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The Voice of Free

Georgia



MAY, 1953

No. 2



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THE VOICE OF FREE GEORGIA

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INDEPENDENCE DAY OF GEORGIA

May 26th is a day of great significance to all Georgians. On this day, 35 years ago, in 1918, the Independent Republic of Georgia was proclaimed. Thus Georgia, once again, took her rightful place in the community of nations, to which she belonged for over 2,000 years.

Situated in the Caucasus, between the Black and Caspian Seas, Georgia is one of the most ancient lands of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Georgian Kingdom lasted from the 4th century B.C. until 1801, the year in which Georgia was incorporated in the Russian Empire. During her long history, Georgia knew times of defeat and decline, but she knew times of greatness too. Inhabited by a race of men, with a language completely distinct from any other living language, Georgia from the very early days came under the influence of the Graeco-Roman culture and soon became an integral part of it. Christianity was proclaimed the state religion as early as the beginning of the 4th century and ever since Georgia has been an outpost of Western culture and Christianity in the East. For centuries, almost uninterruptedly, she waged a battle for her independence and liberty, for her faith and culture. Romans, Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, all tried to crush her. She was many times defeated, but she was never subdued. Throughout history, Georgia has preserved her identity, her race, language, culture and proud traditions. There were times when she attained greatness. During the 11th-12th centuries, she was at the apogee of her power and cultural development. Under Queen Thamar the Great, she was by far the most powerful state in the East, and the brilliant culture of Georgia of those days was seemed to move in the East or in the West. But Mongols came and with them came desolation. Incessantly fighting, gradually losing power, she still kept her identity, faith, traditions and political independence.

საქართველოს ეროვნული ბიბლიოთეკა

In 1783, a treaty was signed with the Empire of the Tzars. The Christians from the North were promising their powerful protection and aid. However, in 1801, the treaty was violated by Russia and Georgia was incorporated into her Empire. Although tired and powerless after centuries of eforts, Georgia did not sumbit, and rebellions and uprisings soon became a pattern of life.

The Russian revolution broke out in 1917 and Georgia immediately profited by the occasion. On May 26, 1918, the Independence of the Republic of Georgia was proclaimed by the Georgian National Council, which was composed of the representatives of all Georgian political parties and organizations. During the next three years, Georgia proved to the world that she was, indeed ready and able to manage her own affairs. Universal, free, truly democratic elections were held and a Parliament elected. This Parliament passed a written constitution, proclaimed an absolute equality of race and sex, freedom of speech and religion; gave land to those who toiled it and passed many other laws and reforms, which proved the political maturity of the Georgian nation and her leaders. The world recognized this fact. Twenty-seven nations, including the Supreme Allied Council consisting of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan, extended their de Jure recognition to the young Republic.

And so did Soviet Russia. A Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed between Georgia and the Soviet Union on May 7, 1920. The Soviet Union recognized unconditionally the full and absolute sovereignty of Georgia and promised to have friendly, neighborly relations with her. However, only eight months later, in February, 1921, without any provocation, without even a declaration of war, the Red Army attacked Georgia and after six weeks of a bitter, unequal fight, occupied the country. Occupied, but did not subdue. The Georgian people have never submitted to the Soviet Communism and the fight begun on February 11, 1921, continued and has not ended yet. A nationwide, general insurrection, which broke out in August, 1924 and was drowned in blood by Communists, was only one of many. More than 60,000 Georgians were executed between 1921 and 1941; more than 200,000 were deported. It is difficult to estimate, how many more did this country of three and a half million inhabitants lose since 1941.

The death of Stalin, the renegade Georgians who will go down in history as one of the greatest enemies the Georgian people have ever had, gave new hopes to the Georgians. The hour of liberation cannot be far off. The Georgian case is in no way diffeernt from that of other countries subjugated by Communism. She has the same legal and moral rights to be free and independent. And every Georgian fervently believes that, sooner or later, these rights will be recognized and that the world will not forget the case of Georgia and will not leave her people under the tyranny of a foreign oppressor.

NOE JORDANIA

(1868-1953)

Noë Jordania, the first President of the Georgian Republic, died in Paris on January 12, 1953. He was in his 84th year.

The news of his death brought sorrow to all Georgians in emigration and to all friends of Georgia, and wherever there are Georgians, memorial services and meetings were held to honor his name.

In New York a memorial service was held in the Greek Orthodox Cathedral on January 17th. After the service, His Grace the Archbishop Michael made a moving speech. On Sunday, January 25th, a public meeting was held in the Hotel Commodore, which was attended by many Georgians residing in New York as well as by representatives of all countries subjugated by Soviet Russia, and others.

The meeting was opened by the President of the Georgian Association in the United States, Mr. Leo Doumbadze, who, after a short speech, introduced the speakers. The meeting was then addressed by the representatives of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasia, Turkestan and others. Two speeches were made by the representatives of the Georgian Association, one in Georgian by Mr. G. Diasamidze and one in English, by Mr. M. Kvitashvili. The text of the latter follows.

"Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen:

"We have gathered here today to honor the memory of Noë Jordania, the first President of the Republic of Georgia.

"To Noë Jordania belongs a big place in the history of contemporary Georgia. He was an able publicist and writer, a true liberal, intelligent and hard working in the interests of his fellow men. Born in 1868 in Western Georgia, he was destined for the clergy, but after spending a short time in the Theological Seminary in Tiflis, he went to Warsaw and enrolled in the Medical Faculty of the University there. From his early youth interested in the new progressive teachings, he soon left the University, and devoted himself entirely to political work.

When Noë Jordania first appeared on the Georgian political scene, a new wind was sweeping over the plains of Russia. Ideas of freedom, liberty, brotherhood and the rights of men had taken root there and in the countries under the Russian rule. Each nation understood the new teachings in its own way and tried to apply them to its own specific problems.

For the Georgians of those days it must have been a significant and decisive time. The best elements of Russia itself were declaring a war on the Tsarist State, against which the Georgians had already been fighting for nearly a century. They saw a powerful ally promising the aid not only of the majority of the Russian people, but of liberals and democrats of the whole world.

Noë Jordania threw himself heart and soul into the fight. In 1894 the

first Social-Democratic organization was formed in Georgia and from that time until the end of his days Noë Jordania remained its teacher, inspirer and leader. He was elected to the first Russian Douma (Parliament) and played a great part in politics on the all-Russian stage. Never a great orator, his main role was that of an organizer, teacher and writer on theory.

Other Georgian leaders—Tzeretelli, Tcheidze, Tchenkeli, Gueguechkori—were better known; his was the fine erudition and organizing ability. During the great schism in the Russian Social Democratic Party, he came out decisively against Lenin and his Bolsheviks and he remained all his life a moderate socialist and a liberal thinking man.

Came the February revolution and with it the break-up of the Russian Empire. What line were Georgians to take, whose largest political party was headed by Noë Jordania? Were they to continue within the framework of the new, democratic Russia, or were they to seek their salvation in their own way?

Early in 1917, the Georgian Church gave the lead. A council of church dignitaries proclaimed the restoration of the ancient autocephaly (independence) of the Georgian Church, broke all chains forcibly binding it to the Russian Church, and solemnly elected its Catholicos--Patriarch of all Georgia. This action of the Georgian Church showed the way to the political leaders and to the country as a whole.

The Independence of Georgia was proclaimed on May 26, 1918. Once again was this ancient land, justly proud of its history and cultural achievements, free to manage its own affairs, to live the life it wanted to live, to give its sons everything to which they, together with all free men, are entitled.

In the first general, universal, truly democratic elections held in Georgia, the majority went to the Party whose chairman, teacher and spiritual father was Noë Jordania and it fell to Noë Jordania to become the first President of the Republic of Georgia.

Those were difficult days. World War I, the Russian Revolution, civil war, chaos and anarchy caused by them, danger from abroad—for Turkish divisions were on the southern frontiers of Georgia, coming in the wake of the retreating, debauched Russian soldiery; complete collapse of currency and economic life, those were the conditions in which Georgia was reborn and in which Noë Jordania had to begin his work as the President of his country.

It is amazing and indeed gratifyto remember how much the Georgian nation did accomplish in three short years, until the new Russian conquest and the new bitter slavery. General elections, held in the most democratic way, Parliament, which gave the country a written Constitution, land reform, which gave the land to those who worked it—these and many other things remain as living examples and proof of the political maturity of the Georgian nation and its President—Noë Jordania. He showed himself an able administrator, a dignified statesman and a tireless worker in the interests of his country. Under his leadership Georgia showed the world that it was indeed ready and able to manage its own affairs, ready to take an honorable and right-

ful place in the community of nations.

And the world recognized this fact. Twenty-seven countries gave recognition to the young Republic. Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, were among them. And so was Soviet Russia. On May 7th, 1920, a treaty was signed in Moscow. Soviet Russia recognized unconditionally the full and absolute independence of Georgia, promised non-interference in its affairs, promised to have normal, friendly relations with her.

All the world knows today what Communist promises are worth; in 1920 one could still hope that the Soviet leaders would behave as normal, decent men.

Only eight months after the solemn treaty was signed, without the slightest provocation, without even a declaration of war, the Red Army invaded Georgia. The unequal struggle lasted from five to six weeks. How could a nation of 3,000,000, only just beginning to organize itself and to gather its forces—how could this nation hold off its powerful and ruthless northern neighbor? Georgia fell. But even though it fell, its fight for liberty, independence and the elementary rights of man continued. His armies beaten and destroyed, his country occupied, Noë Jordania did not give in. He left Georgia together with his Government and went on fighting.

Perhaps the most significant period of Jordania's life began now, a period which shows him as he really was. For all that he accomplished before Georgia fell, he will be remembered with respect and admiration for his intellectual qualities; for what he did afterwards, in exile, the Georgian nation will cherish his memory and remember him with love and gratitude, because he did not fail them but when misfortune struck showed that he was a man and a true Georgian.

From 1921 until his death on January 12, 1953, he took a leading part in the fight for the restoration of Georgia's liberties and independence. He wrote many books and pamphlets; he contributed to the press, he visited nearly every country in Europe and pleaded his country's cause. Everywhere he won respect and admiration for his indomitable faith, his courage, his intellectual qualities and his remarkably correct appreciation of the problem of Communism.

It was not given to him to see his beloved Georgia free once again. But we who are left know that the work to which he gave so many years of his life will bear fruit. The future is on our side. The whole world knows today what Communism means, sees that the Red Empire has grown to be a terrible menace to free men everywhere. But empires founded on cruelty and brute force and on denial of the most elementary rights of all human beings can not endure. The Red Empire will also come to an end.

When that day comes, the grateful Georgian people will remember Noë Jordania; will remember his fight and will not fail the memory of this man, who was a great humanitarian as well as a great Georgian.

THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF GEORGIA

By DIMITRI SINDIKELI

The New York Times on February 28, 1952, in an editorial under the title "Two Anniversaries," reminding the world of the anniversary of the occupation of Georgia by Soviet troops wrote:

"The other anniversary has been almost forgotten but it is still worth remembering: it was thirty-one years ago this week that the Red Army swept into Tiflis and, despite prior promises, ended Georgia's national independence, creating a puppet régime which is now part of the Soviet Union. The immediate tactics in each case were different, but the results were the same."

And so this year it is already 32 years since the tragedy of the people of Georgia began. That is why we think it appropriate to bring to the memory of the free world once more that faraway, hemmed in between the Black and the Caspian Seas, there exists a small, but couraegous nation—Georgia, which was one of the first victims of Communistic aggression.

