for the rights of men and for friendship among nations based on justice and understanding and not on force and domination of one by another.

Evgueni Gueguechkori was born in Salhino, Western Georgia, in 1882. He received his primary and secondary education in the college for the sons of Georgian nobility in Kutaisi, finishing with great distinction, and then went to Russia where he studied law at the University of Moscow. Even in his student days he made his mark, not only among his fellow students, but in the wider circles of university and intellectual life in Moscow. A born orator, with a brilliant mind, a distinguished appearance, and charm of manner, he attracted people and made them respect and like him.

After obtaining his degree at the university he returned to Georgia and started in law practice in Kutaisi. Although very young, he soon became one of the best known lawyers in Georgia. It was during this period that he began to take an interest in politics and shortly became an active member of the Social-Democratic Party. This was the time of the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Party which ended in a definite break-up and the formation of two separate parties: the Bolsheviks, or extremists, and the Mensheviks, or moderates. Gueguechkori used all his intellect, energy and ability in order to prevent Stalin and other Bolsheviks from gaining influence over the Georgian working masses. The fact that Stalin did not succeed in Georgia (until he conquered it with Red Russian bayonets many years later) was due directly to the efforts of only a few men, among them the mortal foe of Bolshevism—Evgueni Gueguechkori.

In 1907, when he was only twenty-five, Gueguechkori was elected to the third Russian Douma (Parliament). This gave him an opportunity to use his great talents as an orator and soon he became one of the best known and respected members of the Parliament and one of the leaders of the Opposition. It is enough to look through the Georgian, Russian, German, French, and English newspapers of the period to see what great popularity this bril-

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liant young man enjoyed in the liberal and progressive circles of all Europe. He became best known for his implacable opposition to capital punishment and for his defense of the rights of individuals, freedom of speech and press, trade unions and an eight-hour working day.

After the 1917 Revolution in Russia he played a leading role in the political life of Caucasia. He presided over the Transcaucasian Federation, but after Georgia proclaimed herself independent, Gueguechkori became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new Republic. As such, it was his job to normalize Georgia's diplomatic relations with the outside world. Russia was then still engaged in a bitter civil war; Turkey had ambitions and pretensions towards some parts of Caucasian territory; Europe was busy with the problems created by the defeat of Germany and the break-up of the Austrian Empire. The two leading powers in Europe, Great Britain and France, had no time to study and deal with the Georgian and Caucasian questions. They had many pressing matters to attend to, much more important to them.

But Gueguechkori was not one to lose heart and courage or to be stopped by difficulties. He was not satisfied with the sending of delegations and diplomatic notes. He went himself. To establish good-neighborly relations with White Russia he even went to see General Denikin, the leader of all the White Russians fighting against the Bolsheviks. He went to Turkey, Italy, France, England. And everywhere by diplomatic talk, memoranda, notes, public appearances and the press, he defended the right of his country, Georgia, to an independent existence.

And he succeeded. The men who were then deciding the fate of the world recognized the rights of the Georgian nation. In January 1921, Aristide Briand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, informed Gueguechkori that the Supreme Allied Council consisting of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Japan, had decided to recognize *de jure* the Georgian Republic.

"It was the happiest day of my life," Gueguechkori used to say in later days. And it easy to believe that it was so. The recognition of Georgia was a victory for his nation and also a personal victory for Gueguechkori.

After the occupation of Georgia by Russia's Red Army, Gueguechkori together with all the other members of the Georgian Government went into exile in Europe. The last act of the Georgian National Parliament was an order to the Government to leave the country and to continue the fight for the restoration of Georgian independence.

Gueguechkori settled in Paris and for the next thirty-three years, until the day of his death, he continued the fight for the freedom and liberty of his country. Wherever and whenever an international conference or a meeting dealing with the question of the Soviet Union was held, Gueguechkori was there, whether it was in Geneva, Paris, London, Brussels or anywhere else. His deep and correct analysis of communism and his intelligent appraisal of the Soviet policy always made a great impression on all his listeners and it was because of him that on many occasions international meetings and organizations condemned communism and the actions of the Soviet Government.

Among the Georgian emigration Gueguechkori was liked probably more than any other Georgian leader. He tried not to take any part in the political differences which naturally enough exist among the Georgians in exile. He was a friend of every Georgian, everybody was welcome in his home, and he tried to advise and help all those who came to him with their troubles. All Georgians and Georgian political organizations, no matter what their political views, had the greatest respect for his intellect, ability and integrity.

Evgueni Gueguechkori was a fighter for freedom, for the rights of men and nations and a convinced and implacable foe of every dictatorship and every tyranny. He was a fighter for a free, independent, democratic Georgia, but at the same time he defended with all his might the right of every nation to an independent life.

This is why, as we said at the beginning, the passing of Evgueni Gueguechkori is a great loss not only to his country but to all those who value the fight for freedom.

A MEMORIAL SERVICE was held in the Greek Cathedral of New York and the Georgian Association in the U.S.A. arranged a public meeting which was held at the Hotel Roosevelt. The meeting was attended by many Georgians as well as by the representatives of friendly nations. Mr. Leo Doumbadze spoke on behalf of the Association and the meeting was also addressed by Mr. A. Tsomaia, Mr. I. Nanouashvili and several others. The well known journalist and writer, Mr. Eugene Lyons, who represented Vice-Admiral Leslie Stevens, spoke on behalf of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism.

"TRADE WITH CANNIBALS"

by ALEXANDER TSOMAIA

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION broke out towards the end of the first World War. The party of Lenin took over the power in Russia, legalized political terror, and the specially created secret police—the dreaded Tcheka—set about executing hundreds of thousands of innocent men and women. Among the political opponents of the Bolsheviks writers, industrialists, traders, priests, officers, professors, doctors, technicians, workers, and peasants—not one class or group of society escaped, and the soil of Russia was drenched in blood. Fooled at first by Lenin's promises, the Russian people soon found themselves facing a terrible reality—no freedom, no land, no peace, and no bread. Disappointed, hungry and oppressed millions could have taken up arms again and overthrown Lenin as they had overthrown Kerenski before him. But for this they needed help from the outside. Moral support alone would have been sufficient. Instead, degrading, cruel, and cynical words were heard—"We trade with cannibals, don't we? Why should we not trade with Moscow?" Such were the words of David Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of Great Britain.

In those days England set the tone. England led and the European countries followed. The acknowledged leader of the victorious coalition in the first World War was Lloyd George. His was the greatest authority; his words were listened to. If he was prepared to trade with Moscow, so were the others. From that time onward, ideological, political, moral, and religious interests gave way to commercial ones.

Thus began the moral decadence of Europe. European countries were falling over each other and pushing each other out of the way in order to get there first and make friends with Moscow. Lenin's government was accepted as legal; money poured in in the form of loans. The German General Staff and the officers of the Reichswehr built up the Red Army; European capital and European engineers created the Soviet war industry. Europe revived, armed,

and strengthened the Communist régime of Moscow.

The results of this mad, short-sighted policy were soon apparent. Moscow became a mortal danger to Europe and to the whole free world. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia, that is to say ethnic Russia, became a colossal empire stretching from the Behring Strait to the River Elbe. Revolutions, riots, civil wars, sabotage, espionage, subversive activities, open aggression, and the constant threat of another war—all these are direct results of this fundamentally wrong policy. Italian Fascism and German Naziism, which brought Europe to the verge of total destruction, were a natural reaction to the danger of Russian communism. Perverted, evil, pathological even, but a reaction nevertheless. We must seek the roots of World War II in Moscow and the evil principle of "trade with cannibals." Apparently the English and French view was that anything is permissible if it serves the interests of their countries. But surely, besides the commercial interests of a country there are also international morals and ethics, without which a man is no better than an animal who thinks only of his own interests. Political, military, or trade agreements with the Government of the Kremlin, with this gang which denies God and morality, which has no scruples and whose hands are red with the blood of millions of innocents, are a denial of all spiritual and moral bases on which our Christian civilization was built.

The trip to Moscow and Peiping which Attlee, Bevan, and other English Socialists undertook is a continuation along the road which brought Europe to its present chaos and impotence. It is difficult to believe that there are still people who do not understand, that "trade with cannibals" can profit only the cannibals. But there is something else besides trade which attracts the Socialists to Moscow. For them the USSR is the country of marxism, the country where their own doctrine has been victorious. For all Socialists, no matter how much they differ on some points, Moscow is THE spiritual home.

Commercial interests and ideology —these are what attract European leaders to Moscow. And if political leaders are to be judged by their achievements, we must say that, since the Russian Revolution, the European leaders have not shown much acumen, intelligence, or far-sightedness.

Not so long ago, at Geneva, we had another example of what results are being brought about by European weakness and the policy of putting local interests before those of humanity as a whole. There we saw a strong, united, active and arrogant communistic block and, against it, divided, uncertain and weakened Europe. We have heard it said that giving half of Viet-Nam and fourteen million human beings to communism was not a capitulation, but a compromise! This obviously is a question of how one looks at things, but even accepting that it was a compromise, it is more than doubtful whether it will bring peace to humanity. Everyone agrees today that the Munich agreement of 1938 made the second World War a certainty. Whether the Geneva "compromise" will have a similar result, of course we can not say. But one thing is quite certain—it has strengthened the Communist world.

We see an entirely different stand in the U.S.A.

The policy of the U.S.A. is totally different from the short-sighted and egoistical policy of other nations. The U.S.A. foresaw the possibility of the Communist danger and put the defense of Western culture and the ideals of humanity before its economic interests. There is no doubt that the loss of Russian, Chinese, and East European markets was and is a serious matter for the American economy. There is also no doubt that had the U.S.A. chosen to "trade with cannibals" she could easily have captured these markets. No one could have competed there with the quantity and quality of American products. But it is obvious that this country is activated by higher principles. The Marshall Plan, stabilization of the European economy, the program of technical and economic assistance to the under-developed countries, aid to Greece and Turkey, NATO, the defense of Korea, the Southeast Asia collective security system—all these and many other facts clearly show that in this country Christian morality and the rights of men and nations are not just empty words. Look at the map. Who can doubt that the U.S.A. could easily have taken all the countries neighboring her. The conquest of Central America would have caused fewer deaths than occur every weekend on American roads. But the U.S.A. foreign policy is based and relies on freely concluded treaties and agreements and not on military might. In this it radically differs from all the great powers. The U.S.A. was born out of a fight for freedom, for the rights of men and nations, and this fact has laid a lasting mark on its conceptions of statemanship and international morality. Today the U.S.A. is the only great power in the world which does not want colonies and does not covet territories of others. And it is also the only power which uses its forces for the defense of international justice and international freedom.