It happened 32 years ago, in February, 1921.

In order to get a clear vision of the tragic event, it is necessary to have a brief outline of the history of that period. It should be remembered that before the actual hostilities began there was a pact of non-aggression, mutual friendship and good will, signed on May 7, 1920 by Soviet Russia and Georgia, recognizing the national independence and sovereignty of Georgia, including a promise of non-interference in its internal affairs.

The first paragraph of the pact reads as follows:

"The Soviet Socialist Federal Republic of Russia recognizes without any reservation all the rights of the independent Georgian nation, its full sovereignty and inviolability of its territory."

The second paragraph of the pact specifies that Soviet Russia* undertakes the obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Georgia."

But Soviet Russia acted in this case exactly in the same way as in all other similar cases; without a declaration of war, on February 11, 1921, the Red Army crossed the Georgian borders.

The invasion started from three different points:

The 11th Soviet Army and the 18th Caucasian Division attacked from Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively; while the cavalry of Jloba and the 98th Brigade of the 33rd Infantry Division advanced from Vladikavkaz through the Mamison Pass.

But Georgia, having a 2,000-year-old tradition of fighting for its freedom and independence, was not caught unaware by the aggression of the much stronger and more numerous enemy, but met the invaders with fierce resistance.

*The term "Soviet Russia" is used throughout this article because at that time the meaningless term 'Soviet Union" had not yet been promulgated.

On February 16, 1921, when the battle was raging in the vicinity of Tiflis, the Georgian Government appointed as Commander-in-Chief, General G. Kvinitadze, the Chief of the Military College, who had already gained popularity by smashing an attack of the Soviet Army in 1920 and was nicknamed the "Lucky General." His assignment to the post of Commander-in-Chief raised the morale of the combat troops and the nation's enthusiasm.

Together with the regular troops, citizens of every class and category were fighting in the Volunteer Army: students, writers, members of liberal professions, factory workers, peasants who left their villages to join the army, schoolboys and cadets of the Military Training School. The superhuman courage and self-sacrifice of the cadets, who in a stubborn hand-to-hand fight repelled the enemy's attack and forced him to retreat, and recaptured the Kodjor Heights, produced nevertheless only a temporary relief. The ultimate winning of this battle was only to add one more glorious page to the already long history of Georgia, but it did not affect the final outcome of the war, which was decided by the sheer numbers of the invading aggressors. On March 18, 1921, the Georgian Government left the country.

After Georgia had been overrun and occupied by foreign troops, the small number of local Communists undertook to persuade the world that a spontaneous internal change of régime had taken place in Georgia and that the Red Army occupied the country with a view "to helping and protecting the Georgian proletariat against capitalist oppressors." This was done according to Lenin's instructions, who in a letter sent to Georgian Communists on April 18, 1921, said:

"A tremendous campaign is being conducted in Western Europe against Soviet Russia in connecton with the Sovietization of Georgia. It is imperative that the Georgian Revolutionary Commttee undertake a serious counter-propaganda emphasizing the pacifying role of Soviet Russia, as well as the active role of Georgian working and peasant masses in overthrowing Georgian bourgeois government."

After having received this directive from Lenin, the local Communists energetically proceeded, contrary to all evidence, to affirm that a spontaneous change of government, desired by all the population, had occured in Georgia.

A considerable amount of effort was expended by the Communist press in order to publicize and confirm this idea. The newspaper "Communist" wrote on May 5, 1921:

"The Red Army of Soviet Russia, our comrade in the class struggle, has given us help and has rescued us from the claws of the Entente."

Lavrenti Beria on the fifteenth anniversary of the invasion of Georgia by Soviet troops, February, 1936, wrote in the official paper "Izvestia":

"In February, 1921, Georgia, with the help of the Soviet Red Army was liberated from the Menshevik oppression and was able to establish Soviet dictatorship."

But the efforts of Georgian Communists to create an impression that the occupation by the Red Army

was a friendly act, designed to protect and to assist the Georgian proetariat, failed to produce the desired results; proof of this is found in the text of a declaration made by the President of the Georgian Communist Party of that period—Mr. Ph. Maharadze (this text had been sent to Moscow to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on December 6, 1921), parts of which read as follows:

"The arrival of the Red Army and the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia had the outward appearance of a foreign occupation because in the country itself there was nobody who was ready to take part in a rebellion or a revolution. And at the time of the proclamation of the Soviet régime there was, in the whole of Georgia, not only not a single Communist cell, but not even a single member of the party capable of organizing action or providing leadership and this task had been accomplished mainly by doubtful or sometimes even criminal elements . . ." And further on ". . . We must realize that during the last three or four years, the Georgian masses got accustomed to the idea of an independent Georgia." And it continued ". . . To be frank we have to admit that at the beginning we adopted, at least on the surface, a seemingly right attitude in proclaiming on every occasion that Soviet Russia was not aiming at depriving Georgia of its independence and that the Red Army entered the country in order to liberate the working masses. The question arose whether we would be able to maintain this stand? We had to demonstrate that we based our position on the independence of Georgia, but in words only, while in effect we rejected it and did not have it as our objective. An intolerable situation, as it is impossible to deceive masses in a political question of that nature, and especially the Georgian people who in recent years had gone through ordeals of fire and water . . . We were announcing that we were working toward the creation of an independent Georgia . . . while we were taking systematic steps to nullify our promise."

All these statements prove that the independence of Georgia had been smothered and annihilated by an intervention of foreign troops.

Another proof of this fact can be found in the writings of Trotzky (Commisar of War Ministry of the Russian Soviet Republic at that time), who in his book "Stalin," published in exile, made the following remarks:

"It looks as if Stalin had forgotten that we had signed on May 7, 1920, a pact of friendship and non-aggression with Georgia and then on February 11, 1921, the Red Army, upon his order, crossed the Georgian border." Trotzky at that time was trying to put all the blame on Stalin and shift the responsibility over to him. But it should be kept in mind that if their personal relations had remained friendly and the final split had not occured, putting Trotzky to the necessity of leaving the country and going into exile, the question of occupation of Georgia by the Red Army would not have caused any disagreement or conflict between him and Stalin. This is confirmed by Trotzky himself in his other book, "Imperialism and Revolution," where the following remark appears:

"We have no objection, and in principle could not have any against the penetration of the Red Army into Georgia . . . It is not our intention to minimize the role or deny the merit of the task accomplished by the Red Army in the matter of sovietization of the Caucasus."

It is well known that in 1922, while in Tiflis, Trotzky in his capacity of Chief Commissar of the Red Army said:

"We do not contemplate leaving Georgia, but if the situation develops in such a way that we have to, then before going away, we would slam the door so that there would be nothing left; not a single brick would remain in place."

All of the foregoing attests that the Kremlin leaders were in complete agreement and that they acted by common consent in invading Georgia and also that their imperialistic tendencies were already apparent immediately after the end of the Civil War.

In brief, declarations of the local Communists (as stated by Ph. Maharadze, then leader of the Georgian Communist Party) clearly indicate that there was no one in Georgia who desired or was willing to support a Communist régime, that it was forcibly imposed by the intervention of a foreign power and that the Communist coup of February, 1921 is simply another instance of Communist tactics when invading and subjugating a smaller country. In this unequal struggle Georgia had been crushed, but had never resigned herself to her fate, and had never recognized Communist rule. This is proven by the existence since 1921, and up to the present time, of a partisan movement fighting for liberation in frequent uprisings; clandestine and open anti-Communist activity; and passive and active resistance.

In the meantime, on this side of the Iron Curtain, the Georgian nationals in exile have not missed any opportunity, since 1921, to remind the free world of the horror and brutality of the Communist régime, its total disregard of moral principles and basic decency, as well as of the infernal conditions of life created under their domination. For the last 32 years Georgians in exile have continued their anti-Communist work with a view to restoring the independence and sovereignty of Georgia by every lawful means at their disposal.

Western Europe was exhausted after World War I and had no inclination to show interest in an anti-Communist activity. There was even, at the time, a certain tendency to regard such activity with disappproval. Many left-wing groups in various European countries were in the mood to support morally the so-called "social experiment of Soviet Russia."

But after the end of World War II, the attitude of the Soviet Union and such actions as the virtual annexation of a considerable part of Eastern Europe, the fostering and fanning up of riots and disorders in Greece, Egypt, Iran and more recently in North Africa, as well as the Soviet policy of expansion in the Far East with its corollary of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and Indo-China, finally compelled the free world to come out of a dream and face reality, giving an impulse for the creation of a movement aiming at resisting Soviet pressure and aggression, as it became more and more apparent that Soviet expansion is a

synonym of war, brutality, starvation, and oppression. This movement is supported and led by the great American Democracy, which, having been founded on the principles of freedom and human dignity, cannot tolerate the idea of brute force prevailing over truth and justice.

The Georgian nation, which fell under Communist rule in February, 1921, now in 1953, thirty-two years later, perceives in this movement a renewal of its hopes and aspirations toward regaining national independence and freedom from Communist oppression.

"PURGES" IN GEORGIA

By DR. D. CHATARA

The struggle of the Georgian people against the Soviet régime began on the day of the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army and is continuing today.

The last nation-wide insurrection, which took place in August-September, 1924, was drowned in blood by the Communists. Tens of thousands of Georgians, guilty or innocent, were executed, put into concentration camps or deported. Georgia was "cleaned" of all those elements which fought against Communist Russia with arms in hand and did not give up hope of the restoration of the independence of their country. More than that: seizing the pretext, the Communists cleaned out all those who were suspected of being their potential enemies and who were likely to raise their voices against Soviet tyranny whenever an opportunity arose.

Sorrow and despair descended upon Georgia after the Soviet executioners had done with her. This is what a noted German historian and writer, E. Obst, who happened to be in Georgia during and after the insurrection, has to say:

". . . When I was in Tbilissi, I found the town plunged into deep sadness. Most women were wearing mourning, their faces expressing boundless sorrow. Almost all men were wearing black ties, yet one could feel that they feared their sadness being detected. There was almost no Georgian family left without at least one of its members lost. The insurrection was suppressed with unprecedented severity. According to the official Soviet statistics, several hundred people were legally executed, but who cares about false statistics? Thousands were executed without any trial by the bloodthirsty Cheka. In many cases it was not possible to prove that the victims had taken part in the insurrection."

The Communists were convinced that they would succeed in crushing the spirit of the Georgian people; and, on the surface, it might

have appeared that they did, partly at least, succeed in their design. With the passing of years, Moscow grew to such power that it became obvious to the Georgians that an open rebellion against the tyranny represented too big a danger to the nation—the danger of complete physical extermination. The fight, arms in hand, ceased.

But the terror did not succeed in breaking the spirit of the people, or their will to be free once again. And this will increases and manifests itself more every time there is a possibility of aid from the outside. In other words, every time the world situation seems to turn against the Soviet Union, hopes revive and people begin a secret, but, nevertheless, active preparation for the ultimate end—the liberation of Georgia and the restoration of its independence.