The danger of communism and the absolute necessity of fighting against it is better understood in the U.S.A. than in the countries much nearer to the Soviet Union, India or France, for example. This is proved on one hand by the outlawing of the Communist Party in the U.S.A., thus bringing to an end its subversive activities, and by the failure of the Brussels Conference *and the rejection of the E.D.C. pact by the French National Assembly, on the other.*

This is the reality of today. And because of this reality, the U.S.A. has become the source of hope for all those who fight against communism. For the last 33 years in the forefront of them has been and still is Georgia. *It is the only country in the Soviet Union which on three separate occasions staged a national uprising against Moscow.* And the fact that lately the oppression has been intensified there proves that the fight of Georgians for liberty and national independence is still going on.

We have always been and still are strong supporters of this fight. Georgia and the other Caucasian nations will be faithful to their glorious traditions and will follow the U.S.A. in its fight against communism.

Whether Washington will understand that these small nations are her faithful allies and whether these valiant people will get the aid which they so richly deserve, only the future will tell.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BILL OF PARTICULARS

BY AKAKI TCHENKELI

Former Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Georgia for Europe

THERE ARE MANY items on the long list of inhumanities perpetrated by the Russian Government which are even now scarcely known in the West. Among them is the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and the fate of its people.

The Chechens and the Ingushes, scarcely differing from each other as to dialect, constitute one people who for countless centuries inhabited the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains.

At the end of June and the beginning of July 1946, the press of nearly all countries carried news of a Ukase (Decree) of the Supreme Council of the USSR dated June 25th, concerning the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the banishment of all its inhabitants, more than half a million souls, "to other regions" of the boundless USSR. The Ukase dared not name these "regions," although it is not difficult to guess that they were somewhere in far-distant Siberia, poles away from the home of these hapless ones in the "Flaming Caucasus," as a Russian poet has called it.

As far back as the summer of 1945 there had been rumors that it was the Kremlin's intention to denude of its local population that part of the Northern Caucasus which Hitler's divisions had invaded, and to settle this population in the North. However, the opening of the Potsdam Conference, and also the imminence of the first UNO meetings in London—to which rumors might penetrate and so arouse universal indignation—*in part* delayed the carrying out of these barbarous measures.

In part must be underlined, for the Kalmuck Republic, for example, completely disappeared from the face of the earth after the relief of Stalingrad while the war was still on. Immediately the war was over, the task of liquidating two other autonomous regions of the Northern Caucasus—the Kabardine-Balkhar and Karachai regions—was commenced, but then temporarily suspended, for reasons of discretion.

However, when the prestige of the USSR was no longer menaced and it could afford to be brash, the Kremlin officially issued the Ukase against the Chechen-Ingush and also a second, of the same date, liquidating the Crimean Autonomous Republic and scattering its Tatar population over the unknown tundras of Siberia.

It should be noted that formerly the Kremlin had made no distinction either as regards the race or the religion of its persecuted subjects. It is almost incalculable how many scores —even hundreds of thousands of peaceful folk and their families—have been exiled by the Kremlin from the Ukraine, White Russia, and from Great Russia itself, for the sole reason that they had been earning a crust of bread in Soviet State farms (Sovkhozy) under the direct management of agents of the German occupation forces. A thin pretext, indeed.

In this particular instance, when speaking of the Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian Chechen-Ingushes, the Kremlin seemed to have been identifying the former with the latter! The Russian newspapers, commenting on the Ukase, described the Chehen-Ingushes as a warrior people of "Turco-Tatar" origin, and of the "Mohammedan" faith.

It is indisputable that these people are both Mohammedans and warriors, but were not the masters in the Kremlin aware that the Chechen-Ingushes have no connection with the "Turco-Tatars," either in race, language, or type?

It is well known that at the time when the question of the Dardanelles was to the fore, the Kremlin had to resort to this subterfuge in order to justify the forcible banishment of the Chechen-Ingushes from the Caucasus.

Furthermore, the Kremlin was well aware that the Chechen-Ingushes are the *only* people in the whole of the Caucasus who have never known any feudal-class subdivision in their social structure, i. e., into nobility and serfs. Imbued through and through, with the freedom-loving, democratic spirit, they have time and again through the centuries courageously defended their liberty and their way of life.

The recollection of the war waged for many years by the North Caucasian mountain races with the Russian colossus, both before and after the Crimean War, under the leadership of the great Imam Shamyl, is irrefutable testimony to their unconquerable spirit.

The whole of the civilized world of that time looked on in amazement at this tragic epic, and the contemporary press, in obvious sympathy with the mountain men, described its various episodes.

The Kremlin can not have forgotten that Karl Marx himself, a contemporary, defended the rights of the mountain folk as opposed to the "gendarme from Gatchino," as he wrote (alluding to the Emperor Nicholas I), in his numerous letters from London to the American daily press.

This war, which lasted nearly 60 years, ended in the victory of the gendarme over the now legendary heroes, whose exploits called forth the admiration and commiseration even of enlightened Russians.

Subsequently there followed the partly compulsory, partly voluntary *mass* exodus to Turkey (where their own Mohammedan religion was practiced) of more than half of the mountaineers, and of nearly the whole of the Circassian people.

This sad process took more than two years: whole processions of old men, women, and children (few fighting men were left). wandered towards the shore of the Black Sea, and hundreds perished while waiting there for sailing vessels. How many of them perished in shipwrecks, or in Anatolia, from the harsh climate to which they had not grown accustomed, is not known.

All that is known is that the descendants of these polyglot exiles are now, in Turkey, called *Cherkez,* and that they have given to their new country many prominent soldiers and public men.

As regards the mountaineers who were left behind, they were declared a "subject population," and the Russian conquerors drove them at the point of the bayonet from the wide valleys in which they had dwelt for centuries, and settled Cossacks there instead. In this way, three new territories were created in the Northern Caucasus, with a so-called military-popular government: the Kuban, Terek, and Daghestan territories.

The Czarist government combined these three North Caucasian regions with five "governments" of Transcaucasia (the Tiflis, Kutaiss, Elizavetpol,* Baku, and Erivan provinces) and three "districts" (Batum, Sukhum, and Zakataly), setting over all of them the *Caucasian Viceregency.*

THIS INNOVATION, in no wise satisfying the national aspirations of the numerous peoples of the Caucasus, who differed from one another in culture, language, religion, etc., was more or less in line with the very complicated situation that had been created.

In the first place, by this act the government at St. Petersburg tacitly acknowledged that the Caucasus differed profoundly in every way from other parts of the Russian Empire and therefore required a totally different kind of government.

In the second place, the Caucasian peoples, living as it were under the same roof, were able to communicate with each other much more regularly, and to draw closer to each other, and by means of mutual co-operation to make their voices heard in defense of their most urgent interests by the central government. True, nothing much came of these efforts: for example, right up to the time of the revolution there was not a single university in the Caucasus, there were no provincial councils, no people's juries; but these misfortunes only served to prepare the ground still more thoroughly for the impending common struggle against Czarist absolutism, and for home rule in the Caucasus.

Thirdly, Tiflis, the residence of the Viceroy, occupying as it did an important strategic position between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey and Iran on the other, and also lying between two seas on the most convenient transit route between Western Asia and Europe, soon became the capital of the Caucasus, and thus the brain of the Caucasian peoples—this having become obvious as early as on the second day of the Revolution.

HAVING BEEN DRAWN into the common Russian struggle for liberty, and hoping to achieve something for themselves, the mountain folk of the Northern Caucasus, although not in any way compelled to serve in the army, voluntarily participated, together with the Transcaucasian peoples (the Azerbaidjanians voluntarily) in the first World War. Everyone still remembers the glorious exploits on the western front of these volunteers who fought in the "Wild Division" under the command first, of the Czar's brother, the Grand-Duke Michael, and then towards the end under General Bagration-Moukhransky.

However, this is not all. During the first years of the Revolution, when the Kremlin began the *second conquest* of the Caucasus (1919-1921), the mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus, with great self-sacrifice defending their liberty against the advance of General Denikin's White Army, opened the gates of the Caucasus to the Red Army (which had inscribed on its banner President Wilson's slogan "Free Self-Determination of Peoples") then attacking the rear of the White Army.

How did the Kremlin fulfill this solemn pledge? They scattered the Federal Government of the North Caucasian Republic and, after dividing the latter into several small republics and regions, annexed all of them to the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

Thus, the Kremlin did not hesitate to do what the Czars had never even thought of doing, to sever from the living body of the Caucasus one of its important organic members.

This treachery was perpetrated when, after the Bolshevist coup d'état, the peoples of the Caucasus had declared their independence, and the governments of their *democratic republics* were carrying on active negotiations with one another, with the object of declaring a *Caucasian Confederation*—in brief, when they had already appeared in the international arena, and their delegations were already in Paris and on the point of obtaining from the Versailles Conference recognition of the independence of their countries.

The Kremlin did not hesitate to undertake other and more monstrous measures, on trumped-up charges of rapprochement with the Germans. In spite of the fact that up to the very last, before their retreat and defeat, the German Army had never set foot on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the inhabitants of this republic, *without even having seen any of Hitler's divisions,* were banished to Siberia!

In order to be convinced of this, one need only look at the map. The Chechen-Ingushes live *on the right bank* of the river Terek, which falls into the Caspian Sea whereas the German troops did not everywhere succeed in reaching *the left bank* of this river. True, in their army communiqués they boasted that from Mozdok they had several times sighted the oilfields of Grozny, but the Cossack station of Mozdok is to the *north,* i. e., on *the left bank* of the Terek.

The whole misfortune of the Chechen-Ingushes consists in the fact that Grozny is the capital of their republic and the inescapable conclusion is that the Kremlin wished to clear them out of the whole of their territory and to settle Russians there. This is all the more obvious in that the Soviet newspapers had for a long time before been publishing reports regarding the discovery of new oil deposits in other parts of the republic.

It is a matter of honor to record here another manoeuvre, although a paltry one, which nevertheless would evoke from the whole of the Georgian people loud and unanimous protests, were they not enchained by the same despoiler. The Kremlin ordered that the territory belonging to the Ingushes —who, together with the Georgian mountaineers, have throughout the centuries been the guardians of the famous Darial Pass—should be incorporated with Georgia.

It is recorded in the ancient chronicles that the Georgian kings although their kingdom had been occupied many times by various conquerors, had always held in their hands the key to the Darial Pass, and for this they had to thank the Ingushes and the Mokhevs.

However, one need not go so far back. In February 1921, when without declaring war the Kremlin's hordes from every side attacked the Georgian Republic, which had been recognized by them de jure as an independent republic on May 7th, 1920 (and by the Allies on January 27th, 1921)—these hordes were halted on the north immediately before the Darial Pass. After this, if for no other reason, to speak of adding *Ingush* territory to Georgia would be unthinkable to any Georgian.

Is there any use in appealing to world opinion at this time, by laying before it a special memorandum regarding a few hundred thousand Chechen-Ingushes, when the enforced migration of millions has taken place and is still taking place? Have not all feelings of pity, or of ordinary Christian compassion toward fellow-man, become blunted by many repetitions of such enormities? Have not human conceptions of right and justice towards large and small nations alike been trodden underfoot? Have we forgotten what the poet has told us—that all men are involved in all mankind?

WELL, THE CHECHEN - INGUSHES managed to survive the tempestuous onslaughts of Attila and Genghis Khan. And there was a time, and that not very long ago, when the names "Aryan" and "Semite" were not so much in fashion, and Europeans were proud of belonging to *the Caucasian race.*

Who knows—perhaps this magnificent people will prove once again its power of survival. Perhaps not all of the population have been driven out or annihilated; perhaps some of them may still be resisting in their mountains. There is still some hope, in this strange world where anything can happen, that some of those who were banished may still be restored to the land of their fathers.

They must never be forgotten, these brave people who survived so many disasters in their two-thousand-year history. And the inhuman Ukase and

its consequences must stand against its perpetrators for all time to come, a brutal item in a long category of crime. History and justice always demand a bill of particulars against the day of reckoning.

RUSSIFICATION

by M. SIMONIDZE

EVER SINCE the Communists came to power, in what was the Russian Empire and is now the Soviet Union, they have been trying to instill "Soviet Patriotism" in their multi-national population. They wanted to create a new type of man, one who would be faithful not to his national fatherland but to a super-national state. "Soviet art," "Soviet science," "Soviet culture," "Soviet man," were declared to be superior to any other. Obviously, to be effective, this "Soviet Patriotism" had to appeal to all the nationalities inhabiting the union, and because of this, in the early days of the revolution and all through the 1920's, certain concessions were made to the non-Russians. The oppressive, crude, and completely ineffective policy of Russification practiced by Czarist Russia was greatly relaxed. The Communist leaders understood that if they wanted to have the non-Russians on their side, if they wanted them to adopt the "Soviet State" ideology, they had to give them certain concessions of national character. National languages were especially favored, because they were to serve the purpose of teaching, transmitting and spreading socialism among the various nationalities of the Union.

However, it soon became apparent that the Communists had miscalculated. The non-Russians still regarded the Soviet State as the Russian State and refused to be faithful to it. In the early 1930's, the national policy of the Soviets underwent a complete change. "Soviet" in reality came to mean "Russian" and a policy of vigorous and ruthless russification—the traditional policy of Russia towards conquered nations—was again in full swing. The abandonment of the idea of Soviet Patriotism became especially apparent in the years just preceding World War II and even more so during the war. Everyone remembers the glorification of Alexander Nevsky, Suvorov, Kutusov and other Russian heroes; Russian culture, Russian language, traditions etc. etc. The Communists found that no one, neither the Russians nor the non-Russians, would fight for the "Soviet" fatherland, but that the Russians, if not the others, would fight for "Russia." And as Russians are numerically the strongest single nationality in the Soviet Union, Stalin decided to put his stake on them. Right up to his death he continued a vigorous fight against the "remnants of bourgeois nationalism" and gradually intensified the policy of ruthless russification. Another war was a possibility and Russian patriotism could again become necessary to save the Soviet state. Stalin died and immediately it became apparent that there was a great divergence of views concerning the national policy among the top Soviet leaders. At first the policy of russification suffered a definite setback in all the national republics. This can be directly attributed to Beria's influence on the Kremlin's national policy. Beria knew that he had a life-and-death struggle before him and he was trying to get the non-Russians on his side. During the 19th Congress of the Communist party he made a long speech on the problem

of the formation of Socialist nations. After this the Soviet press was full of statements such as these: "Efforts to inflame feelings of national antagonism are profoundly alien to Socialist ideology." (*Pravda*, April 6, 1953). "Propaganda can be made understandable to people if it is carried out in their native language. However, this is ignored in certain national republics." (*Communist*, No. 9, June 1953).

Many other examples could be given to show that when Beria was winning, or seemed to be winning, the fight for Stalin's throne, the policy of russification was greatly on the decline. The removal of the Party Secretaries in Georgia and the Ukraine was also in line with this development. The Georgian, Mgeladze, was charged with "fabricating cases of nonexisting nationalism" and Melnikov in the Ukraine was accused of "profound mistakes in carrying out the Leninist-Stalinist national policy."

One of the charges made against Beria after his arrest was that "he used various crafty methods in order to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, to spread discord among the Soviet peoples, and to activate the bourgeois nationalist elements in the Union Republics." Although Communist charges and accusations are not worth the paper they are written on, in this particular case they may have been true, as all the evidence indicates that Beria did attempt to use the national feelings of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR for his own ends.

After Beria's downfall the old party line was not only reinstated but greatly intensified. A "hate Beria" campaign was launched, and all over the Soviet Union, in the national republics especially, great "indignation" was being expressed at Beria's "treasonous" approach to the national question. Even in Georgia, Bakradze, the Premier, who had only been appointed in the preceding April and who used to refer to Beria as the "best son of Georgia," now came out very strongly against him and in a speech made in August 1953 said as follows: "...already in the remote past the Georgian nation tied its fate forever with the great Russian people and during many decades marched with them arm in arm. And nothing in the world can shake the confidence which the Georgian people have in the great Russian people..." Bakradze was trying to save his skin, but even this revolting volte-face and hypocrisy were of no avail. He was dismissed shortly after and disappeared from the scene. It is very doubtful that he is alive today.

Every national republic in the Soviet Union suffered from Beria's downfall by a reecrudescence of Russian chauvinism and an intensified russification program. But the greatest sufferer by far was Georgia. Ever since its occupation by the Red Army in 1921, Georgia has been a thorn in the side of the Communists. Despite the fact that Stalin, Beria, Ordjonikidze, Enukidze, Goglidze, Kobulashvili, and a host of other absolutely top-ranking Communists were Georgians, the Georgian nation as a whole rejected communism. There is nothing in the annals of the Soviet Union which can equal the Georgian national insurrection of 1924. And although open resistance has become impossible, hidden opposition has never ceased and will not cease until Georgia is liberated.

All the reports received here show that Georgia today gives the impression of a country under military occupation. This was especially true for a few months after the downfall of Beria, when the streets of Tbilisi and other Georgian towns were patroled not by police alone, but by police and armed Red Army soldiers. The absolute master of the country is a Russian, General Antonov, who is responsible only to the Kremlin. He has been the master, of course, ever since his appointment as Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District;

now, however, he is quite openly the big boss. He reviewed the May Day parade in Tbilisi, which in the past has always been reviewed by the Premiers of Georgia, and he made a speech in the name of the Government of the Georgian Republic and the Georgian Communist Party. In his speech he had the following very characteristic sentence: "...The toilers of the Georgian SSR are leaning on the brotherly support of all peoples of our country and especially on the altruistic assistance of the Russian people."

It is interesting to note that the May Day parade reviewed by Antonov was commanded by yet another Russian, Major General Gladkov.

All the emphasis in Georgia today is on what great services Russia and the Russian people have rendered to Georgia in the past and are rendering now. All Georgian Communist leaders stress this in their speeches; they would not dare to do otherwise.

Georgian publications are full of it. During the 16th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in Tbilisi in February last, Mzhavanadze, the latest First Secretary of the Central Committee, made a very long report on the state of Georgia. Here are some quotations from his report: (Radio Tbilisi. February 18, 1954).

"...The enormous progressive significance of the unification of Georgia with Russia, as a political, economic and cultural development for the Georgian people..."

"...Prof. Kultadze (?), on the basis of certain compiled facts, has tried to prove that the orientation of Georgian leaders towards union with Russia was a mistake adversely affecting the fate of Georgia. These facts are evidence of an unsatisfactory situation on the historical front in the Republic."

"...The theme of friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union is clearly reflected in Soviet Georgian Literature. However, this great and salutary theme awaits a deeper, many-sided and more worthy reflection."

"...Soviet Georgian Literature grows and strengthens in close cooperation with the literature of other fraternal nations and primarily with the literature of the great Russian nation."

"...Thanks to the assistance and close co-operation of the outstanding representatives of the great Russian realistic art, a national art school has been set up in Georgia."

Mzhavanadze then referred to the unsatisfactory state of teaching the Russian language in Georgian schools. "...It is not a secret that many graduates of higher schools master the Russian language but feebly. For this not only the higher educational establishments are to blame, but also the secondary schools... the schools have too few qualified teachers of the Russian language and literature... we have expanded the teaching of the Russian language in the schools of Abkhazia and South Ossetia."

The *Kommunisti* is the organ of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in the Georgian language. Together with *Zarya Vostoka,* which is in Russian, it is the principal newspaper in Georgia. In its issue No. 3 (9779), 1954, it publishes a long article entitled, "Measures Necessary to Improve the Teaching of the Russian Language and Literature in the Schools of the Georgian Republic." Here are some quotations from this article:

"...Notwithstanding a whole series of measures, such, for instance, as the introduction of an eleven-year period of study of Russian, foundation in Tbilisi of a Russian Pedagogical Institute, etc. etc., the state of teaching the Russian language and literature in the schools of Georgia is unsatisfactory... too many students and pupils fail in Russian examinations... Georgian schools seldom arrange meetings devoted to Russian literature... do not hold conferences in Russian... no Pioneer meetings in Russian... not a sufficient number of text-books in Russian... Russian langauge taught by unqualified men... teachers must be quite familiar with the language of the great Russian people," and so on, and so on, ad nauseam.

Soon after Mzhavanadze's speech, it was decreed that the hours devoted to the teaching of Russian in Georgian schools were to be increased by 400%; that the number of students attending the Russian Pedagogical Institute should be raised to such an extent that by 1960 all Georgian schools would have a sufficient number of teachers of Russian and Russian literature; that special courses were to be created so that present-day teachers could refresh their knowledge of Russian; that by 1955 every school in Georgia was to have a sufficient number of Russo-Georgian dictionaries etc. etc.

It was also interesting to note that the *Kommunisti* of the last few months is filled with announcements about Russian literary evenings, conferences, lectures, discussions, Griboedoff evenings, Lermontov evenings, Glinka evenings, etc. etc. etc. In fact, everything is being done to spread the knowledge of the Russian language and literature among Georgians and to glorify everything Russian.

The *Kommunisti* itself seems to be a different paper from what it was only a few months ago. One would now say that it is a Moscow paper, only in the Georgian language. The front page is almost exclusively devoted to happenings in Russia or other parts of the USSR; photographs are almost invariably of Moscow, Stalingrad, and other Russian centers; most of the important articles are by Russians, usually translations from *Pravda* or *Izvestia;* sports news—Russian, etc. etc. Nowadays perhaps one quarter of the paper is devoted to Georgian affairs. Some issues have more, of course, but then some make hardly any mention of Georgia at all. The language itself is simply unrecognizable in places, so many Russian words are being introduced, although there are perfectly good Georgian words with the same meaning. There is also a very great number of words taken from other languages, especially English, but they too come to Georgian via Russian. For instance, if Russian takes an English word—say "despatch," it is introduced into Georgian as well.