This was the situation just prior to World War II. The Nationalist movement in Georgia had grown to such an extent, that in 1937-38, the alarmed Kremlin was compelled to resort to severe "purges." Moscow considers the strengthening of the "Home Front" as the principal factor in the preparation for war. That is why, during those purges, not only the intellectuals of Georgia were "cleaned out," but also those members of the Communist Party itself who saw the danger to Georgia of the policy of "Russification" which the Kremlin was intensively carrying out. "Titoism" is a comparatively new word, but it is an old conception. Many Georgian Communists, probably the majority, were potential "Titoists" in those years before the war. Many of them were life-long comrades of Stalin, besides being his fellow countrymen, but this "greatest Russian" of all "Great Russians,' did not spare them. Ezhov, who was then the head of the hated and dreaded N. K. V. D., and his executioners were given the task of liquidating practically every top-ranking Georgian Communist. Here is a list, by far incomplete, of those who were cleaned out—murdered would be a better word.

G. Mgaloblishvili, Chairman of the People's Commissariat of Georgia, member of the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party; Budu Mdivani, Deputy Chairman of the People's Commissariat of Georgia; S. Eliava, Chairman of the Transcaucasian People's Commissariat, member of the All-Soviet Communist Party; M. Toroshelidze, Chairman of the Planning Commission of Georgia; T. Jgenti, Secretary of the Executive Committee of Georgia; D. Kiladze, Commissar for Internal Affairs; S. Maticashvili, Commissar of Agriculture; G. Kurulashvili, Commissar of Labor; M. Orakhelashvili, Commissar of Education; G. Kutateladze, Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District; Buachidze, Commander of a Georgian Division; Z. Lordkipanidze, Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjaria; N. Lakoba, Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhasia; S. Duduchava, Chairman of the Arts Commission of Georgia; E. Bedia, Editor of the news-

paper "Communist," and many, many others.

No government department, Communist Party, or, indeed, any organization in Georgia escaped the "purges" of the dreaded Security Police. "National Deviation" was given as reason for wholesale executions and deportations and for destroying everything which could remind Georgians of their proud past, their lost liberties and lost independence.

This is how the Kremlin strengthened the "Home Front" in Georgia.

And yet, the moment the war broke out, it became clear that the possibility of seeing the Soviets beaten and their Empire destroyed, had, once again, given hope to the Georgian people. Georgian officers and men, conscripted into the Red Army, went over to the Germans by the thousands, not because of any particular love for them or belief in their cause, but because they thought that Germany was the power which would destroy the Soviet régime and its tyranny. They went over because it gave them a chance to fight against Communism and against the Russian invaders of their country. In Georgia itself the people awaited impatiently the arrival of the liberating forces. The nation began to arm and prepare itself. Underground organizations sprang up once again, anti-Communist and anti-Russian literature was being distributed in ever growing numbers. It even came to open warfare. Armed groups took to the mountains and the forests and carried out guerrilla operations aimed at disrupting the Soviet troop movements and the flow of supplies from Georgia to the North.

Great agitation began in 1942, when German troops and with them some Georgian detachments were fast approaching the frontiers of Georgia.

At a meeting held in the Opera House in Tbilisi, leaflets were distributed calling on the people to overthrow the Russian Communist rule and to proclaim the independence of Georgia.

Walls of the streets of Tbilisi and other towns and villages were plastered with inscriptions:

"Down with the Soviets; Long live a free and independent Georgia," etc. Men, especially sent as emissaries, went over to the Georgian Legion, fighting on the German side, and brought news that Georgia was ready to detach itself from Russia and that, indeed, a Government was already formed and ready to take over.

However, the war ended and left Georgia still in the clutches of the Communists, still a victim of Soviet tyranny. Men who had fought for the independence of their country were either executed or sent away to forced labor camps. Georgia was once again "pacified,' was again made to feel the power, the cruelty, and the inhumanity of the Communists and their unholy creed.

And yet, all the signs show that hope is not dead. The world situation is once again turning against the Soviets. Georgians see that the Kremlin's policy is leading humanity to a new catastrophe, a new

world war. They believe that in the coming life and death struggle, the Free World will win and Georgia will have another chance. This belief is so strong that despite the terror, the never ceasing arrests and deportations, the nationalist movement for separation from Russia is daily growing in strength. In fact, it has taken hold of the country to such an extent that the Kremlin has again had to resort to its well tried method—the "purge."

In April, 1952, during the general meeting of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, Beria, who came from Moscow especially for the occasion, criticized severely the local party and its leadership. Moscow was blaming the Georgian Communists for failing to instill the Communistic faith in the Georgian youth, for failing to root out the "local patriotism" and even aiding in its spread, deliberately or otherwise.

Immediate wide-spread "purges" began in Georgia. The following list, incomplete of course, will make it plain that the real and potential "deviationists" and "enemies of the people" came from the very top level of the Communist hierarchy of Georgia.

K. Charkviani, General Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, a close personal friend of Beria; Z. Chubinashvili, Prime Minister of the Georgian Republic; Rapava, Minister of the Interior and another personal friend of Beria; M. Baramia and I. Zambahidze, members of the Politburo of the Georgian Communist Party; D. Djibladze, in charge of the Personnel branch of the Tbilisi Bureau of the Party; A. D. Djijinashvili, secretary of the Propaganda branch of the Bureau; V. Barbakadze, secretary of the "Lenin" Raycom of Tbilisi; Zodelava, secretary of the Georgian "Komsomol"; D. Davitadze, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Adjaria; V. Gogua, secretary of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia; Z. Kehoveli, first vice-president of the Georgian Government; V. Bakradze, third vice-president and Minister of Food Supply; V. Kruashvili, Minister of Justice; M. Chubinidze, Minister of State control; Pagava, former Minister of Justice; Tzimakuridze, Minister of Finance; Sturua, former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia; Bukiashvili, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and many others.

In September, 1952, A. J. Mgeladze, the newly appointed General Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and therefore the most powerful man in Georgia, said as follows:

". . . the former leadership forgot about the fact that international reactionaries are trying to find in our Republic national elements with hostile attitude, in order to carry out diversionist espionage work with their help." He said that if the former leaders had been allowed to grow in authority—" . . . Georgia would have fallen apart into a series of independent units and there would have been left to the Party and the Government of Soviet Georgia only an empty shell." He said that

the new leaders had brought an end to this situation and would—"ensure the exposure and criminal prosecution of elements hostile to us and root out their subversive activity."

Anyone who has lived in a Communist country, or who knows the situation behind the Iron Curtain, will easily understand what those words mean. New terror, new arrests, new deportations. But he also knows that Communist oppression will not kill the spirit of the Georgian people and their absolute determination to be free again one day. Mgeladze himself will disappear, just as all his predecessors have disappeared. Charkviani, Mamulia, Gogoberidze, Kahiani, Kiknadze—where are all these once all-powerful men? In the future, as in the past, the Communists will go on destroying one another.

You cannot meet today in Georgia a single former Minister, or any man who has held a top-ranking position in the government or the Communist Party. You will not meet them because they are not just dismissed—they are eliminated. What other fate can await Mgeladze?

Communists come and go. It is their nature to devour one another. But nothing will stop Georgians from fighting for their independence and nothing can change their determination to be free men once again.

Looking back on the thirty odd years of the Communists' rule in Georgia, on all that has happened there and is happening today, certain facts and certain conclusions become evident. And here are some of them:

1. Beginning from February - March, 1921, when Georgia was overrun by the Red Army, until today, Georgia's fight against Communism and against Russian domination has never ceased.

2. Despite terror and oppression, Georgia's fight for the restoration of her liberties and national independence increases every time there is hope of aid from outside.

3. Periodic "purges" are the means Communists adopt in order to weed out all hostile elements and thus strengthen the "home front."

4. "Purges" are the best indication that the Kremlin expects, or is getting ready for a war.

5. If the Kremlin's aggressive policy indeed leads to the breaking out of a world struggle, we may be sure that the Georgian people will take a firm stand on the side of the free world.

Note: These lines were already in print when the Tbilisi Radio announced that the secretary of the Georgian Communist party, A. I. Mgeladze, has been removed from his post and arrested. The Minister of State Security, I. Ruhadze and several other top-ranking Georgian Communists have also been removed from their posts.

A new "purge" has started in Georgia. Again there is talk about "treason, bourgeois nationalism, unshakable union with the great Russian people."

This latest purge is yet another proof that, even after 30 years, Moscow still feels herself insecure in Georgia and even among the members of the Communist party, cannot find men, who can be relied upon to be faithful to the interests of Soviet Russia.

WAR OR PEACE?

By ALEXANDER TSOMAIA

At the 19th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held in Moscow in the Fall of 1952, Stalin addressed himself to the Communist parties all over the world and advised them to put themselves at the head of any movement or organization which has for its purpose the destruction of existing political régimes.

At the same time he openly declared that Moscow will give all possible assistance to foreign Communist organizations. This statement has, in our opinion, a very great significance. Up to now, Moscow has always tried to convince the rest of the world that it did not give any material assistance to the foreign Communist parties. What has happened now? Why does Moscow openly admit something, which in the past it has always tried to deny.

It is obvious that we are dealing with a well-thought-out step. Moscow is no longer satisfied with the role of secret helper and now wishes to come out as the flag-bearer of world revolution.

Communism is a fighting ideology. Marx knew very well that what he taught could not be achieved without bloodshed and terror; that is why we read in the "Communist Manifesto":

". . . Communists openly declare that it is impossible to achieve their aims without destroying the existing social organisms. Let the ruling classes beware of the Communist revolution. (Call to arms)."

And again ". . . Proletarians have nothing to lose except their chains. They will conquer the whole world." (Communist Manifesto, 1848).

On May 5, 1852, that is to say four years after the "Communist Manifesto" appeared, in a letter written to Wedemeyer, Marx tried to explain the inevitability of the coming struggle against the existing society and says ". . . as you see, I have proven that the struggle between classes will inevitably bring us to the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Therefore, the struggle between classes and the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to say the conquest and physical destruction of one part of society by another and the denial of the spiritual values which society has worked out and accepted during thousands of years, both proceed from the same source:

". . . laws, morals, religion are bourgeois prejudices, unacceptable to the Proletariat and which only serve in the defense of the borgeois interests." (Communist Manifesto).

To spread these ideals and to prepare social revolution was the task of the so-called "First International," organized at about this time. To aid the followers of this "International," and to organize revolutionary societies which would overthrow the existing systems, was the aim of the authors of the "Communist Manifesto."

That is why Stalin's declaration that he will help the foreign Communist parties is a belated admisson of what Moscow has already been doing for a long time and a repetition of one of the clauses of the "Manifesto," which reads:

". . . Communists aid all revolutionary movements which are aimed against the existing social and political systems." (Communist Manifesto).

At the 19th Congress of the Party, Moscow openly declared that it is following this way. This is an open threat against the free world and shows what the Kremlin's tactics are. Communist parties, spies, and the Communist fifth column, must work to create disorder between the countries of the free world, to organize new centers of civil wars and to render normal peaceful life impossible. For this kind of activity Stalin, by his own open admission, was prepared to give all possible aid.

It is an undeniable fact that during World War II, the Soviet Union was saved from destruction only by Anglo-American assistance. Yet, as soon as the war ended, the Kremlin started working against these countries.

Trieste, Austria, Germany, Czechslovakia, Greece, Iran, Indo-China, Tibet, China, Korea—here is an incomplete list of countries, where, by various means, Moscow started to war against Anglo-American interests. In not a single instance did Stalin openly use Russia's armed forces. Czechoslovakia was conquered and given to him by the Czech Communists; China, by the Chinese Reds, and in Korea, officially, it is the North Koreans who are fighting. Formally Russia is nowhere at war; she makes others fight for her, hides behind others, backs.