AS FAR AS WE KNOW the language of instruction in the University of Tbilisi is still Georgian, with the exception of the Russian Philology Faculty where naturally enough it was always Russian. However the Pushkin Pedagogical Institute (Pedagogicheski Institutimeni Pushkina) has now been incorporated into the university and as the language of instruction there was, and presumably still is, Russian, it means that there is more Russian used in the university now. Also, judging by the announcements in the *Kommunisti,* the number of dissertations (theses for a Professor's or Dozent's degree) presented at the university *in the Russian language* has increased enormously. Up to quite recently this was an unheard of thing, as all the dissertations had to be presented exclusively in Georgian.

Another thing is very noticeable—the increase in the number of non-Georgians, mostly Russians, who present dissertations at the University of Tbilisi. On the other hand, the number of Georgian Professors and Dozents who have obtained their degrees in Russian Universities has also increased greatly. Apparently much larger numbers of young Georgians go to Russian universities to get their education nowadays than was the case only a few years ago, probably because it is easier for them to get a better job later. Compared with the rest of the Soviet Union, there is a much higher percentage of men with a university education in Georgia, and many Georgians are compelled to go

to other parts of the Union where there is a shortage of trained men.

The nature of dissertations has also changed greatly. For example, during the first few months of this year there were hardly any dealing with Georgian history or generally speaking, with anything of genuine interest to Georgians. At random, here are a few subjects defended this year:

The Meaning of Soviet Patriotism.

The Bolshevik Party and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

Lermontov in the Georgian Literature of the 19th Century.

The Marxist-Leninist Concept of Truth(!!!)

The last named is the plum of them all and it would have been a real education to listen to someone aspiring to become a Soviet Professor, explaining what Truth really is!

Another very interesting fact to which we have as yet no answer: In the *Kommunisti* of March 30th, and subsequent numbers, the State University of Tbilisi announces that it is in need of a great number of Professors, Dozents (lecturers) and Assistants. Similar announcements were made by the Tbilisi Medical Institute and *all* the other centers of higher learning in Georgia. As far as we could count up, there are 36 Professors required, 53 Dozents, 33 Assistants, 20 Senior Teachers, 12 Teachers and 10 Candidates of Medical Science. They are required in all branches of learning — Literature, History, the Arts, Law, Mathematics, Natural History, Languages, various branches of Medicine, Engineering, etc. Perhaps the university and other institutions of higher learning are being enlarged, but it is hardly conceivable that they are all being enlarged at the same time and to such an extent. A conclusion is inescapable—a great number of Georgian scientific workers have been dismissed lately. Dismissed or worse.

That there is not and never has been any academic freedom in the Soviet Union is such a well known fact that it seems hardly worth while even to talk about it. What is worth mentioning, however, is that whereas before science was made to glorify marxism, communism, socialism, or call it what you will, now it has orders to glorify everything Russian.

Voprosi Istorii (Problems of History; organ of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Science) for June 1953 (released only on August 8, after Beria's downfall) gives in its editorial some examples proving the existence of "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies in Soviet historical science, to wit "...In the *History of Georgia* published in 1950, the centuries old ties between the Georgian and the Russian peoples are not fully elucidated. Moreover, despite the historical truth, the authors assert that the alliance with Russia was of little use to Georgia and did not justify the hopes of King Irakli and his followers... this bourgeois nationalist point of view was expressed with even more frankness in the book by Sh. Chketia, *Tbilisi in the 19th Century*, in which the consequences of joining Georgia to Russia were described in the darkest colors." It is very interesting to note that in 1952 this book (*History of Georgia*) was still considered as a reference book on Georgian History and was listed as such in the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Enziklopedia.*

I HAVE ALREADY mentioned Mzhavanadze's reference to Professor Kultadze's book. Here is another of Mzhavanadze's gems: Quote: ...Recently the State University of Tbilisi published the fifth volume of the *History of the Georgian People*, by academician I. Djavahishvili. The leaders of the university committed a rude political mistake by publishing this book... it was published without regard to contemporary Soviet historical achievement, without a critical preface or commentary... and yet the materials and sketches of the fifth volume contain mistakes of a national character, since facts telling of the relationship between Georgia and Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries appear in a distorted form. The book ignores the enormous progressive significance of the unification of Georgia with Russia..." Prof. Djavahishvili was, of course, the greatest Georgian historian, a man who gave all his life to the study of the history of his country, a highly gifted scholar and an internationally recognized authority. He can not possibly be accused of having been biased. Again Mzhavanadze: "...The ideas of the fraternity of peoples has inspired Georgian literature practically from the beginning of its rise. In ancient Georgian literature these ideas found classic embodiment in the immortal poetry of Shota Rusthaveli... after the addition of Georgia to Russia, in spite of the intrigues of the nationalists of monarcho-feudal doctrine, among the best advanced representatives of Georgian literary and public thought the striving for spiritual-cultural accord with advanced democratic Russian literature grew and became strong... it would be difficult to describe accurately the beneficial influence of Russian culture on Georgian culture; it would be difficult to express clearly and brightly the boundless love, the feeling of respect and friendship for the great Russian people, for advanced Russian literature." There is more in the same vein, but even this is enough to make one feel nauseated. Friendship and respect is one thing, but degrading servility is quite another. Mzhavanadze and renegades like him delight in crawling at Moscow's bidding.

What is behind this recrudescence of Russian chauvinism, intensified russification, and even worse oppression of the non-Russians than has been practiced up to now? Some observers think that it is only a means to an end, the ultimate goal being centralized totalitarian power. This is the opinion of Professor Hugh Seton-Watson of London, for instance, who thinks that the conflict today is not between the Russian and the non-Russians, but between the non-Russians and the centralist totalitarian régime. During a conference at Tutzing, Bavaria, held on July 5th to 7th, under the auspices of the Institute for Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Professor Watson expressed the opinion that the extermination of natonal minorities is being carried out not in the interest of the Russian nation, but because the ultimate aim—a world-wide totalitarian state—requires the extincton of national feeling.

In Stalin's days this was undoubtedly true. Stalin was a Georgian and it is difficult to accuse him of Russian chauvinism. To him, quite definitely, oppression of nationalities was a means to an end. First of all he tried to get the non-Russians to adopt the idea of a universal totalitarian state by moderation and concessions. When this did not work he turned to ruthless oppression and centralization or, in other words, russification. Now however, the position is different. The ultimate aim of the present rulers of the USSR is not just a universal totalitarian state, but a "Russian" universal totalitarian state. Today we have to deal not just with militant communism, but with Russian militant communism. Stalin had no Russian national feeling, but Malenkov and his men have. The growth of this feeling is not difficult to explain. The victory in the Second World War is considered by every Russian, not excluding the top Communists, as a national victory of Russians over Germans and this, of course, engenders the feeling of national pride. There is also the natural reaction to a foreigner's thirty-year-long mastery, and the determination not to have it happen again.

But to come back to the situation in Georgia today. It was *officially* announced some months ago that since Beria's fall more than 3,000 Georgians have been dismissed

or liquidated in Georgia from Government and Party posts. However, they seem to have been replaced by other Georgians. Thus, the present Central Committee, Candidates and Auditing Committee of the Georgian Communist Party elected by the 16th Georgian Party Congress last February has only ten Russian, one Armenian and one Azerbaidjani name out of a total of one hundred and fifty-six. All the rest are Georgians, with a few Abkhasians thrown in. In Georgia, apparently the central régime is not quite ready to eliminate Georgians completely, as it has already done in the other parts of the Union. The central administration of the Soviet Union used to be full of Georgian Communists. You found them everywhere—in the Ministries, Parties, Army, and the Administration of the other Republics. Now, it is impossible to find a single Georgian name in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*. The Georgians outside Georgia must have been cleaned out very, very thoroughly. Not that anybody has the slightest inclination to deplore their fate.

As we have already said, all the emphasis in Georgia today is on what great services Russia has rendered to Georgia. Everything is being done to make Georgians adopt Russia as their own. But there is another aspect of russification, the consequences of which it is difficult to estimate, and that is the colonization of Georgia by Russians. There is no doubt at all that there has been a great and steady influx of Russians into Georgia. The post-war population figures are not available, but there is every indication of it. Greatly increased industrialization of Georgia is one of the reasons. Rustavi, the new metallurgical town near Tbilisi, was peopled by 50,000 Russians especially brought over from Russia. Places like Tkvibuli and Tkvarcheli (coal towns), or Tchiaturi (manganese mines), which did not have a single Russian before, are full of them now.

The latest population figures available to us show clearly what has been happening in Georgia.

In percentages the population of Georgia comprised:

	1922	1926	1939
Georgians	74.7%	70.4%	64.6%
Russians	3.2	5.2	8.7
Others	22.1	24.4	26.7

The population of Georgia today is 4,250,000 and it would be quite safe to say that Russians are the largest single minority in Georgia. Executions, deportations, and World War II cost Georgia several hundred thousand men. It is impossible to name an exact figure, but 300,000 would not be an exaggeration. The number of Georgians today can not be much higher than it was in 1939, while the number of Russians in Georgia is growing all the time.

ON OCTOBER 7, 1953, a radio commentator by the name of Krasov said the following over the Home Service of Radio Moscow:

"The monolithic community of nationalities is headed and cemented by the Russian people. The outstanding historical part of the latter—the assembling of the Soviet State of many nationalities—is vividly expressed in the words of our anthem: "The inviolable alliance of free republics was achieved *forever* by Great Russia." The Party has been conducting the Leninist-Stalinist national policy and is still conducting it, in the form of *merciless* struggle against the manifestation of bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism."

What more is there to be said? Except perhaps to remind Krasov that anything merciless results in no less merciless opposition. When the "inviolable alliance" begins to break up, as it most certainly will in the not very distant future, the Communists may regret that they forgot this very simple axiom.

CAUCASIAN INDEPENDENCE

A MEETING to commemorate the declaration in May 1918 of the independence of the four Caucasian Republics — Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia and North Caucasia—was held in the Hotel Roosevelt, New York.

The meeting was attended by several hundred Caucasians as well as by the representatives of many friendly nations.

The proceedings were opened by the President of the Caucasian Relief Society, Mr. Leo Doumbadze, who said as follows:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We gather here today to commemorate the proclamation, thirty-six years ago, of the independence of the Caucasian nations, which declared themselves free sovereign republics and thus ended their century-long struggle for the restoration of their rights.

The rebirth of North Caucasia, Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia, on May 11, 26, 27 and 28, 1918, respectively, was greeted with sympathy by the entire world. Soon after, de facto recognition was extended to all of them, and some even received de jure recognition by the great majority of European powers and by the Supreme Allied Council, composed of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium. Moreover, Georgia was officially recognized by the Soviet Government, which signed a treaty with the new republic on May 7, 1920, and renounced all Russian claims thereto. And Armenia was recognized by the United States Government on April 23, 1920.

A brilliant new era thus opened up before the Caucasian peoples, who have lived side by side for thousands of years with their own distinctive civilization, united not only by mutual political and economic interests, but by their common struggle for liberty.

Caucasia is one of the most beautiful corners of the earth, with high snow-capped mountains, forests, rivers, and lakes; it is situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and its climate resembles that of the French Riviera and Southern California. It is richly endowed with natural resources. The steppes of Northern Caucasia are second only to the Ukraine as a wheat producing region; cotton is cultivated in Azerbaidjan, Armenia, and Georgia; tea and citrus fruit in Georgia; and high-grade timber, fruit, rice, sheep, cattle, and horses of excellent breeds, are all to be found in Caucasia in great abundance.

But above all, Caucasia has always been known for its mineral wealth. Mining and metallurgy had their beginning in Caucasia and Caucasians were reputedly the first people to fabricate and use metals. That is why Greek mythology always referred to Caucasia in terms of gold and other metals. Baku, Grozny and Maikop are the oil centers from which the Soviet Union today derives by far the greatest part of its total output; manganese, so important in the manu-

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facture of high-grade steel, copper, lead, coal and many other valuable minerals are all plentiful in Caucasia.

The great majority of its 12,000,000 people are native Caucasians who form our four principal national groups. Throughout their history they have demonstrated a will for concentrated action, and like all highlanders, Caucasians reveal a deep attachment to their homesteads and land; a noble spirit of independence, integrity, dignity, and pride; courage and steadfastness in the pursuit of the national goal; consideration for others; disregard of trivial and artificial aspects of life; and the determination to defend their traditions.

Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and for centuries the frontier between the Christian and the Moslem worlds, Caucasia could become an important factor for peace in the Near East and could contribute to its economic and cultural development. Although Caucasians are a highly intelligent, hard working, sturdy people, justly renowned for their fighting spirit, natural wealth, ancient culture, and proud traditions, they lack what is most important—*Caucasia lacks freedom.* The Iron Curtain descended upon the Caucasian peoples over three decades ago, resulting in the loss of their rights as free men and nations. But even more significant to the free world is the fact that Moscow is exploiting Caucasia's great natural wealth to further its ultimate objectives: world revolution and world conquest.

Regardless of the numerous declarations of Lenin, Stalin, and other Communist leaders, to the effect that every nation is entitled to an independent life, and despite the fact that Moscow had officially recognized the independence of Georgia and concluded a treaty of non-aggression and non-intervention with her, in addition to promising not to intervene in the affairs of the other Caucasian republics, as soon as the Soviet Government was strong enough, it disregarded its solemn pledges and reverted to the worst practices of Russian imperialism. And the first victims of Moscow gangsterism were the Caucasian peoples.

With its conquest by the Red Army, Caucasia began a new era, the worst it has experienced in its long history.

I am indeed proud to be a Caucasian by birth, because no other part of the Soviet Unon has offered such heroic, desperate and long resistance to the Communists as has Caucasia. Armed revolts and bitter fighting took place in Armenia, Azerbaidjan, North Caucasia and Georgia in 1921, '22, '23, '24, '27 '31 and '37, during which years Moscow had to use its regular troops, tanks, artillery, and air force to crush the Caucasian patriots. During the whole period between the two world wars, the resistance of the Caucasians continued, while the free world extended its material and even moral support to Moscow and thus helped to strengthen Russian tyranny in Caucasia and other parts of the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands of Caucasians sacrificed their lives in the struggle for freedom and hundreds of thousands perished in the slave camps of the Siberian tundras.

This persecution and policy of genocide are continuing even today. It is true that oppression and terror reign in the whole of the Soviet Empire, but in Caucasia they take on a particularly savage character. No one has ever been persecuted or shot in Soviet Russia itself for "national deviation," but in Caucasia and other non-Russian republics, this is the accusation most often heard. Thousands upon thousands of non-Russians have been shot because of their so-called "bourgeois nationalism" and national deviation. It is interesting to note that among the victims were many once powerful and influential non-Russian Communists. In Caucasia the Communists are seeking to destroy not only individuals, groups, and social classes, but they are liquidating whole nationalities—men, women and children.

For example, as was reported to the United Nations in our memorandum of February 28, 1954, more than a million North Caucasians were exterminated or deported to Siberian slave labor camps just ten years ago. And 50,000 Georgians suffered the same fate in 1946.

In spite of the terror and wholesale persecutions, the Communists have never succeeded in crushing the spirit of the Caucasians. Caucasia has never been safe for them, and even today they can only maintain their grip on the country by the use of brute force.

Caucasia is the Achilles Heel of the Soviet Union. Even aside from its tremendous strategic importance, the loss of Caucasia would mean the paralysis of Soviet industry. The Communists know this, but so do we. For this basic reason alone, if for no other, everyone working toward the common goal of ending Moscow's tyranny must support the Caucasian struggle for freedom.

In spite of the present uncertain international situation and the apparent disinterest on the part of the free world, we meet here today to express our firm belief in our ultimate liberation. The world now realizes that our enslavers and enemies are also the enemies of the whole human race. Today Caucasia and other oppressed nations are not alone.

History teaches us that nations that do not despair nor abandon even for a moment their fight for freedom will always attain it in the end.

We are convinced that this will hold true for Caucasians as well, and that they will regain the lost independence and liberty which they so richly deserve.

MR. DOUMBADZE was followed by several speakers representing other nations oppressed by Soviet Russia, as well as by well wishers and friends of the Caucasian nations. Of special note was the speech by Dr. *Clarence A. Manning,* Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University, which we reproduce in full.

IT IS A GREAT HONOR to speak at this meeting of the Caucasian Relief Society on behalf of the Caucasian peoples who are so little appreciated abroad. It is especially appropriate that this meeting should be on Memorial Day when the American flags are at half mast until noon, and then are raised. They are at half mast in honor of the heroic dead. They are raised as a sign of triumph and hope for the future. So with this meeting. It commemorates the restoration of independence to the Caucasian republics. It commemorates the millions of sacrifices under both Czarist and Soviet régimes, and it indicates the final hope of the victory of a free world in which the free Caucasian peoples will have a part.

It is bitter irony that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew the Caucasus as the home of free peoples. The West learned of the ancient world from the Greek scholars who went to Europe as displaced persons after the fall of Constantinople. Yet somewhere in the last centuries, it has reduced the ancient world to Italy and Greece and has forgotten that the eastern end of the Black Sea, with the Caucasus, was a free area within the classical civilization with its own contributions to the welfare of mankind.

A Russian has well said that in 1917 and 1918 the only foes of Bolshevism were a small band of Russian officers and soldiers who were still loyal to the Czar and "Holy Russia," and the great masses of the non-Russian peoples of the Empire who thought of liberation from the Russian yoke, be it white or red. The great statesmen of the Entente and the United States could not realize this, for they thought of Russia as a unit like England or France. Even

President Masaryk, who saw so well the need of giving liberty to the peoples of the Hapsburg Empire could not realize that the same impulses were stirring in the hearts of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire and later of the Soviet Union, with its Muscovite domination.

The West followed the view of the Russian historian Karamzin, who boldly declared that Russia was the one empire that had never expanded by force. He arrogantly denied the truth and he passed over the lies and the chicanery that had marked and still marks the policy of Muscovite expansion. It was used in the early days. It helped to deceive the Ukrainians at the time of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. It was used to wipe out the ancient dynasty of Georgia and it has been used recently to extend the Iron Curtain.

The world did not heed this, nor did it notice that the Romantic Movement which was inspired by human liberty was fatally perverted in Russia. In English literature, Byron proved his love of liberty by his death in the Greek revolution. Pushkin and Lermontov proved their "love of liberty" by celebrating and, in the case of Lermontov, by fighting for the suppression of Caucasian liberty. Even that great lover of peace and mankind, Leo Tolstoy, made his fame by his writings and exploits in fighting for the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. It is always the same story.

The people of the Caucasus know it well and that is why they have continued to struggle against overwhelming odds for liberty. Today when the Russian Soviet menace is embracing the entire free world, we can only hope that the free nations will not be fooled again, but that they will stand firm to secure freedom not only for themselves but for the enslaved peoples within Russia-USSR. If they will but do that, freedom will win and we shall see the independent nations of the Caucasus and the other peoples oppressed by Russia stand shoulder to shoulder with the free world in an international organization working honestly and freely for the good of all mankind."

COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN FORCES IN RUSSIA

by Major A. D. Tchenkeli

June 22, 1941... At dawn the German military might was hurled against Soviet Russia along the whole front of 1800 miles.

Twenty-two months before, Hitler had signed a pact of non-aggression with Stalin—a mere "marriage of convenience," by which the former obtained security in the East while turned toward the West, and the latter gained time to prepare himself for a final settlement with Germany.

"By concluding this pact," Stalin used to say later, "we gained peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of readying our forces, regardless of the pact."

The attacking Wehrmacht launched a four-pronged offensive with four army groups:

In the far north the Army Group of Von Falkenhorst, in liaison with the Finns, was directed against Leningrad and the important Russian seaport of Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean.

In the north the Army Group of Von Loeb was to advance toward Leningrad.

In the center the largest Army Group under Von Bock was to move straight on Moscow.

In the south, the Army Group of Von Rundstedt was directed towards Kiev, in the Ukraine.

On the Russian side the Red Army was deployed in three formations:

The Northern Army Group under Voroshilov — on the Leningrad front.

The Central Army Group under Timoshenko — on the Moscow front.

The Southern Army Group under Budienny—in the Ukraine.

The German reserves numbered only 26 divisions, the Soviets had at their disposal 300 divisions, mobilized during the first six months of the campaign.

At first the Germans achieved such spectacular successes that even the blitz in Europe was as nothing compared with them.

Here is a concise development of this campaign:

According to plan, Von Loeb's northern army overran the Baltic States at the speed of 60 miles a day for four days and, splitting the opposing Russians along the Stalin line, struck at the southern outskirts of Leningrad; in this blitz the Germans covered more than 500 miles in less than a month, and destroyed en route 15 Soviet divisions. Leningrad was closely hemmed in from the south, while the far northern army pressed upon it from the north. The Murmansk supply line was cut.