These are the Soviet leaders' old and, up to now, always successful tactics. What Stalin said at the 19th Party Congress shows that they are still faithful to them. That is why, in the near future, we should expect an increase in "little wars" and will see new points of struggle.

Moscow's aim is quite clear: it is fighting for mastery of the world and does not hide it. If the free world will give in without a struggle, Russia does not want war; if not, wars in Korea and Indo-China will be followed by wars elsewhere.

Until President Eisenhower's election, the diplomacy of the free world was aimed at localizing conflicts. It was as though blindfolded before the real danger. This encouraged the Kremlin and it would not be far wrong to say that it has already started World War III in the form in which it wants it. Korea is one of this war's fronts. To the question "War or Peace?" Moscow has already answered with weapons.

Moscow's war has a second, theoretical, ideological side: it preaches exact logical ideas and promises better life and a better future to all men who are discontented with their lot. Moscow's appproach is always straight and concrete in form, and this is wherein lies its appeal. Every word and sentence Moscow utters springs from the Communist ideology and is used for one purpose only—to acquire new friends and followers and to conquer new countries. Their propaganda is quite shameless and unreserved; it spreads deliberate lies and exploits by every means the weaknesses of its opponents. Everything Moscow says is said with the purpose of weakening the free world's faith in itself and starting it on the way to self-destruction.

How does the free world answer this propaganda? Up to now it has been satisfied with repudiating various lies spread by the Communists and improving the material well-being of the free countries and proving that they are far ahead of the Communist world in this respect; stressing the advantages of living in the free world and describing the Russian Communist régime and its tyranny. These are the main points in the anti-Communist propaganda of the free world.

The question is: What do we want and what do we hope to achieve by such propaganda? Does not every man living under Communism know much better than we do the conditions there? Does it profit a blind man if you continually talk to him of light? To point to Stalin's tyranny is hardly enough to make an active anti-Communist fighter out of a Soviet citizen. Every fighter needs a definite, clearly stated objective, exact poltical ideas and a flag to fight for. Every Soviet citizen should know beforehand what life to expect, once the free world is victorious. What is needed are clear-cut slogans and ideas and definite plans for the future. To promise a change in the social conditions and betterment of the material aspects of life is not enough. This would satisfy only one part of the population of the Soviet countries.

The crux of the matter is that the Soviet Union consists of a conglomeration of various peoples, conquered by Russia at one time or another, peoples of different races with distinctive languages of their own, with their own cultures, history, religion, traditions, and interests. Most of them have fought a long time for their national independence and Moscow was compelled to grant to them some sort of recognition, quite fictitious in fact. The Soviet Union consists of 16 federated Republics, but their independence exists on paper alone; in reality, of course, there is no liberty or independence anywhere in the Soviet Union. This has made the problem of nationalities even more acute than it has ever been before and today there are no more bitter enemies

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of Moscow than the non-Russian republics, which form together with Russia itself, the Soviet Union. Each of these republics has its own national political, social, economic, and religious problems, as have the satellite countries conqured by Russia after WW II. That is why it would be a very grave error to represent the Soviet Union as one whole organism and to try to produce slogans and policies acceptable to all. This would be just a waste of time and opportunity because such slogans do not and cannot effectually exist.

On a proper understanding and solution of the national question depends the position of non-Russian peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union. For a long time they have been engaged in a bitter fight with Moscow imperialism and they will, of course, stand by the side of those who will promise them aid in this fight for their national independence. It is a fact that during World War II the great majority of the Red Army men who went over to the Germans were non-Russians.

Besides one common aim, the peoples of the Soviet world fighting against the Kremlin tyranny have also their own, purely national problems and aims, and, unless they are assured that these are taken into account and will be satisfied, the chief incentive they have for the fight against Communist Russia will no longer exist. This is true of Roumania as well as of Poland; of the Caucasian and the Baltic States; of Ukraina as well as of Turkestan. All these have their national interests and these go against the interest of Russia, at least in the way in which these are understood today by both the leaders of the Kremlin and those of the Russian emigration. Even the word "freedom" is understood differently by the Russians and the non-Russians. To a Georgian it means national freedom and independence from Russia; to a Russian, it means freedom from dictatorshipp, but, subsequent to this, a Russian empire without Communism yet comprising all the nations which formerly belonged to Russia.

During World War II, in Germany, it became quite clear that the aims of the Russians and the non-Russians were completely different. The non-Russian armed legions which were fighting on the German side declined categorically to form one political and military organization with Gen. Vlasov, the leader of the Russian liberation movement and commander of Russians fighting against Stalin. This is a well known fact. The reasons for this refusal are also well known. Vlasov did not recognize the right to independence of the peoples conquered by Russia in the past. A manifesto of his, issued in Prague, was addressed to the "People of Russia." From that moment cooperation with Vlasov became unacceptable to the non-Russians. Even the all-powerful Hitler's demands had no effect.

It follows that the slogan of "the fight against Communism" is not sufficient to create a common anti-Communist fighting front of Russians and non-Russians. The non-Russians must know right now

what they are to expect from the defeat of Communism. National independence, or just changing the rule of Red Russia for that of a white, black or any other Russia? The longer the delay in solving this question, the farther away is the creation of one truly international anti-Communist front. And the sooner the flag-bearer of freedom, the United States of America, declares that it remains true to its great traditions and that it is for the personal liberty and national independence of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, the sooner will there be united, fighting, anti-Communist organization. Within the Soviet Union, the United States has true, natural and reliable allies. These allies are the peoples fighting for their national independence. It depends on Washington whether use will be made of their combined physical forces, their intellects, and their experience of fighitng against Communism.

Stalin is dead. But the ideas he served remain. Marxism, whose precepts Stalin followed with grim energy and determination, still remain the official and only religion of the Kremlin. Not one of Stalin's lieutenants, be he Malenkov or any other, will be able to deviate from the dogmas laid down by this religion. At first at least, Stalin's heir must follow Stalin's line and defend by all means the empire he founded. Later, in order to increase his own authority, he may even find it necessary to add to this empire, to do what Stalin had no time to do.

This would be the best way to consolidate his standing with the Party and the Communist leaders of the satellites. The dictator will appear as a new "genius" and will rid himself of all opponents.

We doubt whether the changes in Moscow mean changes for the better for the rest of the world. The contrary may be true and humanity may find that it is even nearer to a new catastrophe.

THE SPIRIT OF GEORGIAN CULTURE

By A. MANVELISHVILI

Ten centuries before Christ, the Georgians already occupied from the cultural point of view an honorable place among the other peoples of Asia Minor. According to archeologists and ancient writers, the Georgians were the only ones during that period to exploit their mines and export their products. From our study of philology, we know that a great number of metals bear the names of Georgian tribes. Subsequently, these names were modified when taken over into other languages. The Georgians had by then already reached a substantial degree of economic development—they raised horses, manufactured weapons, utensils, etc. According to Assyrian cunei-

form writings of the 11th Century B.C., Georgian social life was highly developed. Each tribe was led by a king who ruled over his nobles and subjects, forming a sort of feudal system. It appears that at this period there was a certain measure of political unity among the different Georgian tribes.

In the 8th and 7th centuries B.C., the Georgians began to use an alphabet. According to specialists, the Georgian alphabet bears a certain resemblance to the Phoenician. At present, there are two alphabets: (a) the ancient one, in common use until the 11th Century and still used today by the Church; (b) from the 11th century on, a "military" alphabet which developed from the first one and is still current.

We have no extant literary masterpieces dating before the 5th century A.D., but as in the case of our neighbors, we can assume the existence of an earlier Georgian literature, now perished. According to Greek writers, Georgian culture was very advanced in the domain of shelter, clothing, and food. Agriculture had also attained a certain stage of development—mainly in the cultivation of vineyards. According to Xenophon, the Georgians produced wine of such quality that it was impossible to drink it without first diluting it with water.

After the 7th Century B.C., the Georgians withdrew northward, and during a century of decadence, they lost their spiritual values. Some centuries later, while under the domination of Persia, Georgia fell under the influence of Mazdaism. In the time of Constantine, Christianity was introduced and then began the struggle in Georgia between paganism and Mazdaism on the one hand, and Mazdaism and Christianity on the other. In the end, Christianity triumphed.

The introduction of Christianity into Georgia had a profound influence on its culture. It is significant that the first literary Georgian masterpiece we possess is purely Christian in character. It is dated the 5th Century A.D.

By the 5th Century, written official documents were in current use in the Kingdom of Lazika in West Georgia. Greek writers inform us that the kings of Lazika possessed archives in which international treaties were kept. The history of Georgian literature begins with the 5th Century. Thousands of manuscripts still survive from this earliest period onwards. The majority of these documents are to be found in the University at Tiflis; others are in Paris in the Bibliotheque Nationale, in the British Museum in London, in Berlin, Rome, Athens, Jerusalem, etc.

In spite of such catastrophic events as the Arab and Seljuk invasions, Georgian culture developed favorably in all phases of life attaining its highest point in the 12th century.

Let us first take literature as an example. With the introduction of Christianity, Christian literature began to develop. From fragments we still have, we see that the Georgians started the translation of the Bible in the 5th century but it was not completed until the 11th and 12th centuries. Philosophic and

scientific works were translated from Assyrian, Greek and Arabic. The same century also saw the beginning of a large monastic movement. The activity of Georgian monks was also felt abroad. They began to travel to Oriental countries and to propagate there the doctrine of Christ. In the 5th Century, Peter the Georgian, the brother of a king, was named Bishop of Maiuma "near Gaza." In this era, the Georgians founded convents in Asia Minor, Greece, Bulgaria, on Mounts Athos and Sinai, in Jerusalem and in other sections of Palestine. In Georgia first of all in Southern Georgia since that section had escaped Arab domination—the monks started a literary movement and schools of translation. In the 9th and 10th centuries many large convents and hundreds of churches dotted the countryside. The monks in these monasteries founded guilds of writers, translators, copyists, bookbinders, architects, etc. They left behind to enrich the history of Georgia a prolific literature and many magnificent architectural monuments. The literature of this era kept pace with Georgian life in general, and during this time there were many martyrs who died for their faith or for their country.

The literary masterpiece of the 5th Century was "The Life and Martyrdom of Shushanik." Shushanik was the wife of a Georgian prince who was governor of a province. Upon the command of the Shah of Persia, this prince embraced Mazdaism but his wife refused to do so. The prince had her unmercifully tortured and Shushanik died as a result. The priest at the court of the prince, who had been a devoted and loyal follower of the princess, wrote the story of her life. Another literary work is "The Martyrdom of Abo." Abo was an Arab converted to Christianity and martyred by his own people.

Gradually, lay influences came into being, and it is during this second period that biographies of famous statesmen and clergy were written. Thus the literature of the 9th and 10th centuries prepared the ground for the lay literature of the 11th and 12th centuries, as it did for science and for the development of other forms of art.

For some time it was thought that Georgian architecture was derived from the Byzantine style, but later it became evident that it had features of a purely national character. Although Georgian and Byzantine art have many points of similarity, Georgian art developed along definite and original ines. Many ruins of churches and monasteries bear witness to the noble achievements of Georgian architecture.

The political and social structure of 5th century Georgia is similar to that found somewhat later in Western Europe. King Vakhtang Gorgasal, after having unified all Georgia, founded an absolute monarchy, and during the same epoch, the Georgian church declared its autonomy. From this period began the development of the feudal system. The unification could have been consolidated had the Persian-Byzantine rivalry and the subsequent Arab invasion not intervened. The dismembering of Geor-

gia was completed in the 6th century. The Arab invasion destroyed its kingdoms. From the 8th to the 9th century, while the Arabs still dominated Eastern Georgia, Western and Southern Georgia re-established their boundaries and thus prepared for re-unification.

In spite of this state of affairs, Georgia maintained cultural relations with the neighboring countries. Being politically allied with Persia, Byzantium, and the Islamic world, she collaborated closely with these countries from a literary, scientific, and philosophic standpoint. Thus she was naturally influenced by Byzantine literature and architecture and profited from Persian writings and Arabic science (mathematics, astronomy, astrology), thus laying the foundation for the Renaissance of the 12th century.

It must be underlined here that Georgia, because of her exceptional geographical location, was unable to escape any major political storm that occurred anywhere in her neighborhood. This fact prevented consecutive and uninterrupted development. She had hardly achieved political unity for the first time in the 5th century when outside factors intervened and put an end to it. During the 11th and 12th centuries another re-organization took place and unification was achieved for the second time. As disturbing influences were then negligible, she was able to develop to the fullest extent.

The Georgian Renaissance of the 12th century resulted from several historical factors. During that period she succeeded in completing her political, economic and cultural expansion.

As has been pointed out above, Georgian influence on Byzantium and the people of Asia Minor is an undisputed fact, and this fact was recognized by occidentals of that period.

Georgia, while retaining her own humanistic form of culture, was also able to assimilate the sectarian elements of the new Persian, Arabic and Byzantine civilizations.

From the earliest times the Georgians of Colchis (West Georia) were in direct contact with Greece and Rome and they covered themselves with glory during Athenian literary and athletic competitions.

During one century of freedom, the Georgians were able to produce in the 12th Century a new civilization, based upon the old and influenced to a large extent by the culture of two continents.

Lay literature attained the apogee of its development. First of all, well-known foreign classics were translated: Aristole, Plato, Homer, Hesiod; also Firdousi and other Persian authors. Then, Georgia evolved its own national literature, of which the most famous exponent was Roustaveli who left a universally acknowledged masterpiece. This work is the embodiment of all the ideas of Georgian society of that period.

Cultural establishments were founded including three academies for advanced studies and several schools of translation. Studies were begun on the history, origins and race of the Georgian people.

Architectural monuments, especially castles and fortresses, were built. Roads, irrigation canals, bridges and subterranean tunnels were constructed.

Agriculture prospered, especially viticulture, which always played a predominant role.

Social life was based on high chivalrous ideals. The cult of womanhood, aid to the poor, to widows, to orphans, were the sacred duty of each citzen. Even the Mongols were impressed at these high moral standards which influenced them to treat this people so much better than others they conquered.

The organization of the state in the 12th century was very complex. The king was the head of the government and had absolute power. This government was composed of seven ministers. There was the "Darbazi," a high Council of State formed by representatives of provinces, high functionaries, and the nobility. The ministers participated in this Council. Fundamentally, the Council was a consultative body but gradually tradition lent it legislative powers.

During the second half of the 12the century, there originated a constitutional movement directed by the Minister of Finance and supported by military and commercial circles. This movement suffered a setback, but in spite of everything, the "Darbazi" was established as a legislative body. Legislation was enacted which constituted the basis of the legal code of Beka and Agbougha in the 13th and 14th centuries and later that of King Vakhtang VI in the 18th century.

At the beginning of the 12th century, the great King David II established a permanent army of 45,000 horsemen. In case of war, this number was doubled. This necessitated the establishment of many military supply depots. Breeding of superior horses and manufacture of arms became the duty of the State, and military techniques of that period astonish us even today.

During that period, the highest forms of culture developed in all phases of life—in the state (that is the army, church, public instruction, administration, justice, legislature), in economics, in spiritual and moral values — which gave birth to a national doctrine. The chief exponent of this doctrine was the great poet Rustaveli. This political doctrine led to an imperial system enveloping all the Caucasus. From the national point of view, it was an absolute monarchy and represented the solidarity of all social classes.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols invaded Georgia and the destruction and political anarchy which followed caused her decline. We know very little of the cultural life under the Mongol domination. The decline must have been gradual and all the existing works could not have been completely destroyed. Suffice it to mention here the great astronomical thesis of Abuseridze-Tbeli (1233) of which the French scholar Brosset says:

"Already in 1233 the Georgians were aware of half of the mistakes which in 1582 obliged Pope Gregory III to correct the calendar." The Codes of Bekha and Aghboug-

ha and the legislation of George the Brilliant date from this period.

The Mongol domination greatly impoverished the Georgian nation from the economic as well as the cultural standpoints.

The country has never entirely recovered but literature was able to revive to some extent. The 17th century is the beginning of Georgian classicism and has been called the Silver Age by historians, in contrast to the Golden Age of the 12th century.

But this poetry had nothing new to say—it is but a feeble recapitulation of the form and style of Rustaveli. A few authors had truly great talent such as King Theimouraz who wrote some poetic masterpieces. New historical and realistic tendencies became evident and it was natural that literature should find its inspiration in historical incidents. The country, badly disoriented by the enemy, lived on the memories of its ancient heroes. Poetry was able to render a tremendous service by idealizing these heroes and challenging the young to emulate their example.

During the reign of King Vakhtang at the beginning of the 18th century, a great cultural work was accomplished under the direction of the king himself. He studied the laws of the past and created an immortal code of laws which is known to this day as the Code of Vakhtang. This code was the basis of all the laws which governed the organization of the state and the establishment of the civil order.

King Vakhtang tried to take part in international politics. However, the responsible minister was his uncle, Prince Saba Sullhan Orbeliani, a great scholar and writer known as the "Georgian La Fontaine." Saba wrote a collection of fables entitled "The Book of Wisdom and Lies." This collection is considered unique of its kind. The fables deal with the education of a prince.

King Vakhtang was a patron of literature and science—he himself undertook the direction of scientific enterprises. He appointed a special commission to collect historic source material. He edited a detailed history of Georgia known today by the title of "The Life of Georgia."*

Prince Saba is the author of a Georgian dictionary.

King Vakhtang introduced printing. In 1709 he printed the Bible and in 1712 Rustaveli's "The Man in the Tiger Skin." The king was a profound scholar of Persian as well as of Georgian literature.

A little later, Prince Vakhoucht (son of King Vakhtang) composed a treatise on the history and geography of Georgia.

During the 18th Century, Georgia drew near to the Occident—the ideas promulgated by the French Revolution found an echo throughout the country. A number of young people were able to pursue their studies in Europe. Several of them received their degrees in philosophy and theology and upon their return spread the concepts of occidental civilization.

Catholicos Anthony I is considered one of the foremost scholars of that period. He was a great theologian and was in sympathy with the Catholic religion. He translated the "Logic" and several other works of Aristole. Also, a great many other scholars translated philosophic and literary works.

*See the French translation of M. F. Brosset.

Literature became simpler in form and more realistic in content as it drew nearer to the people and it is this simplicity and the abandonment of a certain aristocratic tendency which gave it its peculiar character. Two great "popular" poets can be named: the first, David Guramishvili, wrote poetry full of sentiment and an awareness of the thoughts and sufferings of his people; the second, Gabashvili (Besik), erected a great temple to love in the style of Roustaveli. In conclusion, I quote a scholar:

"The 17th and 18th centuries are the historical springtime of our civilization. The nation senses the birth of a great force, she dreams of an abundance of artistic concepts, and in this prodigious waiting, she prepares for herself a splendid future . . ."

With the coming of the Russians, Georgian culture began to decline. They suppressed the Georgian language in the schools and in the government. They destroyed national customs and manners and established a Russian way of life. The majority of the nation did not have time for cultural pursuits since it was mostly under arms — however, even in this difficult hour, the Georgian genius was able to create beautiful works.

The well-known Georgian romantic poetry dates from this period. Although this poetry has much in common with European romantic poetry of that era, it is peculiarly national in character. The political and social sources of this movement were the loss of freedom on the one hand, and the decadence of the aristocracy on the other. There were women poets also—royal princesses composed nostalgic lyrics in distant Russia. The four great romantic poets of the era were: Alexander Chavchavadze, (a general in the Russian army and the leader of the rebellion of 1832), Gregory Orbeliani, Vakhtang Orbeliani and Nicholas Baratashvili.

From 1860 on, realism began to develop in the Georgian literature. The years of Russian domination proved to be a period of resistance and then of despair. Poetry reflected this mood and the romantic tendency was predominant. However, in the second half of the 19th century, the country, though exhausted, took a more realistic political stand and this, in turn, deeply influenced its authors.

The chief exponents of the new realism were Ilia Chavchavadze and Akaki Tseretheli. They were followed by numerous disciples. Chavchavadze fought many a keen verbal battle, writing and publishing novels on the subject of defense and unity. Tserethelli's poetry was full of national sentiment and did much to inspire the people to fight for the deliverance of their country.

On the whole, the development of literature in 19th century Georgia paralleled that of Europe. There were many romantic writers such as Alexander Kazbek at that per-

iod. Vaja Pshavela wrote a masterpiece both national and international in character. He was perhaps the greatest Georgian genius after Rustaveli, a profound student of nature, and he is considered a sort of Georgian Maeterlinck.

Apart from literature, much good work was also done in the theater, in schools and libraries. But the policy of Russification prevailed. The Russians forbade the teaching of the Georgian language in the schools and it took the country a long time to re-establish this practice.

The Georgians tried their best to establish a national university even if the subjects had to be taught in Russian, but without success.

This was the situation up to the Revolution of 1917. Then Georgia declared her independence and, able to breathe freely after a century of oppression, resumed her cultural development.

During the first days of independence, the Georgian National University was established. Scholars heeded the call of patriotism and assembled in Tiflis. Even those living abroad returned joyfully to their native country. Since that time, the university has become the cultural center of the land.

Bolshevik Russia has tried once more to destroy the Georgian national chaarcter, but this time she has not been able to accomplish her purpose. In spite of continual persecution, the Georgian people are stronger today than they were in the 19th Century. The Bolshevik régime notwithstanding, Georgia has been able to retain her national traits.

STALIN - AS WE SEE HIM

By N. M. K.

This is not meant to be yet another biography or obituary of Stalin. Too many have been written already. Here I want only to throw some light on why he was so pitilessly ruthless to his own native country, and why it is that his fellow countrymen—Georgians —execrate his name more, perhaps, than anyone else.

Ioseb Djugashvili, later to be known as Joseph Stalin, dictator and all-powerful ruler of the Communist Empire, appeared in Georgian Marxist circles at the beginning of this century. He was a Georgian, the son of a poor cobbler from the small provincial town of Gori, and it is strange to think that were it not for his own personal charateristcs and for the events which happened during his lifetime and helped him on the way to an unlimited power, he would probably have remained in Georgia and would have been no better known than any of his schoolmates.

A son of a drunkard of a father and of a pious, but colorless mother, he could not have had a happy childhood. After his father's death, his mother sent him to the Theological Seminary in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia. When only in his teens, he became interested in Marxism and began taking part in revolutionary activities. Expelled from the Seminary, he devoted himself entirely to these activities. It must be understood that at this time he was still a patriotic Georgian, full of hatred for the Russian rule; also, it seems that he had a personal grudge against this rule, blaming it for the poverty of his family and for his expulsion from the Seminary, and vowing to be avenged some day.