In the center, Von Bock's army succeeded in a series of envelopments at Bialistok, Slonim, and Minsk; destroyed 22 infantry divisions, 7 armored divisions, 6 motor-

mechanized brigades and 3 cavalry divisions, and took 300,000 Soviet prisoners, 2500 tanks, 1500 guns and 300 aircraft. Advancing irresistibly it broke through the Stalin line and reached Smolensk, 230 miles from Moscow. In this drive Von Bock's divisions, while fighting, covered 400 miles from Bialistok to Smolensk in a week. On August, the battle of Smolensk ended with annhilation of another Russian army, and the Germans took 200,000 prisoners, 2000 guns and 2000 tanks; at the same time, south of Smolensk, Guderian's Panzers captured 50,000 prisoners, 200 tanks and 200 guns. Then Von Bock turned against Moscow, and assaulted Briansk and Vyazma; here, Timoshenko's forces were split apart and crushed in the iron grip of the enveloping Panzers. Von Bock took 700,000 prisoners, 5500 guns and 1200 tanks together with an immense booty of war materials. After Hitler's delayed approval, the Germans jumped off for Moscow, when suddenly, on October 18, pouring rains, which lasted without respite until November, bogged down the exhausted Germans; on November 3rd, the first frosts came, and the terrible Russian winter set in definitely. Soon the temperature fell to 22° F. below zero, stalled the tank and truck engines, grounded the Luftwaffe, and among the soldiers caused many deaths by freezing. On November 16th, in a last effort, von Bock assaulted Moscow, and his advanced units reached Dmitrov, 14 miles from the city. By December 2nd they were already in the suburbs, in sight of the Kremlin. But the Germans were unable to keep up their drive; the temperature of 25° F. below zero was too much to withstand and they stopped, exhausted, on December 5th.

In the south, Von Runstedt at first made slow progress in his drive but, gaining momentum, in July his Panzers swept on to Jitomir, which fell; then at Human they encircled 22 Soviet divisions, 6 of which were armored, killed 200,000 men and took 100,000 prisoners.

In September, near Kiev, striking Budienny's army from all sides, Von Runstedt accomplished the greatest envelopment coup of this war and took 675,000 prisoners, 3700 guns, 900 tanks, and an imposing booty of war materials. After this, the Germans advanced into the Crimea and the Donbas. In October they carried out another encirclement operation in the battle of the Azov Sea and took 100,000 prisoners, 700 guns, and 250 tanks.

During the first week of December, owing to the severity of the Russian winter, the German offensive was halted from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. Leningrad and Moscow were not taken but the spectacular German victories had reduced the Soviets to the verge of an abyss.

Politically, the exasperated populations of the USSR prayed for a German victory and the collapse of the hated régime. Their hope of liberation remained alive, although their national aspirations had never been clearly recognized by the German authorities nor confirmed with any friendly gesture.

Militarily, the Red Army lost about 4,000,000 of its best trained officers and soldiers, and its strength had diminished to about 1,500,000 men. This fact is proof enough that its officers and soldiers were not inclined to fight for the Kremlin régime. The loss of materials surpassed all imaginable calculations, and the crippled Soviet industry was not capable of replacing them.

Economically, the USSR lost—along with 30% of its European territory and 45% of its population—the vital areas of Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and the Donbas. The war industries of these areas were transferred beyond the Ural Mountains, but their output was still far from being normal.

Had the Wehrmacht had one month more of good weather, and had it not been for the American and British supplies, Soviet Russia would have been irremediably knocked out.

During the winter of 1941 to '42, the Red Armies undertook to disengage Leningrad, to relieve Moscow, and to raise the siege of Sevastopol, in the Crimea. In the north they failed at Leningrad as well as in their attempt to retake the Murmansk line, so necessary to the flow of American and British war supplies. In the central area the Reds succeeded in wiping out German advanced positions, but failed in approaching the enemy's main line. In the south Von Manstein's army made a clean sweep in the Crimea, and captured in the Kerch area about 150,000 prisoners, 1,200 guns, 255 tanks and 320 planes. On June 28th Sevastopol fell, and the Germans took 100,000 prisoners, 622 guns, 26 tanks, and 141 planes.

To forestall the German offensive, Timoshenko attacked south of Kharkov, but fell into Von Bock's mousetrap at Zyum, his armies being nearly annihilated; he lost more than 270,000 prisoners, 2000 guns, 1250 tanks, and his command.

Only now were the Germans directed towards the badly needed Caucasian oilfields while another offensive, having only a protective purpose, was launched towards Stalingrad. This operation could have had a successful ending had it not been for Hitler's fatal intervention which shifted several divisions and aircraft from the armies assaulting the Caucasus to help Von Paulus who was trapped at Stalingrad.

Von Bock crossed the Don at Voronej, took about 100,000 prisoners en route, and an army under Von Kleist moved on the Caucasus. On July 25th, Von Kleist captured Rostov, then Salsk, thus isolating the defenders of the Caucasus; finally Krasnodar fell and then the whole Kuban area, and the Black Sea naval port of Novorossisk. This offensive went on without any serious resistance, but the shortage of oil, and shifting the units for Stalingrad slowed it down at the gates of the main oilfields. Up to November 10th, the Germans captured only the Maikop oilfield and Alaghyr, where the Georgian military road runs through the mountains down to Tbilissi.

Previously, in the north, Von Paulus's army had taken Kalach, west of Stalingrad, with 57,000 prisoners and 500 tanks and had reached the city; here it was surrounded by fresh Siberian divisions, and surrendered to the Russians in February 1943.

From January 1943, the precarious German situation made necessary the withdrawal from the Caucasus. Moreover, from this period onward a significant fact emerged; little by little partisan warfare had spread out all over the German rear; it was being carried out by the exasperated population, which not so long ago had greeted the advance of the Wehrmacht.

In the area of the Dnieper the Russians swept back the Germans who held the Donetz basin; in the North the Red Army advanced on the whole front, pressing the Wehrmacht whose strength had already evaporated. The advancing Red Army did not permit the Germans to disengage themselves and to take up strategic positions favorable for defense and paradoxically enough, the Wehrmacht melted as it shortened its lines of communication towards Berlin.

The United States and Great Britain contributed decisively to the Russian victory, with their overwhelming contributions of war materials, which not only replaced those destroyed or taken by the Germans, but gave to the Red forces command of the air and great efficiency in the field.

THUS ENDED a campaign which had begun in a most spectacular way. The reason for its utter failure aroused much speculation but the events are still too near to be able to form a definite conclusion; in the light of the available documents on the subject, one can only mention the defects existing in the Wehrmacht strategy at the outbreak of the Russian war, and the political blunders which occurred while it was being waged.

THE STRATEGIC DEFECTS

Inferiority in Numbers and Dispersion of Forces

From the outset, the Soviet forces consistently outnumbered the Germans. In round figures the Red Army included 154 infantry divisions, 10 armored divisions with 15,000 tanks of the best model in the world, and 37 motor-mechanized brigades; the Soviet air force numbered more than 8,000 aircraft, but they were generally inferior to the Luftwaffe.

As for the Germans, they mustered against Russia: 141 divisions of which 14 were motor-mechanized; the 10 armored divisions of 1940 were raised to 19 by halving the number of tanks in each, which amounted to 3,200 in all; the Luftwaffe numbered 2,000 planes of all types.

The strategic reserves of the German High Command amounted to only 22 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 2 motor-mechanized divisions; the satellite units amounted to about 33 divisions. Thus the superiority of the Wehrmacht resided only in the value of its commanders (even tied as they were by Hitler), and in the better training and skill of its soldiers. The creation of numerous units gave to the Wehrmacht a great facility of maneuver but a limited striking power. Toward the end of 1941 it had no more strength left to carry out strategic maneuvers. Moreover, this numerical inferiority was made worse by unnecessary dispersion of forces at the wrong time and place. Thus, out of the 201 divisions of the whole Wehrmacht about 40 divisions were in France, 12 in Norway, 7 in the Balkans, and 1 in Denmark.

At that time the United States was not yet a belligerent, and Great Britain was quite unable alone to open the second front which could justify the presence of so many divisions in Europe. For the decisive blow, out of these 60 divisions 25 could have been used in Russia, or in Lybia. The annual contingent of German conscripts being 700,000 men, it was evident that the Wehrmacht was going to be badly in need of manpower. This manpower had existed by the million, and they asked nothing better than to fight the Reds, but as some of them used to say bitterly; "Hitler appeared to be Stalin's best secret weapon."

2—Shortage of Fuel and other Materials.

Another reason for the German defeat in Russia was the shortage of oil, raw materials, and winter clothing. From the end of 1941 Hitler had been warned of the absolute necessity of the Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat. Soon the Allies' bombing hit German industry, and particularly the fuel industry, to a dangerous extent. Thus in 1943 the Luftwaffe was receiving monthly only 50,000 tons of fuel (30,000 tons nine months later) instead of the 200,000 tons normally needed. The synthetic fuel production fell to an output of 3,500 tons monthly, instead of more than 220,000 tons in 1941: the same shortage occurred proportionally with raw materials and foodstuff.

And yet the Germans were at the gates of a country which abounds in all these products, yet here again, they did not avail themselves of them.

3—Delay of D-Day

In 1940, the D-day for an all-out onslaught against Russia was fixed by Hitler for May 15th, 1941. Unfortunately for Hitler, the Yugoslavian revolt drew the German forces in the Balkans which were bound for Russia, from Greece to Yugoslavia (April 6th-30th) and then to the Island of Crete (April 30th) and delayed the assault on Soviet Russia. Had Hitler stopped after the liquidation of the Balkans and launched his offensive at the beginning of May 1941, he would still have had time enough to knock out the Soviets before the Russian winter had set in.

Even starting the all-out offensive on June 22nd, Hitler would have achieved great decisive results if he had chosen another sector for the main thrust. He ignored the fact that Soviet Russia could survive the loss of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, providing that the natural bastion of the Caucasus covered her most sensitive flank, and supplied her with oil and war materials.

II—THE POLITICAL BLUNDERS

Hitler committed heavy political blunders when dealing with the nationals of the German occupied territories of Russia. Before the invasion, hopes of a speedy victory were built on the prospect that Stalin's régime would be overthrown by its own population if the Red Army suffered heavy defeats. In fact, most spectacular annihilations occurred: the Germans occupied vital areas of Russia, the panic stricken régime stood on the verge of disaster, and the populations greeted their alleged liberators; but the looked for upheaval did not occur. On the contrary, Hitler turned his potential allies into bitter foes because of the inhuman policy on which he had embarked from the very beginning of the war.

"Our task is to rule, to govern, and to exploit," he said, a month after the invasion, referring to the subjugated Russian nationalities. Keeping pace with him, Himmler added: "...we need them as slaves, otherwise they are of no interest to us." Borman was even more cynical: "They should work for us... if they are of no use, let them die..."