In 1903 he wrote an article for the Georgian Social-Democratic newspaper 'Kvali," the editor of which was the late Noë Jordania, who later became the first president of the Georgian Republic. Jordania did not like the article and would not print it in his paper. He advised young Djugashvili to study thoroughly the subject on which he intended to write, before writing it. This was, according to Jordania, Stalin's first attempt at journalism and writing. Stalin never forgave Jordania, and from that day until his death he was full of hatred for him. This hatred was probably one of the reasons, possibly the main one, why he joined the Bolsheviks, that is to say, that wing of the Social-Democratic Party which was disputing with Jordania for influence over the Georgian working class. But, whatever the reasons, Stalin soon showed that he had all the "qualities" which make a good Bolshevik. He was a gifted intriguer, cruel, revengeful and secretive,

pitiless to friends and foes alike, suspicious, hating everybody, stubborn, daring and full of ambition and self-opinion bordering on mania. He especially hated those whom he recognized as his superiors in any way—those who were more clever, better educated, or more urbane.

After the London Congress of the Social-Democratic Party in 1903, when the split occurred which divided the Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Djugashvili, who sided with the Bolsheviks, tried to form in Georgia an organization of the followers of Lenin—the leader of Bolshevism. However, badly educated, always a poor speaker, with an unprepossessing yellow face, thick and untidy hair, low forehead, insincere smile, and coarse manners, Stalin was not at all the type of propagandist and demagogue who wins popular support. In Georgia he could achieve nothing. And how could he! Georgia of those days had men immeasurably superior to him: better educated, better orators, better prepared for revolutionary work. Men whose names favorably compared with the most famous names of European Socialism. Stalin was dwarfed by them and he resented it bitterly.

Disappointed with the results of his work in Tiflis, he moved to Batum, the Georgian Black Sea port. But here also he met with no success: in fact he was hardly listened to and even found it difficult to get a chance to speak at political meetings. Enraged by his failure, to the utmost degree stubborn and convinced of his own abilities, Stalin tried to attain his ends by intrigue and by besmirching the names of his opponents. Gradually he became more and more involved in the morass of personal intrigue and rivalry and lost all respect and confidence of the Georgian working class organizations. He began then to devote most of his energies to activities of a different type, namely, obtaining funds for the Bolshevik Party by any means at his disposal. He formed and led small armed bands and became an expert in "expropriation," a polite word for robbery with violence. The most famous of his exploits was the daring robbery of the Tiflis State Treasury in 1907.

Pursued by the police, disliked and rejected by his fellow countrymen, Stalin was compelled to leave Georgia. He went to Baku and continued his activities there. He left Georgia not only because of the Russian Gendarmerie; he was runing away from the Georgian people, the Georgian workers, who disliked and despised him for his cruelty, bloodthirstiness and blind fanaticism. He left Georgia with hate in his heart, hate for the Georgian workers and peasants, who had turned their backs on him. He left in 1907 and did not return until 1921. But his hate for his native land never abated and the thoughts of revenge never left him.

All available documents prove beyond any doubt that the plans and all practical arrangements for the conquest of Georgia by Red Russia were prepared by Stalin in 1920. He it was who convinced

the Communist leaders and finally decided them to strike at Georgia. Lenin was against this move; he was afraid of the unfavorable reaction of Europe and counselled against the invasion of Georgia. But Stalin was not to be deprived of his revenge and of his determination to become master of his fatherland, Georgia, the country which had rejected him.

Victorious Stalin visted Georgia in 1921 a few months after its bloody conquest by the Red Army. He was already quite a big man in Communist Russia. But when he came face to face with the Georgian people, he saw that conquering a country by foreign bayonets was one thing, but killing the ideas of liberty and national independence was something quite different. While speaking at a meeting in the Tiflis Palace Hall, he was constantly interrupted and several thousand Georgians shouted, "traitor, murderer, traitor." Stalin, pale and uneasy, left the hall surrounded by his guards. The same evening he called a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and told them: "Georgia must be gone over with a hot iron." Stalin's desires were clear. The "hot iron" burned many thousands of Georgians. The rejection of Stalin cost dear his native country.

When Soviet Russia's tyranny became unbearable, a nationwide armed rebellion broke out in Georgia in August, 1924. On hearing of it, Stalin declared at a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow: "Georgia must be plowed over with the utmost thoroughness." This order of Stalin was carried out and, indeed, with the thoroughness he demanded. Georgia was certainly plowed over and under. The rebellion was drowned in blood. More than 7,000 Georgians were executed during the first three days after the rebellion was broken; more than 20,000 were deported. This was the first large scale blood-bath with many others to come. Between 1921 and 1941, the number of executed passed 60,000 and those deported—200,000. And this in a country of just over three million inhabitants!

This is what Stalin did to his native country. In the history of Georgia he will certainly be remembered and his name will be linked with those of the greatest enemies Georgia has had through the centuries: Genghis Khan, Tamerlaine and others. There is little doubt that to the great majority of Georgians, Stalin's death meant not sorrow, but rejoicing. And hope of an eventual and inevitable liberation is perhaps more alive today than it has been for many a long day.

Personal courage Stalin did not lack; one cannot take this away from him. But all the other national charateristics of which Georgians are proud—loyalty, generosity, gallantry, magnanimity, tolerance, and above all chivalry—were alien to this dark, brooding and cruel man. In a magazine article an English historian* has this to say of Georgians:

"They are an attractive people, often irritating, but always charming; all through more than 2,000 years of their history they were

'gentlemen' with a fine sense of 'what is done' and 'what is not done.' They fought their battles as chivalrous boys and never did they become secretive and cunning to sharpen the axe against their enemies. Theirs is a fine country, where neither climate nor diet are conductive to brooding. They are not men full of fears and they do not repress themselves. Through the ages they have enjoyed the good things of life which God gave them: their mellow climate, their good wine, their fertile soil, the good looks of men and women; things that console the native and charm the visitors even today. They have ever laughed at men of moral fervor with their oppressions and their repressions. They have laughed, drunk, danced, sung, loved and fought through their history and died like men when their turn came. Theirs is not the temperament to gloat over tortures. Neither rack nor thumbscrew was known in Georgia, nor the Inquisition."

What an irony of fate that this man, Stalin, should have been a Georgian, yet a complete antithesis of everything that is fine in Georgian character and tradition. An uncouth despot instead of a gallant gentleman, a cruel and vindictive foe instead of a magnanimous and chivalrous knight. Georgia has always been justly proud of her sons, but Stalin—Djugashvili, this incarnation of everything that is evil—she will never accept as her own. Whatever history may say about him, to Georgians and Georgia he will always remain a traitor to his native country and a man who denied and rejected all that Georgia and Georgians have always stood and fought for.

* Malcolm Burr. "Georgia," The Quarterly Review. London, 1932

"UNITED WE STAND - DIVIDED WE FALL"

By private initiative of a few American citizens an organization was founded in the United States some two years ago, which was given the name of "American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia."

On May 26, 1951—Georgian Independence Day and National Holiday—on the occasion of the opening of a Georgian service in the "Voice of America," Mr. Dean Acheson, who was then the Secretary of State, made a speech welcoming the new service. This speech showed the Georgians in exile that their fight for the restoration of the independence and liberty of Georgia was regarded with sympathy by the government of the United States and that in the question of the liberation of peoples forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, the government of the United States saw eye to eye with them.

This was an event of tremendous importance to all the Georgians. The words of sympathy and understanding spoken in the name of the American government gave real encouragement to them. Ever since, even to a greater extent than before, all Georgians, whether in their own country or in exile, have been looking to the United States and placing their hopes in an eventual and inevitable liberation on this country.

It is easily understood, therefore, that the foundation of the "American Committee" was of tremendous interest to all Georgians. Unfortunately, the Committee did not quite live up to the hopes placed in it, and its main aim—co-ordination of efforts of all anti-Communist forces—is yet to be achieved.

As, together with all Georgians, "The Voice of Free Georgia" wishes nothing but success to the "American Committee" and is willing to do all in its power to assist it in every way, perhaps it would not be out of place to express our views on certain fundamentals which the "American Committee" must accept, if its noble and unselfish work is to be crowned with success.

1. The American Committee must make it quite clear that it recognizes the right to independence and full sovereignty for every people now under the Soviet yoke.

2. The American Committee must declare now that it is against any domination of one people over another.

3. The American Committee must support an automatic and unconditional recognition of the independence of those countries which were recognized as such before their conquest by Soviet Russia; that is to say, without any plebiscite, referendum or any such measure.

4. The American Committee

must support the right of every people to the restoration of its independence the moment its territory is liberated from the Red armies, without waiting for the liberation of the whole of the U. S. S. R.

5. The anti-Communist front should consist of various national organizations which will co-ordinate their work in accordance with general programs of action.

6. The co-ordination of the work of various national organizations is to be in the hands of the American Committee itself and not in the hands of a co-ordinating center as proposed up to now.

7. National organizations must be truly representative of the whole of each nation concerned and not represent only some political parties or organizations.

We are convinced that the acceptance of these fundamentals will lead to much greater assistance being given to the American Committee by various nationalities, and that its aim—formation of one anti-Communist front—will thus be achieved.

GEORGIAN - AMERICAN LEAGUE

The annual meeting of the Georgian American League took place in New York on Sunday, March 29th. A new board of directors was elected and current questions were discussed.

The League, which was formed three years ago, has for its main purpose to combat the nefarious ideas and activities of Communism and to seek the restoration of the independence of Georgia, destroyed by Soviet Russia in 1921.

The League, which represents the great majority of Georgians living in the United States, as well as Americans of Georgian descent, is willing and anxious to collaborate to the fullest exent with all American organizations as well as with organizations of other nations in the United States, which have the same aims, namely to combat Communism and to assist in the liberation of all peoples subjugated by them.

The new Board of Directors, unanimously elected by the members present is as follows:

President, Mr. T. K. Bargration; secretary, Mr. N. M. Kay; treasurer, Dr. D. Chatara; members, Mr A. Tsomaia, Mr. I. Kontridze, Mr. V. Sangulia, and Mr. L. Doumbadze.

The address of the League is as follows: 169 East 78th Street, New York 21, N. Y.

The following telegram was sent to the Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, at the conclusion of the meeting:

"On the occasion of the annual meeting of the Georgian-American League, the members of the League wish to express to you, Mr. President, their warmest support of your crusade for a free world and for the defense of this country against Communist subversive attempts. The Georgians and Americans of Georgian descent trust that your policy will help the Georgian people as well as all other peoples enslaved by Communism to rid themselves of the Bolshevik misrule and enable them to live in freedom once again in a Christian democracy."

THE CAUCASUS AND RUSSIAN EXPANSION

By ALEXIS IMERI

The formation of the Russian State—Great Russia—began in the first half of the 14th century, when Ivan Kalita (1328-1340) made Moscow (Moskwa) his residence and seat of government. The Russian State, directly inheriting the rule of the Mongols (the Tartars), adopted many features of the Mongol form of government, and from that time to the present day Russia has known no other system. The Russian people had become accustomed to despotism, and their cultural and social life was adapted to it. It was at this time that Russia began her course of expansion by conquest. This policy of expansion was greatly intensified from the time of Ivan the Terrible (1547-1584), as is evidenced by the following record: conquest of Kazan (1552), Khanate of Astrakhan (1555); the incorporation of Siberia (1584) attempted conquest of Poland; the campaigns of Peter the Great against Scandinavia; the conquest of the Ukraine, and the war against Persia, for the purpose of getting control over the natural resources of Central Asia; plans for the conquest of India, and an attempt to enroach upon the Caucasus; the wars with Persia, and Turkey; the conquest of Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania; efforts to gain control over the Black Sea and the exit to the Mediterranean; the Panslav movement, aimed to facilitate the conquest of Constantinople, and to establish Russia in the Balkans; an active policy in the Far East for gaining an exit to the Pacific Ocean; the war with Japan; political opportunism as displayed in the Russian attitude towards the European "balance of power"; the protection of Serbia in order to win control over the Balkans; the announcement of Russia's claims to Constantinople and the Dardanelles at the time of the first World War; the Revolution, and the breaking asunder of the Russian Empire which, not without reason, has been called "the prison-house of nations."

This prison-house now embraces more than 100 nations of different lanuguages, races and religions. The Soviet Government established after the Revolution resumed the old Russian imperialist policy and carried on in the old tradition by annihilating the ndependence of the Ukraine and the Baltic States; the war against Finland, waged for the same purpose; re-conquest of the nations of the Caucasus; the destruction of Georgia's independence; the establishment of Russian control over Turkestan; the seizure of Mongolia and Manchuria; Soviet duplicity in the Second World War, and the partition of Poland; establishment of Russian control over Eastern Europe; the "solution" of the Balkan problem in favor of Russia, and the renewal of the Russian claim to predominance over the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean. This succession of events clearly shows that from Ivan IV and Peter the Great to our own day, Russia's foreign policy has remained unchanged.

The continuous existence of this vast imperialistic program explains why the Russian rulers have always concentrated their whole attention upon seizure of new territories, with almost complete disregard of their internal policy and the social welfare of their own country and people. The characteristic expression of this strange concept with regard to the purpose of the state is Russia's uninterrupted striving for new territorial acquisitions while disorder prevails in the home country; cultural and technological backawrdness, grave social injustices, and the existence of a stern, reckless dictatorship have been constant throughout the whole history of the country.

This insatiable craving for conquest of new territories has served to divert the Russian people from the desire for improvement of their individual living conditions, and the perpetual existence of the dictatoral government apparatus has gradually, from force of habt, accustomed the people to belief in the primacy of the state as inevitable and as a corallary, to accept the concept of subordination of private interests to the interests of the state.

Thus a mythical concept of the natural necessity for the all-power of the state and belief in its invincibility have resulted. Within the consciousness of the Russian people has been established—and fortified—the concept that, after the decline of the Byzantine Empire, its claim to world domination descended, in the nature of things, to Russia, and that Moscow is a third Rome. A Russian formula which has become a popular proverb says, "Moscow is the third Rome; there is no fourth." This consuming ambition to become a world empire was given justification in the works of a number of Russian authors, and prior to the first World War, the formula was the leading motto of Russia's foreign policy.

By way of justifying its imperialistic policy, Russia has always claimed that some existing political situation had given rise to it: it was—according to the time—for the protection of Christianity, for Slav unity, Communist ideas, world revolution, or defense of the state. In reality, all these theories served the same purpose, namely, to lead the "God appointed" Russian people to world domination and the establishment of a new order.

Stalin's diplomacy in the second World War plainly revealed Russia's political tendencies as completely unchanged, and showed the strict adherence of the Soviet government to the political legacy of Peter the Great. Because of international circumstances and insurmountable resistance, Russia has sometimes been forced to refrain from overt aggressive actions, but when conditions have changed and resistance has lessened, it has immediately resumed its old course and has gradually but steadfastly pursued its objectives—the esatblishing of Russia's predominance in Europe and Asia. Rulers and generations have changed, the constitution, too, has changed, but the aims of Russia's foreign policy, and its methods and practice have remained unchanged. An investigation of Russia's history confirms this statement.

RUSSO - GEORGIAN RELATIONS

It is not, however, within the scope of this article to analyze this problem. We deal here only with a single feature of the question—the conquest of Georgia by Russia—and we wish to present a survey of the relations between Russia and Georgia since the establishment of the first diplomatic contact between the two countries.

The first attempt to establish diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia dates back to 1491. However, because of the great distance between the countries and the insignificant commercial interests involved, this attempt was without result.

In 1552 Ivan the Terrible conquered Kazan and in 1555 the Khanate of Astrakhan. From that time on, the Russian State expanded rapidly towards the south and approached the Caucasus. Among the Caucasian nations, the Kabardines made the initial move towards establishing political contact with Russia when, in 1555, after the conquest of Astrakhan, they concluded a treaty of friendship with Ivan the Terrible and recognized Russia's protectorate.

After that, in Georgia, too, there began to be an interest in Russia, and the question of winning the influence and power of this strong Christian state—"the third Rome"—to fight their common enemy, the Moslems, assumed great importance. In 1584 diplomatic delegates of the Georgian King Alexander visited Moscow. The Georgian diplomats had a specific objective: to conclude a commercial treaty and also a military treaty of friendship. The Russian Czar, Feodor Ivanovich (1584-1598) received the Georgian delegates with high honors, but the treaty did not materialize and the Georgian mission returned home empty-handed. This was the first official attempt to establish friendly and normal trade relations between Georgia and Russia.

Boris Godunov (1598-1605), a man who in his foreign policy was much more active than his predecessors, showed greater interest in the Caucasus, but internal disturbances in Russia and quarrels about succession to the throne (before the authority of the state was fortified by Peter the Great) made interference with Caucasian matters impossible. However, after accomplishing his interior reforms and reorganizing the state apparatus, Peter directed all the strength of the revitalized state towards the acquisition of new territories and the conquest of other countries. The Black Sea coast and the Caucasus became items of main importance. From that time on, Russia watched the situation for the most appropriate opportunity to conquer the Caucasian nations and to carry out its ready-made plans in an astonishingly methodical manner.

In 1654, the Russian Czar Alexis had concluded a treaty of friendship with the Ukrainian Hetman, Bogdan Khmelnitzki, according to which the Ukraine preserved

its autonomy as a state. It also maintained its own army and administration; the Hetman remained head of the state, and Russia was not allowed to interfere with the Ukraine. Russia rendered the treaty ineffective and began the russification of the Ukraine. The Hetman Ivan Mazeppa became disgusted with these acts of violence and organized a great revolt against Russia. Later he concluded a military alliance with the Swedish King, Charles XII and fought against Peter the Great. The result of these battles was sometimes indeterminate, and the history of Russia—and eventually of the whole of Europe—might well have taken another turn if Peter the Great had lost the battle of Poltava in 1709. This battle brought to an end Ukrainian independence and the Ukrainian state. At one stroke Russia gained free access to the Black Sea coast and a free hand in the North Caucasus. After Peter the Great, Russia's plans for acquisition of foreign territories remained in force and unaltered.

In 1763 the town of Mosdok was founded and a fortress erected there to house a large garrison. In 1769 General Saveliev reinforced his regular troops with the Volga Cossacks. Other new fortresses—Georgievsk, Stavropol, and Ekaterinodar among them—were also established. In 1799 the Russians conquered Kabarda. In the same year, Vladikavkas—a town erected by Potemkin—was garrisoned. In 1782 Russia had already occupied the Crimea peninsula and the whole Kuban district, thereby gaining navigation rights on the Black Sea and at the same time bordering Georgia along the waterway. All these facts prove that the Georgian question had already become an acute item in Russia's foreign policy and that it was soon to be decided upon.

According to Lord Malmesbury, at the time British Ambassador to Russia, the great force and momentum of the Russian expansion to the south must be attributed in part to Potemkin's personal ambtions. In the east, Persia was in a state of decay and Turkey's power was also on the wane, so that in this direction the ambitious Potemkin saw great possibilities for the realization of his dreams. The Empress Catherine did not in the least limit her favorite from pursuing his aims, since they entirely agreed with the tendencies of official Russian policy, namely, to establish Russia's power in the territory between the Black and the Caspian Seas.

Potemkin's personal ambitions and the interest of the Russian state ran along parallel lines—a campaign to the South and the East for the conquest of new countries. The best way to extend the Russian influence in the South was, beyond doubt, to include Georgia in the sphere of Russian policy. This would involve both a great political success and the gaining of strategic advantages for Russia against Persia and Turkey. Russia therefore increased its promises to Georgia. It promised Irakli II, King of East Georgia, territories which originally had belonged to Georgia but which were then occupied by Turkey. Many other promises were also made. The letters of the Russian government are full of assurances of esteem and of great prospects for the future.

At the same time, however, Russian forces were brought to the Caucasian frontier. In September, 1782, for example, Pavel Potemkin, a cousin of Catherine's favorite, who had been appointed Chief Commander of the Russian army for the Caucasus, had the following units placed at his disposal: 25 infantry battalions, 20 squadrons of dragoons, 4 artillery companies, 4 regiments of Don Cossacks, and 10,000 Kalmucks.

This whole army had been formed for a special purpose which Irakli clearly foresaw. Not to have seen it would have indicated a complete lack of political foresight. It was obvious that by fair means or foul Russia was determined to include Georgia in her sphere of influence.

RUSSO-GEORGIAN TREATY OF 1783

On July 24, 1783, at Georgievsk, the Russian-Georgian treaty of friendship was signed by the accredited representatives of both countries. According to this treaty the King of East Georgia placed his kingdom under the protection of the Russian Empress. The treaty stipulated that Georgia's relations with foreign powers were to be regulated in accordance with the will of the Russian government. The King of Georgia, as an ally, was obliged to grant Russia every assistance and in case of necessity to come with his army to the aid of Russia. Russia, for its part, engaged itself to protect the territory of East Georgia against invasions by foreign powers, to treat Georgia's enemies as its own, and to support the return of those territories to Georgia which had formerly constituted a part of it but which

at the time of the conclusion of this treaty were in the hands of other states. It was further agreed that Russia should not interfere with the interior administration of Georgia, namely, her army, her civil administration, courts, and finances. All these were to remain as before, subject to the supervision of the king. Russia engaged herself to reserve the throne of the kingdom to the descendants of the Bagratid dynasty and guaranteed its inviolacy. The Georgian Church was also to retain its independence.

In order to facilitate reciprocal relations, a plenipotentiary ambassador to the Court of the King of Georgia was appointed and also a Georgian envoy to represent his country before the emperor. The Georgian nobility were placed juridically on an equal footing with the Russian aristocracy. Georgian merchants were granted the same rights as Russian merchants throughout the Russian empire. Georgians were permitted to settle in Russia at their discretion and they were supposed to enjoy there the privileges of Russina citizens. The Russians were also entitled to settle in Georgia. This treaty consisted of 13 articles and an appendix of four points.

Russia's political leaders received the ratification of this treaty with enthusiasm. The rejoicing of the empress herself over this treaty was expressed in one of her letters to Potemkin:

"Yesterday I received your letter of the 5th inst., brought over by Colonel Tamara, who also brought me the Georgian matter, for which I thank you again. You are really a perfect darling! . . . I am calmly awaiting Europe's jealousy. Let them enjoy themselves while we act."[1]

The greatly pleased Empress richly rewarded all participants and promoters of the Georgian matter: Lieutenant-General Prince Pavel Potemkin received a gold cigarette case adorned with jewels which bore the portrait of Catherine, as well as 6,000 rubles; his collaborators received 2,000 rubles each and their promotion.

On August 17th the act of the Treaty of Georgievsk arrived in Petersburg. The Empress considered the matter of such importance that she signed and approved it within three days, on August 20th, in the big festival hall of her palace. In Tiflis the treaty was ratified on January 25th, 1784.