Such statements were enforced by acts; the Ukrainian provisional government, formed in 1940, was sent to the camp of Sachsenhausen and massacred there; about 20% of the Soviet prisoners died of starvation in other camps. To the very end of the war Hitler not only opposed all separatist tendencies among the non-Russian nationalities, but strictly forbade the formation of fighting units of these nationals. Finally the hopeless situation of the Wehrmaht obliged the German commanders to accept the services of the enthusiastic prisoners to fight the Reds. Very soon, increased by the massive desertions from the Red Army their number amounted to one million. At that period appeared a former Soviet general, A. Vlassov, who was appointed as the chairman of the Russian National Committee, created by the Wehrmacht in 1942. But as Vlassov stood from the very beginning for a "one and undivided Russia," he met a tenacious opposition from the Georgians, Ukrainians, Turkestanians, Armenians, Azermaidjanians and other non-Russians.*

As for the populations of the occupied territories, who had so heartily welcomed their alleged liberators, their fate became even worse as, freed from the N.K.V.D., they fell under the terror of the *Gestapo*. Then,

* About three years ago Mr. A. Kerensky, chief of the Russian provisional government in 1917, was charged with the task of co-ordinating the anti-communist activities of the Russian democrats in Europe. Like General Vlassov, Kerensky took a stand for the "one and undivided Russia." He met the same opposition from the same non-Russian nationalities, and his movement failed before it had started...

when it became evident that Germany was losing the war, and fearing the NKVD reprisals, they organized guerrilla warfare, to gain the Soviets' favor. A part of the population followed the Germans in their retreat; made prisoners by the Allied troops, they were handed back to Stalin against their will, together with General Vlassov and his associates, and perished at the hands of the communists.

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN said on the strategic defects of the Wehrmacht, it seems that the Germans should have captured the Caucasus before they attempted major operations in Russia. Had the Wehrmacht conquered this area before it was trapped at Moscow and Stalingrad, the Germans would have gained the following advantages:

1. The Communist-hating and freedom loving Caucasian populations would have given enough contingents to form many divisions, which the Germans needed so much toward the end of 1941. Initially these populations could have been used to paralyze the Soviet forces stationed in the Caucasus—by waging guerrilla warfare.

2. Until 1943 the Caucasus was supplying 90% of Russia's total oil production; her foodstuffs and mineral resources (coal, manganese, timber, etc.), were as varied as they were large in quantity.

3. The Caucasus enjoys, even in its high mountains, such climatic conditions, that no special clothing nor pre-adapted war materials are required.

4. From the Caucasus it is easier to assault the Soviets' most sensitive heartland under relatively more favorable conditions than in a frontal drive from the East.

5. Across marshy Poland and the stoneless Ukraine there is a lack of building materials for road and rail repairs, whereas the Caucasus abounds in timber and freestone.

6. The satisfaction of the national aspirations of the Caucasian peoples would have produced a most favorable psychological effect upon the other nationalities subjugated by Soviet Russia.

AFTER THIS short survey, it seems that the political and strategic plan of campaign against Soviet Russia should have been outlined as follows:

On June 22, 1941, when Hitler addressed his people he ought to have affirmed plainly and solemnly that the independence and full sovereignty of the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and all subjugated nationalities within Soviet Russia would be restored.

Backing these statements with friendly acts, he ought to have:

1. Permitted the formation of provisional governments of each of these nationalities from their exiles in Europe, and established treaties of alliance, assistance, etc., with them.

2. Formed by common consent with the provisional governments national units to fight alongside the Wehrmacht, but against the Red Army only.

3. Issued a call through these governments for carrying out an intensive guerrilla warfare.

4. Promised the abolition of collectivisation, and the distribution of land.

5. Promised to abolish slave labor and the concentration camps in Russia.

6. Guaranteed equality of treatment between the Germans and the allied nationalities.

As for the strategic plan of operations, it could have included the following:

1. To knock out the Red Army by seizing the Caucasus in order not to exhaust the striking power of the Wehrmacht in battles of attrition across the Russian vastness.

2. To create a "Liberation Army of the Caucasus" with 30 divisions drawn from France, plus the Caucasian formations. The task of this army should have been to follow the army group of von Rundstedt, as a strategic reserve in case of emergency, but under normal conditions not to be engaged beyond the boundaries of the Caucasus.

3. To attack the Russians by surprise all along her frontiers, in order to draw as many as possible of the Red Armies, and to destroy them in double envelopment maneuvers, with which the Soviet High Command was then quite unfamiliar.

4. To stop the Wehrmacht on the line running South-North, and marked with: Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk, the Valdai Hills, Novgorod, and Leningrad; to fortify this line for a stand, to hold and paralyze the opponent Soviet armies.

5. To entrust the Ukrainian formations with the conquest of the Crimean peninsula.

6. To entrust the Southern Army with the task of seizing Stalingrad, and establishing a strategic barrage turned northward, along the Lower Don and the Lower Volga, (Akhtuba).

7. To rush the "Liberation Army" of the Caucasus toward the Black Sea littoral through Krasnodar, Novorossisk, Tuapse, Batumi, while the Caucasian formations would seize, with the help of local partisans, the three highways across the Caucasian Mountains.

8. To launch the air and ground forces in an all-out offensive from the Caucasus northward following the Moscow, Gorki, and the Ural Mountains axis, while the Armies in Finland would operate southward on the Leningrad-Moscow axis.

9. To knock out the enemy with speed, before the Soviets' losses were alleviated by the war supplies from abroad.

10. To plan these operations for two summer campaigns at the most.

HITLER LOST World War II because he committed numerous strategic blunders, and mainly because he neglected the Caucasus as well as the national aspirations of her populations.

For fear that such errors might be repeated, may our Allies, present and future, avoid the same blunders.

GEORGIA AND RUSSIAN EXPANSION*

by ALEXIS IMERI

THE REVOLT OF 1804

IN 1804, A NEW rebellion broke out in Georgia. The banner of insurrection was unfurled in the mountains, and the surrounding provinces followed, so that the Russians found themselves in a very dangerous position. The passage from Georgia to Russia could be made only by crossing the high mountains, for Russia did not control the shores of the Black Sea or the Caspian, and the Turkish and Persian sea forces were strong enough to hinder the action of the Russian ships. All traffic had to follow the one highway which led into Georgia, and along this route Russian troops, transports, mail, arms, ammunition, and food were sent. If the Darial Pass were cut off, all Russian troops in Georgia would lose the access to their provision center. Both parties knew very well the importance of this roadway, therefore the Georgians immediately attacked the Russian guards in this area and soon had the whole mountain pass under control. The road to Russia was cut off and Petersburg was greatly perturbed. Alexander I gave his most emphatic order that all power be used to free this route, which was of such vast importance for the army and for the maintenance of the Russian government in Transcaucasia.

At the end of July, 1804, all the mountaineers swore before the image of Saint George to put the Russians to flight or to die. An agent was sent to Russia with a message stating that the suppressions, the pillage, violence, and bribery by the Russians must be put an end to, and that no Russian would henceforth be allowed to remain on Georgian soil. Words were translated into deeds: the Georgian patriots seized the pass-route, destroying the bridges between Ananuri and Kajschauri, and blocking the way at many places with rock, stones, trees, and earth so that it was closed for six months. The first action took place at Kajschauri where after a four-hour struggle, a Cossack post was overcome. Fifteen men were killed and the rest put to flight, leaving their whole store of material behind.[2]

At the same time messengers were sent to Prince Alexander Bagration in Persia, carrying letters which requested him to come and direct the fighting.

The administrator of Georgia was absent on a military expedition to Eriwan, and his deputy, Prince Wolkonski, acted for him. News about the revolt and the cutting off of the mountain route had disturbed him very much, but as he was not correctly or fully informed about the extent of the revolt, he had ordered only one company of infantry and three hundred cavalrymen to open the highway and to punish the "rioters." These units did not even reach Ananuri, being destroyed en route.

The area of action grew larger from day to day. On the third day the communities of Gudamakari, Chartali and Chando followed. On the 10th of July, a larger skirmish took place next the Crosshill on the field of Aldo where two guns, two hundred rifles, horses, and other material were captured. By the middle of July, after having cleared up the small posts and the units billeted in the villages, the Georgians had encircled Duschethi, Ananuri, Kobi, Kajschauri, Stephan-Tsminda, and Lomissi.[3] The Russians reckoned the rebels as numbering four thousand, but there must have been more, for it does not seem possible that four thousand could at the same time have attacked at seven different places. Besides this, General Wolkonski tried in his reports to minimize the rebellion. Soon however he had to recognize the power of the revolt and he entrusted Major Gen. Talisin with special orders to put down the insurrection.

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* See "Voice of Free Georgia," No. 2 and No. 4.

2 The Documents, Vol. II, pp. 308-09.

On July 12th, the Georgian patriots besieged the garrison of Lomissi. Four times they attacked with the sword. The fight lasted six hours and on both sides there were considerable losses. The Georgians lost forty men, among them Burduli, a leader well known in the mountains for his courage and perseverance. Major Melle and the remnants of his men who had managed to escape from Ado were annihilated at Lomissi. The Russian garrison, entrenched in the fortress, defended itself very bravely. The besiegers were handicapped by lack of artillery, and the fighting dragged on until July 15th. The Russians attempted to retire, but there was no way out through the mountains and ravines, as the Georgians held them from all sides under fire. The whole Russian unit was destroyed except two men. The occupation of Lomissi was the first important victory for the Georgians.