It is not our intention to criticize here the jurisdictional structure of the treaty. Much has been written on this subject. In the view of prominent European authorities on international and constitutional law, the treaty represents a typical agreement concerning the creation of a protectorate, limiting the sovereignty of the Kingdom of East Georgia (Karthli-Kachethi), and granting Russia the right of investiture of the king and control over the foreign relations of the kingdom. The state as such, however, continued to exist, the right to the throne is reserved for the legal heirs, and the protecting country does not interfere with the interior matters of the state in question. Louis le Fur, Professor of International Law at Paris, writes:

"This is an international treaty concluded between two states of equal rights and between two sovereign persons in the sense of international law."[2]

As was to have been expected, the Russian-Georgian Treaty provoked great dissatisfaction in Persia and Turkey.

PERSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 1795

At that time very important events were taking place in Persia. The quarrels about the succession to the throne which had broken out after the death of the famous Nadir-Shah ended with the victory of the representative of the Qajar dynasty, the eunuch Aga-Mohammed Khan. In 1781 Aga Mohammed Khan gained control over the province of Gilan, and through his methodical and hard fight and his pitiless extinction of his opponents he finally won the victory over the whole of Persia. In 1785 he conquered Teheran; later he subdued his chief opponent, Jafar Khan Zend and conquered Irak and Azerbaijan. By 1792 he was the actual ruler over the vast Persian Empire and from that time on he did not conceal any longer his hostile feelings towards Russia. First of all, as was to have been expected, Aga Mohammed Khan tried to separate Transcaucasia and Georgia from Russia.

In the beginning it seemed as though Aga Mohammed Khan was avoiding war with Irakli. He spoke with great respect of the king, and tried not to spoil his rela-

[1] Compare N. Dubrovin, History of the War and Rule of the Russians the Caucasus. Vol. II, p. 11.

[2] See his "Georgia and International Law."

tions with him. His ambassadors used a frienly tone, saying: "Dissolve your relations with Russia and we can conclude a treaty which will last forever." In the event of acceptance of this condition, the Persian ruler promised the king, in addition to his friendship, the whole of Azerbaijan.*

How enticing such a prospect must have been for Irakli! It would have been impossible for him not to consider such a proposition. But how could he break his word already given to Russia, and the ratified treaty which he had confirmed by his oath? The heroic king felt unable to do so; he would not break his oath, once it had been given. His clean conscience, his high moral views, and his sense of justice, were incompatible with breach of contract and betrayal.

Irakli rejected Persia's proposal. This meant war. The Shah began his preparations for an expedition against Georgia. Irakli did not remain inactive. Systematically he gathered information about the Shah's plan of campaign and handed it over to the Russians.

According to the treaty the protector was obliged to defend Georgia's territory against enemies from without. Irakli reminded Russia of her duty, and demanded energetic transfer of Russian military units to Georgia in order to protect his country against Aga Mohammed Khan. As an answer from Russia failed to arrive, Irakli sent a special plenipotentiary to Petersburg, and, in order to give the mission greater weight and significance, he sent his personal adjutant-general, Prince Garsevan Chavchavadze, who was the very life and soul of the Russian-Georgian Treaty and one of the authors of the agreement of 1783. On his way to Petersburg, Garsevan Chavchavadze visited General Gudovich in Georgievsk and explained to him that Georgia stood in the face of a great danger, that Aga Mohammed Khan was definitely planning an attack, and that the reason for the attack was solely and exclusively Georgia's friendship with Russia.

Finally the king sent his son to Petersburg, to explain the situation to the Russian government and to demand the forwarding of Russian troops to the Caucasus, as provided for in the treaty. Prince Mirian submitted his plea through the intermediacy of Count Ploton Zubow.*

However, the State Council decided to maintain the same policy as theretofore. A secret instruction was given to General Gudovich, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in the North Caucasus, not to discourage the Georgians, to make them verbal promises, but to refrain from giving any military support. The general was instructed to promise assistance to the king so that Irakli would not, in despair, conclude an agreement with the Persians, but to leave him alone in case of war. On May 7, 1792, the Empress of Russia wrote to General Gudovich.

"The sending of troops to Georgia is of no avail as long as conditions have not taken a favorable turn and the military lines have not been established and organized on a firm basis."**

Georgia, being under the protectorate of Russia, naturally expected the assistance provided for by their treaty. After Garsevan Chavchavadze's departure for Petersburg, Irakli sent his couriers to General Gudovich to explain the situation to him once more. On June 6, 1795, the King sent another appeal to the Russian government. By this time the armies of Aga-Mohammed Khan were already on their way to Georgia. Simultaneously with the king's appeal, Queen Darejan, his wife, sent a message to Empress Catherine and Irakli sent a reminder to the First Minister of the Russian Empire, Count Bezborodko. But by then Aga-Mohammed Khan and his troops had reached the Georgian frontier.

The Russian Government and General Gudovich watched these events with the calmness of impartial spectators. The general was kept regularly informed about the movements of the Persian troops, but he did not consider assistting Georgia,

* See Butkov, Material on The Modern History of the Caucasus, Vol. II, p. 357, and M. Brosset, Histoire de la Georgie, Vol. II, p. 259.

* See N. Dubrovin, History of the war and rule of the Russians in the Caucasus, Vol. III, p. 9.

** See Dubrovin, History of the War and the Rule of the Russians in the Caucasus, Vol. III, p. 9, as well as, P. Butkow, Material on the modern history of the Caucasus, Vol. II, p. 334-335, and also General Potto, Historical Survey of the Wars in the Caucasus, Vol. 1, p. 264.

which Russia was actually and formally committed to protect, and which was now in jeopardy solely because of her compact with Russia. In view of the facc that it was the will of the Russian government and the Empress that Georgia face the critical situation alone, the general's only concern was lest Irakli eventually win the war without Russian assistance. This would have meant a failure of plans cunningly and carefully developed by the Russian government for a long time.

The concentration of the Georgian troops had not been completed when Aga-Mohammed Khan reached the borders of Georgia. Then began a bitterly hard fight. Irakli was everywhere to be seen. He encouragd the thin ranks of his army, he issued commands, and he stated that rather would he prefer to die on the field of honor than to retreat. Filled with fury and the determination to continue the battle unto the utmost limit, he threw himself into the thick of the fight and—as history tells us—he would have been lost had not Prince John, with the help of three hundred soldiers, rescued his grandfather from encirclement by the enemy.

By the third day only a few hundred men were left in the whole Georgian army. The unfortunate king took a last look at his beloved capital and then retired into the surrounding mountain region.

The way of the Persians was now open. The next morning the Shah inspected Tiflis, confiscated all the treasures of the Royal Palace, and the valuables of the nobility, and granted his troops three days of complete freedom. This short period of time sufficed for the plundering of the whole city.

Twenty-five thousand persons, chiefly old men and women with children who were unable to escape from the city into the mountains, were murdered by the Persians. After three days, the Shah decided to have the whole capital burned to the ground, and he himself directed this crime from the top of Mount Sololaki. The Russians historian, Potto, describes this event as follows:

"Of this flourishing town with its palaces and wonderful Christian churches not one stone has remained on another. The town was reduced to such a heap of rubble that for some time Irakli thought of completing the demolition and resettling the remaining population elsewhere."

Nothing was left of the beautiful city which had been famous for its rich palaces and churches, its gardens and squares —only rubble, desolation, ruin.**

For eight days Aga-Mohammed Khan raged amongst the ruins of Tiflis until finally, on September 20th, he gave orders for the Persian army to retire. The reason for this sudden withdrawal probably was that the Shah did not consider the war completed; in all likelihood he realized that, with his reduced army, he would be unable to withstand an attack of the freshly organized Georgian troops and he feared that Irakli might encircle him in Tiflis. He therefore left Georgia and returned to his own country.

THE END OF GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE

This savage invasion was prompted, as we have seen, by Persia's desire to vitiate the Russian-Georgian Treaty and to render invalid the agreement of 1783. For several years Aga-Mohammed Khan had been preparing himself for this war, and the Russians were fully informed about his preparations. According to their treaty, the protector-nation was pledged to protect Georgia from any aggression from without (Articles 2 and 6) and to consider the enemies of Georgia as her own. Therefore, the Russians were in honor bound to protect Tiflis together with the Georgians. This was Russia's sworn obligation by all the provisions of international law.

We have shown how Russia violated these provisions by failing to send any aid whatsoever to protect Georgia from Persian aggression.

From that time on, the treaty of 1783, having been thus formally violated, was without validity. Louis le Fur, professor of International Law at the University of Paris, has written:

"It is generally agreed in international as well as in state law that the non-fulfillment of the obligations on one side

** This description of the war of the Georgians against Aga-Mohammed Khan is based on General Potto's "Historical Abstract of the Caucasian Wars," Vol. I, p. 276-284. N. Dubrovin, History of the Wars and the Rule of the Russians in the Caucasus, Vol. III, p. 35-40. S. Kakabadze, Irakli II, pp. 183-187, and S. Kakabadze, The Medieval History of Georgia, pp. 145-150.

releases the other side from her obligations."***

Another authority on international law and the author of many classic works on this subject, has written:

"If one nation recognizes the protectorate of another more powerful nation or submits herself to that nation in order to enjoy her protection and if the latter does not grant her any real protection under circumstances provided by the treaty then it is obvious that she renounces also her rights derived from the treaty. But also the other partner is released from all his obligations deriving from the treaty and regains his original rights and his former independence and freedom.***

Of the same opinion is the Swiss authority on international law, Nippold, and all other specialists on this subject.

Russia violated the Treaty of 1783, thus Georgia was automatically released from all her obligations and her sovereign righst were automatically restored, returning to her by reason of Russia's defection.

In actuality, something quite different took place—something which made Russia's guilt, in the sense of international law, still greater. Russia, having seriously defaulted on a sworn obligation, went a step farther; after some years, ignoring altogether the existence of the traety, she put into effect the complete annexation of Georgia. (Article 12 of the treaty provides that any alteration of he agreement could take place only by mutual consent.) This annexation was announced by two manifestos: the first one was published by Emperor Paul on January 18, 1801, and the second one by his successor, Alexander I on September 12th of the same year.

With the issuance of these manifestos Russia had at last dropped all disguises and Russian imperialism was revealed in its true nature, for what it was.

Little by little, over a thirty-year road of retractions and renewals of promises, Russia had led Georgia to the slaughter, finally permitting Persia to destroy her, the easier to be able to appropriate the exhausted and ravished country. This realization of plans which had been devised in Petersburg was a signal triumph of Russian policy.

The ally and co-religionist, whose help had been sought by Georgia to protect her independence, gave Irakli's kingdom the death-blow from behind.

In the beginning of the 19th century—the epoch of the awakening of the shackled nations of Europe to the recognition of their rights to freedom—Russia extinguished the national independence of a two-thousand-year-old nation on the eastern border of Europe, and transformed it into a simple administrative province.

How did the Georgian nation react to this act of annexation? A nation with two milleniums of consecutive history and tradition, with a highly developed civilization, and a strong feeling of self-realization, could not accept without protest this act of violence. Three months after the publication of Emperor Alexander's manifesto there was a revolt in Georgia and then began a fight which lasted for a whole century, with not a single district or village in the country remaining untouched by this struggle, the full history of which will be dealt with in the second part of this article.

*** Louis le Fur, "La Georgie et le droit International," pp. 10, Parisfi 1932.

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