At the same time the units of General Talisin reached Zichis-Dsiri, where one thousand Georgians had taken their stand. General Talisin opened fire. The battle, which began on July 11th at two in the afternoon, continued throughout the whole day and night. The losses of the Georgians were greater, as they fought with rifle and sword only. On the 12th, Talisin received reinforcements of artillery, and on July 13th, the Russians launched new attacks. The battalion of Captain Kitkewitsch succeeded in turning the flank of Zichis-Dsiri and came up behind Tscharbalin, to the rear of the Georgians who, caught now between two fires, were obliged to leave Zichis-Dsiri and retire into the mountains. General Talisin was the victor, and he informed General Wolkonski enthusiastically about the three-day encounter.[4]

When General Talisin shelled Zichis-Dsiri on July 11th, a meeting took place at Barrissacho, and the Chewsurs decided upon coming to the aid of Georgia in her effort to expel the Russians. On the same day five hundred of these allies marched to Duschethi in order to reinforce the defenders. The same decision was taken by the Aragwians under the leadership of Goschpar, Durmischchan, and Dmitri Kobiashwili. All of East Georgia was now in revolt. General Wolkonski was advised that the Princes Julon and Pharnaoz Bagration had arrived in Karthli from Imerethi, with the intention of leading the uprising, and Prince Alexander took up a position between Tiflis and Eriwan with his cavalry units. Near Karaklis, Prince Alexander surprised the units of Major Montresor, killed three hundred and fifty Russian soldiers, and seized important material.[5]

The success of Prince Alexander encouraged the Tatars of Bortschalo and rioting began there. At Kachethi a large group of the Lesghians appeared. Tiflis was in great danger. Because of these events, General Wolkonski ordered General Talisin back, and charged him with the defense of Tiflis. The transfer of General Talisin gave the Georgians a breathing spell, and time to replenish their stores of material and ammunition. Moreover, the morale and optimism of the fighting men were bolstered. Good news from Ossetia arrived: the Ossetian leader and friend of the Bagrations, Achmed Dudaruk, had fortified the highway in the north, in order to make it impossible for Russian troops to approach from Vladikawkas.[6]

On July 16th, with Achmed Dudaruk at their head, three hundred Ossetians arrived at Stephan-Tsminda and gave their oath of allegiance. In this way, the revolt which had begun in the mountains spread within twenty days over the whole district from Kharthli to the North Caucasus. The Russians were in a perilous situation. It was not possible to put down the insurrec-

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3 The Documents, Vol. II, pp. 308-09.
4 The Documents, Vol. II, p. 316.
5 N. Dubrowin, *Transcaucasus*, pp. 339-40
6 The Documents, Vol. II, p. 321.

tion with the units they had, and as the highways to Russia were in the hands of the Georgians, they could not count on help from that quarter. The administrator, General Zizianow, who at this time was besieging the town of Eriwan and waiting for its surrender, was at this critical time the only one who could help them. Wolkonski, in despair, sent a special courier to Eriwan with tidings of the critical situation. At the same time, he ordered "Councillor" to send through Imerethi a " special comprehensive report" directed to the emperor, in which he wrote:

> "The turbulent mountain people have revolted and interrupted all traffic between Russia and Georgia. Besides spreading excitement over all districts of Ossetia and the upper Kharthli, they have also made it impossible to send any information. Several times I have written Lieutenant General Glasenapp to send to our assistance the Cossack regiments, but no answer has arrived. The groups within Georgia are not sufficiently strong to calm the excited masses and to extinguish the raging fire. This situation has been rendered more difficult since the Tatars of Somchithi and Schamschadil have also revolted and, under the influence of the princes, communication between Tiflis and Eriwan has been interrupted and I am not in a position to render aid to Prince Zizianow. I am forwarding the third transport to Eriwan, but though sufficiently strong units will accompany it, I am not sure whether the supply column will arrive safely."[7]

On July 24th, the patriots surrounded a Don Cossack regiment which had come from the North Caucasian front line, and after an eleven-hour battle destroyed the regiment and took eighty prisoners. All the material, equipment, horses, and weapons of the regiment, were also captured.[8]

The fighting continued during the months of July and August. On August 20th, the town of Duschethi was taken. This was a great victory for the Georgians. The Russians had run into a difficult situation. In order to help defend Tiflis, the siege of Eriwan, and the fighting which had cost the lives of so many thousands of Russian soldiers, had to be given up by General Zizianow in the month of September. At last good news arrived for them. The emperor had agreed to the demands of Wolkonski, carried by Kawelin to Petersburg, and strong military units had been ordered to put down the revolt in Georgia: five regiments under the command of General Glasenapp, one Cossack regiment from Mosdok, two battalions of mountain and heavy artillery; six companies of the Kasan Musketeers, three companies from Wologda; one company of dragoons, and one regiment of artillery under General Neswetajew from the Crimea.[9] These units arrived in the combat area at the end of September and the administrator issued the following order:

> "These insurgents must be beaten down with the sword and cut into pieces; these robbers and barbarians must find no clemency, their houses and dwelling-places must be burnt down, and during the struggle, every thought of care and charity and compassion must be suppressed."[10]

The Russian army surrounded the Georgians on all sides, like an iron ring. Resistance to such a large and well-equipped army was impossible. The beleaguered nationalists were clear-sighted enough to recognize this, but the unshakable decision to fight until death and the will to sacrifice enabled them to continue the struggle.

On October 16th, the Russian units began their attack from all sides. The regiments of Glasenapp from the north advanced very slowly, for besides the fighting they had to clear the way and to reconstruct the bridges. In every village, from every house, they were greeted with a deadly fire, and many villages resisted for a whole week. The reconquest of Darial, Lars, Kasbek, and Sion was a hard experience, and about 2700 Russian soldiers lost their lives in action before these places. In Sion the Georgians had one hundred and fifty killed and

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[7] See the Documents, Vol. II, p. 326 and N. Dubrowin, *Transcaucasus*, p. 367.
[8] See the Documents, Vol. II, pp. 296-97.
[9] See the Documents, Vol. II, pp. 296-97.
[10] See N. Dubrowin, *Transcaucasus*, Vol. I, p. 359.

the same number wounded. It was the artillery that decided the issue here. During forty-eight hours, thirty guns played on walls and fortifications. The defense became impossible, but swords in hand, the Georgians broke out of the iron circle and retreated. Sion, burnt and demolished, was occupied by the Russians.[11] The superiority of mass and arms succeeded. The Georgians were able to fight because of their knowledge of the country, its mountain passes and fords, and because of the sympathy of the whole people, but in the end the better armed troops were bound to decide the issue. The Russians proceeded systematically, step by step, and forced the defenders into a narrow circle. The end of the revolt came with the loss of Duschethi at the end of October. The wonderful examples of bravery and sacrifice could not change the final outcome. The revolt had been in vain; the Russians held the whip-hand; the last blow of resistance had been struck, and the punishment of the people began.

Vicious and cruel in the extreme was the Russian reprisal. After having burnt the dwelling houses, whole families, men, women and children, were imprisoned. A Russian official, secretary of the Tiflis court, (Lofitzki) writes in his reports that the prisons of Tiflis, Gori, Signagi, Thelawi, Duschethi, and Ananuri were so overcrowded with prisoners that one did not know where to put them all. There was no food and no heat in the prisons so that women, children, and old persons, perished during the winter.[12] The fate of the survivors was entrusted to a secret commission of three men, with special orders that no appeal against its sentences would be heard. The president was "Councillor" Tarassow, and his assistants were Choraschewski and Nagel, officials of the service of the administrator. The activities of the commission were to be held in secret, and the execution of the sentences was entrusted to the military. The commission also had the right to rule in the cases of people not under arrest; it was in its power to make out new warrants of arrest. It is not difficult to imagine the work of this commission, as none of its members had any juridical education nor any practice in court procedure. Besides, they did not know the Georgian language. What sort of justice could be meted out by these men? But the Russian administration had no interest in right or justice. The revolt of 1804 gave them a welcome opportunity to stamp out the anti-Russian propaganda and feeling, and national sentiment in Georgia, and this opportunity they made the most of. Responsibility for the revolt was laid upon the whole of Karthli-Kachethi, and the "execution units" of the secret commission appeared in all the villages of Eastern Georgia. The number of those arrested, exiled, deported and executed can not be found in Russian sources. But from statements of contemporaries who took part in the revolt, and from those who escaped abroad, it can be ascertained that every family in Eastern Georgia lost at least one of its members.

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[11] Ibid. p. 376.
[12] See *The Documents*, Vol. III, pp. 1-8.

Dear Readers:

The aim of this publication is to give the American public true and objective information about one little-known corner of the world—Caucasia in general and particularly Georgia. Caucasia borders the sphere of the economic and strategic influence of the U.S.A. in the Middle East, and there is no doubt that in case of worsening of relations between this country and the Soviet Union, Caucasia will become of enormous importance, military and strategic.

Because of this, it is imperative that more should be known about Georgia and Caucasia. The knowledge of their history, culture, traditions, national characteristics and the political aspirations of their peoples is not only of scientific interest; it is indispensable if the U.S. foreign policy in that area is to take a realistic and practical line.

Our publication defends the political concepts and the democratic principles of the Free World, and revealing the tyranny and oppression practised by the Communists in Georgia, which is largely unknown to the world at large, strengthens the position of the anti-communist front of the free nations.

The VOFG reaches to the farthermost corners of Europe, Asia, and South America, where many thousands of Caucasians have found refuge from Communism. To give these exiles a sign that they are not forgotten, to show them that the U.S. foreign policy gives them ground for hope, and thus to strengthen their anti-communist spirit—these are the additional aims which this publication has in view.

To publish the VOFG we have up to now received no aid from any government, private, polittical or charitable institution of any country. As can be seen from the list of donors published in this issue (No. 6), we have been able to exist thanks solely to the voluntary contributions of a few Georgians. Unfortunately their resources are limited and we are in danger of being forced to suspend publication unless we get aid from other sources. This forces us to appeal to all those organizations and private persons who consider it necessary to carry on ideological struggle against communism. Financial aid will enable us to assure the regular publication of the VOFG, to enlarge its contents and to improve them. We consider that the struggle which the Georgian nation has been waging against communism ever since the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army, strengthens the anti-communist camp of the Free World. We also consider that the suspension of the publication of the only Georgian anti-communist magazine in the English language will not be to the benefit of this camp.

We are convinced that our readers will consider everything which we have said above and will render us aid without which we cannot continue publication.

Editorial Board

The Editorial Board wishes to express its sincere thanks to all those who by their generous help have made the publication of the VOFG possible.

The full list of voluntary contributors follows:

A. Gourieli, $300. M. Kvitashvili, $225. J. Andronikoff, $150. Z. Abdusheli, $175. S. Eristoff, $125. L. Doumbadze, $115. D. Chatara, $90. A. Kekelia, $80. D. Sindikeli, $77. S. Kobiashvili, $70. N. Kvariani, $50. G. Maskhi-Gleboff, $50. N. Topuria, $60. G. & O. Zaldastani, $60. M. Dadiani, $45. V. Kobahidze, $25. A. Tzomaia, $20. I. Orbeliani, $20. P. Romanishvili, $20. S. Margvelashvili, $20. K. Shatberashvili, $20. G. Habeishvili, $20. D. Purtle, $20. Pickering, $20. B. Lanning, $30. D. Nakashidze, $20. V. Sakvarelidze, $20. A. Tchenkeli, $20. A. Baratheli, $15. I. Malania, $15. S. Doumbadze, $12. M. Zakradze, $10. B. Korisheli, $10. V. Sangulia, $10. Mahatadze, $10. J. Ahmeteli, $10. T. K. Bagration, $10. T. Bagration, $10. G. Abuladze, $10. L. Pitchhadze, $10. N. O. Whitehouse, $10. G. Gabliani, $10. A. Tuskia, $6. J. Hart, $5. K. Eristavi, $5. Z. Gamkrelidze, $5. A. Gunia, $5. S. Gvasilia, $4. E. Goodman, $1. A. Merabishvili, $50. Total $2,160.

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Total — $2.650.
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